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Abstract 
This thesis examines the writing of individuals whose stance during the Algerian war 
of 1954-62 might broadly be defined as favourable to a process of colonial reform. 
Focusing above all on the integration programme championed by Jacques Soustelle, 
the present study will seek to challenge colonial reformers for their over-generous 
reading of France's colonial past; overturn their claim that they had the consent of the 
Muslim population for their proposals; critique their reading of the European 
population as willing to embrace change; criticise them for replicating many of the 
Eurocentric notions of progress and development associated with the old colonial 
policy of assimilation; and finally, show how in their search for explanations for the 
failure of reform, they failed to appreciate that the dynamics of the colonial system 
prevented its reform. Whilst the proposals of reformers were, for the most part, guided 
by a genuine, if misguided, good will, the thesis will also identify certain areas where 
the attitudes they displayed, and the measures they proposed, fell short of the liberal 
principles which they claimed to uphold. In constructing a critique of the colonial 
reformers' position, the study draws upon the work of anti-colonialists theorists 
writing at the time of the conflict such as Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi and upon 
the assessments of contemporary historians. 
Whilst the territory over which this thesis ranges has been partially mapped, it has not 
been comprehensively so. No previous study has fully analysed the integration 
programme, particularly with the aim of establishing the ways in which it differed 




In general, I have used the term `Muslim' or `indigenous population' to describe the 
Arab and Berber populations of Algeria. I use the terms `settler community', `pieds- 
noirs' and `European population' to describe those inhabitants of Algeria whose 
families trace back to Europe, even where they were third or fourth generation settlers. 
In both cases, the terms are used interchangeably, largely for stylistic reasons. Whilst 
I am aware that, at the time of the conflict, the use of words such as `indigenous' or 
`pied-noir' may well have carried with them political connotations and reflected a 
certain prise de position, it is with the belief that the passage of time has largely 
stripped away most of the significance that is attached to these words that I employ 
them here (in the same way that it is now possible to talk without implying bias of la 
guerre d'Algerie). My use of them is in no way intended to convey an a priori 
judgement. 
IV 
Abbreviations and Notation 
In order to avoid needless repetition of endnotes, I have used a system of 
abbreviations incorporated in the text to refer to those works most often cited. I have 
included separate and full endnotes for the first reference to each of these works in the 
main body of the thesis. Additionally, on those occasions where these works cite 
another speaker or refer to a declaration or broadcast made previous to the time of 
writing, a separate endnote is given. The abbreviations are as follows: 
NA: Chevallier, Jacques, Nous, Algeriens (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1958) 
SR: Fanon, Frantz, Lan V de la revolution algerienne : sociologie dune revolution (Paris: 
Maspero, 1959) 
DT: Fanon, Frantz, Les damnes de la terre, 2"d edition (Paris: Maspero, 1970) [First 
published 1961 with a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre]. All references in this study are to 
the later edition. 
PN: Fanon, Frantz, Peau noire, masques blancs, 2nd edtion (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1975) [First published 1952]. All references in this study are to the later edition. 
PC: Memmi, Albert Portrait du colonise precede du portrait du colonisateur (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1985). [First published Paris: Correa, 1957]. All references in this study are 
to the later edition. 
AS: Soustelle, Jacques, Aimee et souffrante Algerie (Paris: Plon, 1956) 
PT: Soustelle, Jacques, La page nest pas tournde (Paris: Editions de la table ronde, 
1965) 
ET: Soustelle, Jacques, L'Espdrance trahie (1958 -1961) (Mayenne: Editions de I'Alma, 1962) 
DA: Soustelle, Jacques, Le drame alg6rien et la decadence frangaise. R6ponse ä 
Raymond Aron (Paris: Plon, 1957) 
AL: Tillion, Germaine, L'Algdrie en 1957 (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1957) 
*CA: Camus, Albert, Chroniques algeriennes 1939-1958 (Paris: Gallimard, 1958) 
*FR: Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, Face a la raison d'Etat. Un historien dans la guerre d'Algdrie 
(Paris: la D6couverte, 1989) 
*These are works of collected essays. In order to allow a distinction to be made between the different essays, the abbreviation for the title of the collected work following the first reference is used only in the endnotes rather than incorporated in the text. 
Any references following the first to articles cited from Le Bled will be denoted in the 
endnotes by the abbreviation LB. 
V 
Archival Material 
First references to any articles drawn from the archives of the Service Historique de 
1'Armee de Terre [S. H. A. T. ] will contain the full title details, the date of production 
where given, the catalogue number and full title of the dossier within which it has 
been classified unless previous reference has already been made to that dossier in 
which case only the dossier number will be given. Any references following the first 
to a particular article from the archives will contain the title of the article and the 
catalogue number of the dossier from which it is drawn. 
All dossiers stored at the S. H. A. T. consulted in this study begin with the number 1H. 
The acronym is not repeated in the endnotes. 
The full title of the dossiers stored in the archives at the S. H. A. T. are included at the 
start of the bibliography. Individual items cited in the study drawn from these 
dossiers are also incorporated in the bibliography together with the number of the 
dossier from which they are drawn. Owing to the nature of the material, most of these 
articles are listed under the heading of `Works with no specific author'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The historical significance of the passing of Empire can scarcely be overestimated. 
Given the number of personal, commercial and national interests linked with the fate 
of colonialism and the immense significance of the decolonisation process for the 
(ongoing) history of both colonising and colonised countries, debate about what 
colonialism was, and why it ended, is often far from dispassionate. `Decolonisation', 
writes Martin Evans, `revealed the world as fluid, decomposing, recomposing and 
changing and destroyed the historical certainties that underpinned imperialist 
perceptions of the world. " Nowhere were these historical certainties exploded with 
greater force than in Algeria. As Laurent Gervereau, Jean-Pierre Rioux and Benjamin 
Stora comment in the foreword to their 1992 study, the Algerian conflict is not 
amongst those episodes in contemporary history `qu'on peut exposer avec la serenite 
de l'äge et la tranquillite du savoir etabli'. 2 
The armed insurrection which finally brought an end to French rule is generally 
recognised as having begun on 31 October 1954. An extra consignment of French 
troops was despatched to Algeria to quell what was widely perceived to be a sporadic 
outburst of local discontent on the part of a few poorly armed bandits. Algeria was 
legally part of France, its incorporation dating from 1848. Owing to its special status, 
which distinguished it from its neighbours Tunisia and Morocco, there was a great 
deal of reluctance within French military and governmental circles to look upon the 
uprising as a foreign policy or even colonial matter. 
Eight years later, the `bandits' of 1954 had been transformed into the statesmen of 
1962 and the conviction that Algeria was forever French had been shattered. The 
French Army had effected an inglorious withdrawal from Algerian soil, leaving 
behind it an independent state under the control of the Front de Liberation Nationale 
(FLN) 3 In the course of an often brutal combat, huge numbers of men and resources 
had been mobilised by the French against an enemy which could only muster a tiny 
fraction of this force, reports of war atrocities had become commonplace, and under 
the pressure of events in Algeria, France had undergone a political transformation 
which had seen the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the return of General de 
Gaulle from a self-imposed political exile. 
Between the years 1954 and 1962, the struggle for Algeria was not only waged in her 
cities, rural outposts and deserts, but also textually, giving rise to a substantial and 
diverse body of writing comprising books, newspaper and journal articles, tracts, 
petitions and novels. Commentators, both military and civilian, competed for the 
sympathies of policy-makers, soldiers and the general public, seeking to convince 
them that their interventions on the war were just. Much of this writing might be 
broadly described as politically committed, that is to say, it is characterised by partisan 
narratives both in favour of, and opposed to, Algerian independence. In the immediate 
aftermath of the war, Michel Crouzet described the Algerian conflict as `la bataille de 
l'ecrit' 4 Madeleine Reberioux, writing at a later date, employed a similar metaphor, 
observing that `la guerre d'Algerie fut aussi une bataille de mots'. 5 If such metaphors 
perhaps exaggerate the importance of the role played by journalists and intellectuals 
during the war, they remain useful in conveying a sense both of the volume and the 
mutually oppositional nature of the material written at the time. 
The anti-war stance adopted by certain publications and the individuals who wrote for 
them has been charted by David Schalk. Tracing different `cycles of engagement', 
Schalk identifies 1955 as the beginning of a'pedagogic stage' of protest during which 
2 
commentators warned of the grave risks which the nation ran through its continued 
prosecution of the war. The 'moral stage' followed in 1956 in which the condemnation 
of the war was expressed more vigorously. Lastly, in 1957, came the 'counterlegal 
stage' during which individual writers or publications committed or condoned forms 
of protest deemed illegal by the government. 6 Focusing on individual opposition to 
the war, Pierre Vidal-Naquet's classification of protesting intellectuals as dreyfusard, 
bolchevik or tiers-mondiste also provides a useful aid to navigation through the 
minefield of contributors active during the conflict. Whilst dreyfusards condemned 
the war (or the means by which it was being waged) on the grounds that France's 
democratic and republican values were being violated in the process, both bolcheviks 
and tiers-mondistes adopted a more radical contestatory stance. The bolcheviks saw in 
the FLN `une elite revolutionnaire capable de mettre en mouvement les masses 
algeriennes pour les conduire ä la victoire du socialisme' whilst the tiers-mondistes 
viewed the inhabitants of the Third World as `de nouveaux "damnes de la terre" qu'il 
convenait de redimer'. 7 
At the same time, as Raoul Girardet has observed, the considerable body of texts 
favourable to the continuation of the French presence should not be overlooked, even 
though they have received less scholarly scrutiny and no parallel typology to that 
produced by Vidal-Naquet has been offered. 8 Works such as Jacques Soustelle's 
Aimee et souffrante Algerie, Jean-Yves Alquier's Nous avons pacifie Tazalt or 
Christiane Fournier's Nous avons encore des heros are good examples of this pro- 
Algerie francaise writing .9 
The signing of the Evian Accords in 1962 brought no end to the production of this 
litterature engagee. Divisions amongst commentators, much in evidence in the 
`written battle' of the war years, have not been reconciled. The post-war literature 
became, in the words of Stora, a `bataille pour 1'heritage des memoires' typified by 
General Jacques Massu's 1971 work La vraie bataille d'Alger, a frank account of his 
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prominent role in the now infamous 1957 Battle of Algiers. 1° Fiction has also become 
an important battleground for re-fighting the war and keeping alive old enmities. 
Philip Dine has shown the way in which fictional narratives have become a favourite 
medium for `all those with a case to plead or an axe to grind'. 11 The period since 1962 
has also given rise to a certain amount of academic writing about the war. Whilst not 
devoid of a certain prise de position, this writing is more self-consciously balanced 
than the polemical accounts. In this category, mention might be made of La guerre 
d'Algerie et les Francais edited by Jean- Pierre Rioux which collates the contributions 
made during the 1988 conference organised by the Institut d'Histoire du Temps 
Present. 12 In the English language, one thinks of Alistair Home's weighty tome A 
Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 or John Talbott's The War Without a Name: 
France in Algeria, 1954-1962.13 
So great is the cumulative effect of all the various types of writing about Algeria that 
Stora has referred to a `veritable avalanche de l'ecrit ä propos de la guerre d'Algerie'. '4 
He calculates that between 1960 and 1990, nearly 2000 publications appeared on the 
war. 15 His own dictionary of the books dealing with the conflict published between 
1955 and 1995 is not only a valuable research tool but testimony to the depth of 
interest generated by this subject. 16 In similar vein, Dine, Rioux, and Patrick Eveno 
and Jean Planchais have all drawn attention to the burgeoning corpus of material 
dedicated to the conflict. " 
The Colonial Reformer 
From amongst the polemical writing, it is possible to identify a group of writers whose 
position might broadly be defined as favourable to a process of colonial reform. 
Colonial reformers, as we wish to term them here, were a heterogeneous grouping 
made up of politicians such as Jacques Soustelle, intellectuals such as Albert Camus 
and Germaine Tillion, and even factions within the French Army. Despite the 
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differences in profession, background, political allegiance and intellectual 
sophistication which existed between them, the underlying principles which governed 
the reformers' stance on the war were sufficiently similar for us to group them 
together in this study under a collective label. Reformers believed in what Dine has 
termed, `an improvable colonialism' or what Stora has called `un colonialisme de 
progres' based on the notion that it was incumbent upon the French to `guider les 
peuples vers le bonheur'. 18 According to reformers, a revised and, in their eyes, 
improved version of France's traditional civilising mission, able to turn a dominance- 
dependence relationship between coloniser and colonised into a partnership of equals, 
constituted both a liberal and achievable resolution to the Algerian conflict. 
Laying claim to a democratic heritage inspired by the 1789 Declaration des droits de 
1'homme et du citoyen, reformers claimed to support tolerance, equality, the right of 
national self-determination, and peaceful co-existence between peoples of different 
ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds. It was in the name of these principles that 
they attempted to justify the retention of French sovereignty over Algeria. 
Underpinning their position was the belief that as long as the French were sincere in 
their reforming intentions, Algeria's Muslim population would (still) aspire to play a 
full role within the French national community. For this reason, liberal principles and 
the prolongation of French rule were not, in their eyes, incompatible. 
A number of other themes frequently featured in the writing of reformers. Whilst 
disputing the claims of Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Memmi that French colonialism 
was, by definition, exploitative, reformers nonetheless held that it had been deficient 
with regard to the Muslims who were supposed to benefit from it. This situation, they 
believed, could be remedied. Reformers claimed that the European settlers would be 
prepared to accept a series of measures designed to bring to an end the privileged 
status which they had historically enjoyed. These measures were grounded in a 
particular conception of modernity and progress which held that the industrial 
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development of Algeria constituted a `good' and which, on the political front, 
assumed the universal applicability of the Western model of parliamentary democracy. 
The implementation of these measures was essential since, reformers argued, Algeria 
could not survive without French assistance. As a necessary corollary to this position, 
they asserted that the financial burden of the proposed transformation of Algeria 
could, should and would be borne by the people of Metropolitan France. Finally, once 
it had become abundantly clear that Algeria was to become independent, Soustelle in 
particular, attributed the failure of reform to a number of 'scapegoats', with General de 
Gaulle the principal target for his ire. 
Through a detailed examination of the writing of these colonial reformers, the present 
study highlights the flaws in the proposals which they expounded. Our analysis will 
seek to attack reformers for their over-generous reading of France's colonial past; 
question their conviction that they had the consent of the Muslim population; 
challenge their reading of the European population as willing to embrace change; 
critique them for replicating many of the Eurocentric notions of progress and 
development associated with the old colonial policy of assimilation; and finally, show 
how in their elaboration of `scapegoat stories', they failed to appreciate that their own 
proposals were inherently flawed. Whilst some of the proposals of reformers were, for 
the most part, guided by a genuine, if misguided, good will, the thesis will also 
identify those occasions where the attitudes they displayed, and the measures they 
proposed, fell short of the liberal principles which they claimed to uphold. In 
constructing a critique of the colonial reformers' position, the study draws upon the 
work of radical anti-colonialists writing at the time of the conflict such as Frantz 
Fanon and Albert Memmi, and upon the assessments of historians such as Tony Smith 
who have written with the outcome of the conflict already known. 
Our critique is necessarily a retrospective one undertaken at a time when Algerian 
independence is a political reality and the era of formal colonial control is all but over. 
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Whilst the French are generally perceived to have played the mauvais role and the 
position of the reformers now seems anachronistic, this marks a considerable 
evolution from the time of the conflict itself. 19 Smith has highlighted the existence of 
a 'colonial consensus' on the positive benefits of Empire emerging in France towards 
the latter part of the nineteenth century and continuing throughout the Fourth 
Republic. 20 That France had played a benevolent role in her colonies and that she 
should remain there were amongst the assumptions which together formed the 
conventional wisdom framing colonial policy, what David Chuter in another context 
would describe as a `meta-strategy. 21 The existence of a consensus over Algeria is 
affirmed by Girardet in his personal testimony included in Rioux and Jean-Francois 
Sirinelli's study, La guerre d'Algerie et les intellectuels francais. He sees the end of 
1960, a time when the official position had shifted to favour Algerian independence, 
as heralding a sea-change in the political climate within which writing on the Algerian 
war was produced. Until this time, those who wrote in favour of the continuation of 
the French presence were very much in accordance with the official line: 'L'audace et 
le courage sont de l'autre bord, il faut bien le reconnaltre: ce sont eux les 
contestataires. i22 Although Charles-Robert Ageron's analysis of opinion polls 
conducted throughout the war suggests that popular opinion had become, at best, 
lukewarm about French military efforts to preserve Algeria well before the end of 
1960, Girardet's analysis is correct to the extent that France's political and intellectual 
classes, with some notable exceptions, had been reluctant to concede that Algeria 
should be granted her independence until this time 23 
Amongst the various plans for colonial reform, the one upon which this study 
concentrates is integration. The integration programme was launched by Soustelle 
following his appointment to the post of Governor-General of Algeria in January 
1955. It was a programme fully committed to the maintenance of French control over 
Algeria on a territorial level, since Algeria was legally a French province, whilst at the 
same time it purported to respect the cultural, linguistic and religious differences 
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which gave Algeria its own `personality'. On the political level, integration proposed 
equal rights and responsibilities for all cultural groups within Algeria which 
effectively meant that all Muslims would become fully-fledged French citizens. These 
measures were to be combined with policies aimed at promoting convergence between 
living standards in France and Algeria, implying a far-reaching transformation of the 
largely agrarian and low per capita income Algerian economy. Integration, in the 
words of Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever, `reposait sur le double postulat de la totale 
appartenance de 1'Algerie ä la France et de 1'originalite algerienne, notamment dans 
les domaines linguistique, culturel et religieux. En quelque sorte, 1'egalite des droits 
dans le respect de la difference. '24 
Our reasons for privileging integration over other proposals for colonial reform in this 
study are, in part, a reflection of the place which it occupied during the war. Although 
endorsed only fleetingly and without great conviction by governments of the Fourth 
Republic, integration was, nevertheless, the reform plan which was given most airing 
during the conflict. It was overtly championed by the politically-active elements of the 
Army during the turmoil of May 1958 and, although the word itself was never actually 
pronounced, integration appeared to be de Gaulle's policy until he pointedly distanced 
himself from it during his speech on Algerian self-determination of 16 September 
1959. Furthermore, although all plans for colonial reform were, in our view, destined 
to fail owing to the mistaken nature of the reformers' assumptions about the 
motivations and aspirations of the various players in the Algerian conflict, the study 
will suggest that, from within the logic of the reformers' position, integration was the 
most intellectually coherent of the reform strategies available to the French and 
therefore the most worthy of a comprehensive treatment here. 
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Contribution to the field 
In 1957 Albert Memmi produced his seminal critique of colonialism Portrait du 
colonise, precede du portrait du colonisateur. Central to this work was his conception 
of the colonisateur de bonne volonte, an individual seeking the reform of colonialism 
along liberal lines but whose impact upon the colonial situation was negligible since 
he could neither change the attitudes of his fellow settlers nor those of the colonised25 
Memmi's portrait is an excellent likeness of the colonial reformer. Several key themes 
of reformers' writing have also been discussed in academic studies. In this context, 
mention might be made of Rita Maran's work on torture and human rights or Kristin 
Ross' study of the social and economic changes occurring in France throughout the 
duration of the Algerian war. 26 Many of the themes which we cover here have also 
preoccupied the producers of fictional writing on the Algerian war, as Dine's study 
shows. 27 However, whilst the territory over which this thesis ranges has been partially 
mapped, it has not been comprehensively so. Neither the theoretical work of a figure 
like Memmi nor any subsequent academic study has fully analysed the integration 
programme, particularly with the aim of establishing the ways in which it differed 
from a policy of assimilation, or considered at length the ideas of its chief architect, 
Jacques Soustelle. 
As a prominent parliamentary figure during the Fourth Republic and, crucially, as 
Governor-General of Algeria between January 1955 and January 1956, Soustelle was, 
arguably, the individual who was most closely involved in the elaboration of the 
integration programme and who wrote about it in the most detail. He is widely 
credited with having coined the term, although when interviewed in 1988 he claimed 
that it was provided for him by Mendes-France28 
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Soustelle was intimately linked with the events that led to the overthrow of the Fourth 
Republic as a leading agitator in the Gaullist camp. Upon his return to Algeria at the 
time of the coup of May 1958, he was arguably the most popular amongst the parade 
of civilian and military figures who addressed the assembled masses in the capital and 
throughout the country. Despite being one of the key players in securing de Gaulle's 
return to power, he went on to become one of the staunchest opponents of the 
General's Algerian policy as it moved progressively towards the acceptance of 
Algerian independence. Ultimately, he was forced into exile through his association 
with the settler terrorist group, the Organisation Armee Secrete (OAS). He produced 
four main works on the Algerian war. The first of these was Aimee et souffrante 
Algerie written about his period of office as Governor-General and published in 1956. 
This work dealt primarily with the provisions of the integration programme. It was 
followed in 1957 by Le drame algerien et la decadence francaise: Reponse a 
Raymond Aron, his response to Aron's treatise in favour of French withdrawal from 
Algeria By the time he came to write his 1961 work 1'Esperance trahie, Algeria was 
virtually independent. This work and, to a lesser extent his 1965 work, La page n'est 
pas tournee, reviewed the position which he had articulated throughout the conflict 
and criticised de Gaulle's shifting Algerian policy as a betrayal of the integration 
programme. 29 
For a figure who played such a prominent role in the Algerie francaise camp, 
Soustelle has received surprisingly little detailed critical attention. By virtue of his 
involvement in the conflict, he figures in every historical account yet his major works 
are rarely analysed at length. An ethnographer by training, having published an 
academic study of Aztec civilisation, he is a surprising omission from Rioux and 
Sirinelli's edited work on intellectual engagement during the war although, according 
to most conventional definitions, he is certainly worthy of a place amongst the ranks 
of the Intelligentsia. 
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Overlooked as a subject of academic study, Soustelle has perhaps also fallen victim to 
a number of over-generalisations regarding the evolution of his thinking during the 
course of the conflict. For Schalk, Soustelle underwent a marked change of attitude 
due to the intoxicating effect of living in Algeria: 
Like many who came before him, the natural beauty and particular ambience of Algeria 
went to his head -1 Algerie montait a la fete was the phrase often used... Soustelle 
abandoned his liberalism in 1955 and moved 180 degrees politically, under circumstances 
that have never fully been elucidated. 30 
Greeted with suspicion if not outright hostility upon his appointment as Governor- 
General by the settlers who considered him to be too much of a reformer, Soustelle 
was feted as their idol when his spell in office came to an end twelve months later. 
The most frequently cited explanation for this shift in stance is that, appalled at the 
FLN-led massacre of Europeans at Philippeville in 1955, Soustelle was converted to a 
much harder line. 31 Upon appointing Soustelle to a minor ministerial role, de Gaulle 
was criticised by Jean-Marie Domenach for having `donne au fascisme algerien un 
poste-cle pour le contröle de 1'opinion francaise' 32 Soustelle remains, however, a 
deeply ambiguous figure. Whilst at times he seemed to articulate an agenda which 
borrowed significantly from the ultras, he cannot simply be condemned as a champion 
of illiberalism since he was undoubtedly in favour of reform. In this ambiguity, he was 
not atypical of reformers in general, if, on occasions, a little more extreme in his 
views. His continued insistence, even after Philippeville, that the destruction of the 
FLN and prolongation of Algerie francaise had to be backed by new rights for the 
Muslims means, however, that the notion of a sudden change in his attitudes towards 
the rebellion, transforming him from suspected bradeur to darling of the pieds-noirs, 
is misleading. If one accepts at face value the view that the settlers were generally 
hostile to reform, then their rapprochement with Soustelle must be attributed as much 
to a misunderstanding on their part over the extent to which he wished to defend the 
colonial status quo as it was to a change of heart on his. 
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Alongside Soustelle, this study also considers a number of anonymous figures from 
within the French military whose writing has not previously been subjected to detailed 
critical analysis. The documentation produced by the French Army remains, as yet, a 
largely untapped source of primary data. Most historical studies of the Army's role in 
the conflict predate the availability of this material, much of it stored in the military 
archives at Vincennes and only released for public consultation in 1992 to coincide 
with the thirtieth anniversary of the end of the war. Whilst it is not our intention to 
present the thoughts of, say, an historically unknown sergeant as representative of the 
Army as a whole, the study seeks to provide a modest contribution to the elucidation 
of the material relating to those branches of the Army most closely linked to the 
reform process. These were the Cinqufeme Bureau, the branch of its operations 
assigned the specific responsibility for the production and dissemination of 
propaganda, and the Sections Administratives Specialisees, units set up by Soustelle 
with the aim of providing a humane face to the French Army's attempt to eradicate the 
rebellion and entrusted with implementing economic and social change at a grassroots 
level. 
Other figures cast in supporting roles to Soustelle in this study include the 
ethnographer and his one-time collaborator in Algeria, Germaine Tillion, the hard- 
liner turned pro-reform mayor of Algiers, Jacques Chevallier, and Albert Camus. As 
an intellectual `giant' of the twentieth-century, Camus' political thought has been 
widely discussed, Tillion and Chevallier much less so. If their contributions are 
accorded limited treatment here this is firstly due to the fact that they were less 
prolific on the subject of Algeria than Soustelle and secondly because their proposals 
for colonial reform were less fully worked out. In the case of Camus, his self-imposed 
silence on the Algerian question from 1958 onwards and his untimely death in 1960 
have deprived us of his opinion on some of the key moments in the conflict. 
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History and Text 
This thesis largely deals with text. Using the accounts of the colonial reformers as our 
primary source material, this thesis not only judges the consistency of the measures 
which the reformers proposed against the values which they claimed to defend, but 
also seeks to explain why their proposals were bound to fail. In order to arrive at such 
judgements, it draws on other textual accounts of the conflict which offer competing 
assessments to those offered by the reformers. Included amongst these are a number of 
studies written by academic historians. Whilst it is not our intention to embark upon a 
lengthy discussion about the theoretical aspects concerning the nature of historical 
'truth' and how such truths might be conveyed textually, some understanding is 
required of the way in which the rival textual mediations consulted relate to each other 
and to the war itself. 
Much of the primary source material written by activists such as Soustelle has a dual 
function as both historical artefact in its own right and as report on an unfolding 
historical process. Although occasionally produced for a reader sharing the same 
vision as the author, a good deal of this politically committed writing was conceived 
with the express purpose of persuading an uncommitted reader of the veracity of one 
particular interpretation of the conflict. The vast majority of the material produced by 
the French Army was propaganda, designed to serve a persuasive function in a 
conflict in which it was widely held in French military circles that the key to the 
conflict lay in winning `hearts and minds', and in which the text itself could be 
considered as a weapon. 
It is our belief that the academic (historical) accounts of the war differ from these 
polemical representations of the conflict insofar as they respect certain rules of 
scholarship (such as the need to provide documentary evidence) and as a consequence 
of the intellectual honesty and integrity which the professional historian maintains in 
the construction of the text. As such, these accounts offer a more self-consciously 
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balanced view. Even in the absence of any single reality about the world or absolute 
standard against which to judge textual representations of it, this thesis works on the 
understanding that `knowledge' about the past is nevertheless possible and some 
accounts can be considered `better' representations than others based upon a 
consultation of documentary evidence. If we are not prepared to go even this far, we 
end up in a theoretical impasse in which all texts have equal and consequently no 
value. As Christopher Norris has convincingly argued, when `truth' and `history' are 
reduced to purely discursive concepts, the `real world' political consequences are 
particularly dangerous. 33 
The only proviso is that the scholarly account and the work of propaganda must both 
be approached with a constant awareness that the text is a cultural artefact and that the 
writer has a series of preoccupations, conscious and unconscious, anchored in the 
values and norms of the society in which the work is produced and dependent upon 
the imprecisions of language. Firstly, historians are not impartial custodians of truth, 
nor is their work the ultimate arbiter between competing representations of 
colonialism to be found in, say, the writing of Soustelle and Fanon. The guidelines of 
the academic profession cannot prescribe a method of operation so strict that the 
historian is placed in a methodological straitjacket which totally constrains his/her 
own voice. 
The 'inevitable bias' attached to any piece of historical writing is perhaps heightened 
in the case of the Algerian war given that relatively little time has elapsed since the 
end of the conflict. The temporal and spatial separation between the author and the 
events in question which provide the historian with a certain 'critical distance' are, in 
this case, often missing. Many of those involved in studying the war in their 
professional capacity as academics also personally experienced the events of the war 
and were often politically active for or against independence. To draw upon two 
particularly striking examples, Pierre Vidal-Naquet and Raoul Girardet have both 
14 
written about the war in their capacity as professional historians; indeed, both have 
produced typologies as a way of classifying forms of engagement during the 
conflict. 4 Yet both figures were also activists, working for opposing causes and, in 
the case of Vidal-Naquet, liable for incorporation within his own categorisation of the 
conflict. 35 This ambiguous status has provoked conflicting responses in the two 
individuals concerned. Conceiving of the historian as `temoin de la verite', Vidal- 
Naquet does not view his professional training and his political engagement as 
contradictory. The secondary title of his work Face ä la raison d'Etat is un historien 
dans la guerre d'Algerie. His investigations, he claims, were undertaken with a 
constant awareness of'I'eminente dignite de ma profession', causing him to verify all 
the facts which he brought into the public domain and to retain a necessary `distance 
reflexive' between himself and the object of his enquiry. 36 
For Girardet, by way of contrast, there is an unease at the duality of his role which, as 
he admits, underpins his contribution to Rioux and Sirinelli's study. In his eyes, the 
individual activist [temoin] views events from a personal, and necessarily limited, 
horizon which, however honest his/her representation of the conflict, remains `marque 
par le poids des fidelites, des refus, des amertumes'. Since he views it as incumbent 
upon the historian to attempt to incorporate the individual perception of the conflict 
into a wider ensemble, he concludes, `Il est donc bien incommode d'etre a la foil 
historien et temoin, et je ne pretendrai pas concilier ä tout prix les deux r6les. i37 
Vidal-Naquet is accepted as being an eminent historian whose work is scrupulously 
documented. Nevertheless, Girardet's remarks highlight the fact that the historians 
writing about the conflict often have a personal agenda, one which cannot be 
completely detached from their professional role. 
When seeking to establish the status which is to be accorded to text in this study, we 
must also be aware that the writing of both the polemicist and the historian is more 
than simply the revelation of a conscious prise de position. A case can be made that 
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we are bound in a network of discourses, intimately tied up with power and 
knowledge, which are beyond our capacity to comprehend or to change. The writer 
cannot, in any sense, be `outside' society, imbued with a kind of cultural and historical 
weightlessness which allows access to some higher `truth'. In other words, what is 
considered significant is a function of what is considered worthy of measurement at 
the moment of writing and within the society in which the text is produced. However, 
as we stated earlier, recognition of the cultural and historical specificity of any text, 
and indeed, our own culturally and historically determined standpoint as readers, 
should not be evoked as a reason for setting out the impossibility of any judgement 
provided we approach the text with a certain vigilance regarding its conditions of 
production. 
This same vigilance should also be extended to the present study since in its treatment 
of the relationship between the Algerian war and the writing about it, it is clearly not 
innocent. Even where it wishes to show the existence of conflicting analyses as they 
have been constituted across a disparate corpus of materials, the present study is 
involved in the process of selecting and reading texts, deciding which of them offers a 
more plausible explanation of the conflict and, on the basis of this operation, 
generating its own 'narrative'. As such, this work is not merely an overview of a 
debate about the reformability of colonialism but is itself a participant in it, and is 
subject to many of the same factors governing its production as the sources which it 
considers. It is for this reason that the term `(re)interpreting' has been included in the 
title since it suggests the nature of the relationship between the present study, the 
sources consulted and the Algerian war in itself. 
Finally, it is appropriate to mention the position from which this thesis passes 
judgement on the colonial reformers and, in particular, the charge that they were guilty 
of Eurocentric attitudes in their plans for the transformation of Algeria. In the same 
way that Soustelle and the colonial reformers sought to move beyond assimilation by 
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offering the new goal of integration, might it not be argued that the present study 
merely offers one more version of Western imperialist discourse about the colonial 
experience of the Algerian people? It is a dilemma neatly encapsulated by Norris: 
How can `we' (on our own terms) 'enlightened' and `progressive' secular intellectuals 
presume to speak on behalf of [a] wider community without laying claim to a universal 
wisdom that suppresses difference and thus writes another chapter in the violent history of 
Western ethnocentrism? 39 
The work of Edward Said and, in particular, his 1994 work Representations of the 
Intellectual can be seen to offer a defence of our position. 39 Attacking the `endless 
talk about Judeo-Christian values, Afrocentric values, Muslim truths, Eastern truths, 
Western truths, each providing a complete program for excluding all the others', Said 
laments the fact that the `result is an almost complete absence of universals'(pp. 67-8), 
defining universality as: 
taking a risk in order to go beyond the easy certainties provided us by our background, 
language, nationality, which so often shield us from the realities of others. It also means 
looking for and trying to uphold a single standard for human behaviour when it comes to 
such matters as foreign and social policy. (p. xii) 
The extent to which it is possible to talk about universals in any meaningful way 
without simply articulating our own culturally specific values is, of course, an issue to 
which Said remains highly sensitised. Indeed, Said himself has done as much as any 
thinker to show the way in which imperial powers transformed their belief in the 
universality of their message into a vast Empire of world domination. The rhetoric 
produced by political leaders, he points out, often suggests that "`our" values 
(whatever those may happen to be) are in fact universal'(p. 68). If this critique of 
Western hegemonic pretensions would be taken for granted by most contemporary 
exponents of postcolonial or literary theory, Said, nevertheless, writes of a `truly vast 
array of opportunities despite postmodernism'(pp. 13-4). 40 This vast array of 
opportunities seems to lie precisely in charting a path between the two extremes of 
seeing everything in terms of the local situations and power structures and the blithe 
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assumption that the dominant discourse of any given society has any axiomatic 
universal relevance. It is in accordance with the strategy advanced by Said in 
Representations of the Intellectual with his emphasis on tolerance, justice and racial 
non-discrimination as universals, whilst at the same time recognising the potential for 
universality to serve as a cover for cultural exploitation and the imposition of one's 




QUESTIONS TO THE REFORMERS 
Around four months after taking up his position as Governor-General of Algeria in 
February 1955, Jacques Soustelle sent a communique to Edgar Faure (the head of the 
ruling coalition of the Fourth Republic at the time) setting out the components of his 
integration programme: 
L'integration suppose: 
a. Que 1'Algerie est une province ayant sa physionomie, sa `personnalito' particuli6res, 
notamment sur le plan culturel, linguistique et religieux. 
b. Que l'6conomie, l'industrie et la monnaie de I'Algerie devront etre compl8tement 
fusionn8es avec celles de la metropole (... ) 
c. Sur le plan politique, complete egalite de droits et de devoirs. ' 
It was Algeria's Muslim inhabitants who were intended to be the chief beneficiaries of 
these measures. Since, in the vast majority of cases, they were poorer than the 
European settlers and the inhabitants of Metropolitan France, integration offered 
extensive economic assistance; since they enjoyed fewer of the benefits of French 
citizenship, integration promised new political rights; and since they had a different 
cultural and religious identity, integration proposed to respect their particular 
`personality'. 
Although never challenging France's right to rule in Algeria, other advocates of 
colonial reform wrote about, and campaigned for, similar versions of this `new deal' 
for Muslims. Whilst there were political differences and nuances of opinion between 
writers and activists who broadly favoured colonial reform, Soustelle's project 
captured the essence of their thinking. 
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The integration project was, in part, launched in response to the pressing political and 
military imperatives placed upon the French following the outbreak of the rebellion in 
1954. The victor, it was widely believed, would be the side that managed to win the 
'hearts and minds' of the Muslim population. At the same time, the proposals for 
reform submitted by Soustelle were made in the context of an enduring French 
presence which was already a century and a quarter long. Reformers were aware that 
they were not acting in an historical vacuum; before they could talk about the future, 
they had to re-read the past. Inscribed within their strategies were a whole series of 
assumptions about the specifics of the 125-year-long French presence in Algeria and 
about colonialism in general. Whilst a comprehensive portrait of reformers' thinking 
will emerge over the course of this study when we examine their writing in more 
detail, the purpose of this chapter is to generate a series of accusations or challenges to 
be put to them as the basis for a more rigorous examination of their belief system. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of France's mission civilisatrice, a set of ideas 
often articulated in pro-colonial discourse to provide a moral justification for the work 
of empire building in which the French had been engaged and in which reformers' 
ideas were rooted. The second section surveys in brief the results of French 
colonialism, highlighting the extent of the discrimination which Muslims suffered 
during the period of French rule. It seeks to show that, even if considered on its own 
terms as a genuine attempt to improve the lives of those upon whom it was visited, 
France's civilising mission must be deemed to be a failure. 
Whilst the `faux modele de la Republique'2 that was colonial Algeria did indeed 
contain political, economic and cultural indicators of a very real disparity between 
civilising rhetoric and the reality of French occupation, the nature of the'gap' between 
them is far from straightforward in the colonial context. The third section provides a 
brief survey of the ideas of -anti-colonial thinkers writing around the time of the 
Algerian war (Sartre, Memmi, Fanon) and, to a lesser extent, of historians writing 
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after 1962. These writers accounted for the disparity between rhetoric and reality by 
asserting that colonialism was, by definition, an immobile system of domination 
which did not allow for the transformation of the colonised. Drawing upon the same 
writers, the fourth section considers their argument that the nature of the colonial 
system was such that the colonised was compelled to rebel against it. The final section 
looks at the economic arguments for decolonisation as advanced by Raymond Aron, 
amongst others, who argued that there was little political will within mainland France 
to fund a process of widespread reform in Algeria. 
The Civilising Mission 
Assumptions of European Superiority 
Attitudes towards imperial expansion in France and Britain, writes Edward Said, were 
characterised by `virtual unanimity that subject races should be ruled, that they are 
subject races, that one race deserves and has consistently earned the right to be 
considered the race whose main mission is to expand beyond its own domain'. 
Scholars of French imperialism such as Girardet and Ageron, whilst noting that 
imperial `France' was not a unitary actor and that was there no absolute homogeneity 
of thought amongst those who advocated colonialism, have highlighted the extent to 
which the speeches made by supporters of French colonialism reveal a vocabulary 
permeated by notions of European supremacy and their duty to rule over the `inferior' 
peoples to be found in Africa and Asia. 
France's self-appointed mission civilisatrice justified the conquest and retention of 
overseas territories on the grounds that the nation had a duty to export the values of 
her political system, culture, expertise and patronage to what were perceived to be 
backward regions of the world. This mission presupposed the superiority of Western, 
and specifically French, forms of development and social organisation, favouring 
individual property rights over traditional concepts of communal ownership of land, 
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and settled communities over nomadic patterns of living. Drawing its rationale from 
the discourse of the Enlightenment, it took as given the universality of Western 
notions of science, medicine, education and progress and largely scorned the 
traditional knowledge and practices of indigenous societies. As Masao Miyoshi puts 
it: `This eighteenth-century universalism is part of the philosophy of progress and 
evolution that endorsed the nineteenth-century imperialism of the West. '5 
Employing an `inside-outside' paradigm to describe imperialist thinking, the 
American geographer James M. Blaut explains that, for colonialists, Europe and North 
America formed the 'inside', perceived as the location of all that was innovative, 
modem and developmental, whereas other countries were part of the 'outside', 
advancing more slowly and viewed as able only to copy the ideas originating in the 
'inside'. 6 Blaut outlines opposing characteristics which, according to accepted imperial 
orthodoxy, separated the advanced `inside' from the primitive `outside': 
Inside Outside 
Inventiveness Imitativeness 
Rationality, intellect Irrationality, emotion, instinct 
Abstract thought Concrete thought 
Theoretical reasoning Empirical, practical reasoning 






Of course, this belief in European supremacy did not go unchallenged within France 
and within the territories subjected to French rule. By way of example, one might cite 
the intellectual resistance to French hegemonic pretensions brought by the negritude 
movement which flourished in the 1930s with Leopold Senghor and Aime Cesaire its 
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principal exponents. These writers sought to subvert the coloniser's hierarchy of 
values by attributing positive value to those aspects of colonial society deemed 
inferior according to Western conceptions of economic development and social 
behaviour. 8 This proved to be a double-edged sword because, although critical of 
colonialism, at the same time it validated the coloniser's racially-inspired binary 
division of the world. As Wole Soyinka has argued: 
Negritude stayed within a pre-set system of Eurocentric intellectual analysis of both man 
and his society, and tried to re-define the African and his society in those externalised 
terms. 9 
Blaut's own work can be conceptualised as an attempt to find a way out of this 
dilemma. His intention is to explain the characteristics that allowed European powers 
to conquer and rule distant lands (rather than the other way). He maintains that there 
were no cultural, natural or scientific reasons to account for it, challenging the notion 
that European civilisation `has had some unique historical advantage, some special 
quality of race or culture or environment or spirit of mind, which gives this human 
community a permanent superiority over all other communities, at all times in history 
and down to the present'. 10 The belief system which ascribed primacy to European 
civilisation and which fostered the ideology of colonialism is deconstructed and 
replaced with Blaut's own version of the nineteenth-century notion of the 'psychic 
unity of mankind' which ascribed equal potential for inventiveness and innovation to 
all peoples (p. 12). 
The year 1492 is an important date for him. Europe, he argues, enjoyed no 
developmental advantages over African and Asian societies at this time. Any 
ascendancy which Europe gained post-1492 can be attributed specifically to the flow 
of wealth into the continent generated by the colonisation of America. This conferred 
an enormous advantage upon European powers which allowed them to overtake Asia 
and Africa in terms of material development and, ultimately, to colonise them 
(pp. 152-3). Despite certain inconsistencies in the argument, Blaut's narrative does 
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provide a theory which presents European dominance over Africa and Asia as itself 
dependent upon, and explicable in terms of, an earlier colonisation. 11 It thereby 
challenges, albeit retrospectively, the claims of nineteenth century colonialists to a 
natural right to rule. 
Unfortunately, Blaut's somewhat mystical-sounding notions of the `psychic unity of 
mankind' did not enjoy much currency at the time of colonial expansion. The 
technological advantage which the European imperial powers enjoyed over the 
territories which they would go on to conquer was almost certainly instrumental both 
in creating, and then in reinforcing, the received wisdom of the Metropolitan centres 
regarding the non-white inhabitants of the globe. Precisely because European 
countries had undergone a more extensive process of development than countries in 
Africa and Asia, giving them an economic and technological ascendancy which 
allowed them to expand territorially, they felt superior. As Said comments, `Europe 
did command the world; the imperial map did license the cultural vision' (his 
emphasis). 12 As he illustrates both in Orientalism and in Culture and Imperialism, this 
became a self-reinforcing process in which the representation of the non-European 
`Other' in everything from anthropological studies, through the works of little known 
travel writers to some of the canonical texts of Western European literature, served to 
reinforce dominant cultural stereotypes in the West. 13 
`Savages' into Frenchmen 
In order to describe the process by which supporters of imperialism assumed 
`progress' and `civilisation' moved across the world from the European centre to the 
non-European periphery, Blaut uses the term diffusionism. Summarising the essence 
of diffusionist thinking, he writes: 
Colonialism, including settler colonialism, brings civilization to non-Europe; (it) is in fact 
the natural way that the non-European world advances out of its stagnation, backwardness 
and traditionalism. 14 
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Whereas the belief in the inherent superiority of the European powers provided no 
more than a Darwinian justification for colonialism in the name of the right of the 
stronger, the professed interest in the diffusionist aspect of imperialism as `purveyor 
of progress' allowed colonialism to appear legitimate to those whose ideological 
persuasions might more logically have led them to oppose it. It permitted them to 
resolve, in their own minds at least, the contradiction which lay at the very heart of the 
civilising mission: whilst the French promised to spread democracy, civil liberties and 
individual rights to the far-flung corners of the globe, it was only through violating 
these very principles on the back of French military conquest and through the initial 
subjugation of other peoples to French rule that the civilising mission could begin. 
Hiding this contradiction entailed a neat juggling trick recognised by Fanon, who, 
whilst condemning the attitude of the Western bourgeoisie towards the colonised as a 
dehumanising `racisme de mepris', nonetheless saw that the promise of equality was 
the way in which colonial ideology `se debrouille pour rester logique avec elle-meme 
en invitant les sous-hommes ä s'humaniser ä travers le type d'humanite occidental 
qu'elle incarne'. 15 
Girardet has observed that French imperialism was underpinned by a discourse which 
held that the extension of French sovereignty and all it brought with it could only be 
beneficial for those to whom it was extended. Whilst a certain pride was taken in 
imperial conquests, Girardet stresses that raising the French flag over new lands was 
equally `le symbole d'une certaine forme de civilisation, d'une conception de 1'homme, 
de tout un ensemble de valeurs spirituelles'. The French saw themselves as marked 
out by Providence to play a special civilising role, driven by `la conviction que 
l'etablissement de la suzerainete francaise ne peut qu'etre eminemment bienfaisante 
pour les peuples sur lesquels eile s'etend'. 16 The final stage in this transformative 
process was assimilation; through French generosity, the colonial subjects would 
gradually be transformed into Frenchmen and women. French imperialism was thus 
animated by a rhetoric which Jack Hayward has labelled a kind of `cultural self- 
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confidence' which assumed that France could convert any nation in the world into 
French citizens. '7 
Faith in France's imperial vocation united republicans and the Catholic Church with 
the result that, as Michel Winock has pointed out, France was `doublement 
missionnaire, au nom des Lumieres et au nom de la foi chretienne'. 18 This was 
remarkable in the sense that Church and Republic were so often the bitterest enemies 
over the principle of laicite, although more understandable when we consider that the 
ideal of converting `savages' was common both to the missionary and the pro-colonial 
republican. Even Socialists, with Jaures the most frequently cited example, saw no 
absolute contradiction between the retention of a colonial Empire and France's claim 
to promote freedom, democracy and the cause of the oppressed. As Winock puts it: 
Aux yeux d'un Jaures, adversaire de 1'imperialisme, la colonisation francaise n'etait pas 
perverse en soi: eile contribuait ä civiliser, eile etait une etape du progres humain, pourvu 
quelle soit convaincue de ce devoir. 19 
A further example of the complicity of the Left with France's civilising mission can be 
seen in the attitude of Claude Bourdet. Although he was to become one of the leading 
activists in the anti-colonial lobby during the course of the Algerian war, Bourdet 
admitted to having taken a long time to become aware that the notion of the inherent 
superiority of French values could be challenged. As he was to comment in an 
interview conducted in October 1978: 
Les hommes de gauche de ma generation ne percevaient pas le probleme colonial. J'ai passe 
toutes les annees de la Resistance sans songer une seconde ä I'emancipation des peuples 
colonises. L'idee qu'ils puissent aspirer A autre chose qu'ä titre francais me paraissait 
incongrue. 20 
Bourdet's recognition of the Left's failure to conceive of French colonialism as 
problematic reveals another component element of the civilising mission - the belief 
that the French were welcomed by the native population. Bourdet explains the 
lingering confidence in the magnanimity of the French colonial enterprise by pointing 
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out that by the time of the Algerian war, the benevolence of French intentions had 
been written into France's cultural history: `Pendant cent cinquante ans, les petits 
Francais ont continue ä apprendre quel role genereux et civilisateur jouait la France. 21 
It is a point confirmed by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle who observes that for many 
generations French schoolchildren were not only taught that the Empire contributed to 
French power and prestige but equally `that the French were better colonisers than 
others, that the Blacks and Africans liked and welcomed them'. 2 
The `Harmony of Interests' 
In order to give some indication of the context in which the ideology of the civilising 
mission was elaborated, it should be emphasised that those colonial supporters who 
professed their faith in France's great humanitarian vocation to spread her values 
across the world did not reject the additional benefits which colonialism might bring. 
The writing of pro-colonial Frenchmen from around 1870 onwards in the wake of 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian war revealed a number of different motivations for the 
acquisition and maintenance of an overseas Empire. Surveying the decade from 1871- 
1881 and analysing the writings of a number of theorists of colonialism such as Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu, Gabriel Charmes, Paul Gaffarel and l'AbbW Raboisson, Agnes 
Murphy argues that `no Imperialist Frenchman of that era viewed colonial policy from 
a single point of view'. 23 She identifies a number of key themes in the discourse of 
these figures and concludes from this that we should reject the `systematic 
classification of motivation into patriotism, international rivalry, science, commerce, 
industry, propagation of the Gospel, civilisation of backward peoples'. 24 Stuart Persell 
offers a similar analysis: `Precisely because no single purpose animated the actions of 
imperialists, historians must now assume the confluence of several causal factors as 
the best way to explain a multifaceted historical epoch. ' 25 
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That there were a plurality of reasons invoked to justify French overseas expansion is 
evident from the ideas of Jules Ferry, one of the leading advocates of imperialism in 
the 1880s. In addition to highlighting France's civilising duties, the 'Ferry doctrine' 
stressed the economic advantage and the gains in national prestige to be had from the 
possession of Empire. As Daniel Leconte puts it: `Elle rassemble dans une doctrine 
homogene les arguments de marchands, les generosites d'humanistes et les raves de 
grandeur des nationalistes. '26 The analysis of Smith and Girardet has shown that the 
same arguments were echoed by advocates of colonialism, albeit modified by the 
changing international political climate, up to and beyond the outbreak of the Algerian 
war. 27 In other words, colonialists saw an unproblematic co-existence, or `harmony of 
interests', between commercial gain, the acquisition of national prestige and the 
fulfilment of the civilising burden of educating the 'savage'. 28 In French eyes, it was a 
`win-win' strategy for all concerned in which France could gain economically and 
augment her international standing whilst transferring the gifts of French civilisation 
to the indigenous populations of the conquered lands. 
The One and Indivisible Republic 
Before leaving this brief overview of the French colonial idea, we should note the 
particular place of choice which Algeria enjoyed within the French Empire. The ties 
between France and Algeria were both territorial and human. In 1848, Algeria was 
legally incorporated as an integral part of the French nation. It also became an 
important colonie de peuplement to a far greater extent than its near neighbours 
Tunisia and Morocco. Without the presence of a million or so European settlers, it 
seems unlikely that the French would have gone to such lengths to resist the advent of 
Algerian independence. 
A mixture of French, Spanish, Italian and Maltese descent, settlers were keen to stress 
their particular status as Algerian Frenchmen. 29 As Stora has observed: `Quelle que 
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soit leur origine, ils se considerent comme appartenant ä une "France algerienne", les 
"Francais de France" etant percus comme des compatriotes differents. '30 Despite this 
insistence on their particular status as Algerian, the Europeans were fiercely patriotic, 
always observing the days of national commemoration with more verve than was 
shown in mainland France, an ambiguous relationship neatly expressed by Camille 
Briere who writes of the `regionalisme particulier' of the settler community and by 
Stora who refers to their `nationalisme extreme' 31 The cultural divide and the 
geographical distance which separated Algeria's European population from 
Metropolitan France created, according to Stora, a psychological need amongst 
settlers to be accepted as true Frenchmen and women: `Pour se faire aimer, se faire 
comprendre de la mere trop lointaine, les pieds-noirs n'auront de cesse de pratiquer 
une surenchere nationaliste. '32 
The rampant nationalism of the settlers coupled with the legal status of Algeria meant 
that the principle of the One and Indivisible French Republic was extended to Algeria, 
with the Mediterranean seen as dividing it from the Hexagon in the same way that the 
Seine divided Paris. Of course, this claim never stood up to close scrutiny since 
Algeria was never administered as though it were merely one more French province. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, it exerted a powerful influence on the thinking of even 
some of the most liberal thinkers in France during the 1954-62 conflict. 33 
Bilan de la presence francaise 
Despite the outbreak of nationalist violence in 1954, there was no shortage of figures 
from amongst Algeria's settler community and within mainland France itself prepared 
to wax lyrical about the marvellous results which the French colonial presence had 
achieved. The 1955 conference report of 1'Assemblee des Presidents des Chambres de 
Commerce de France et de 1'Union francaise offers a particularly striking example of 
this. 34 According to the report, pre-colonial Algeria was a barren land, subject to `la 
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plus complete anarchie' for which the French presence had substituted peace, security 
and economic prosperity (p. 2). Thanks to the efforts of administrators, industrial 
workers, the business community and farmers, all of whom 'n'avaient pas hesite a 
repondre ä l'appel du Gouvernement pour aller mettre en valeur ces territoires 
nouveaux', France had brought to Algeria real economic and social progress in which 
she could have 'une legitime fierte' (p. 2). Nor was it to be assumed that only the 
settler population had reaped the rewards of this transformative endeavour; the 
indigenous population had also benefited from French expertise: 'Loin d'etre 
accomplie dans un but egoiste, cette oeuvre profite en tres grande partie aux 
autochtones qui possedent la plus grande part des terres cultivables' (p. 3). Rather than 
simply reproduce the `harmony of interests' thesis by stressing that French economic 
gain from the colonies was offset by the `gift' of civilisation, the report claimed that 
France had been doubly generous: not only had she provided culture and civilisation 
but she had also developed the Algerian territory'au prix d'un apport de capitaux pour 
lesquels il ne peut etre question d'une rentabilite normale' (p. 3). 
The report presented the education of the Muslims as the very paragon of the French 
civilising role, boldly proclaiming: 'L'education de la population a toujours ete un des 
principaux soucis de la France' (p. 2). French school teachers had been sent to North 
Africa and, once there, had instituted the same educational opportunities for all 
children, regardless of ethnic background, with a view to providing equal 
opportunities in the work place. This teaching had struck a balance between respect 
for indigenous Muslim culture and Western rationalism: 
Si eile n'a jamais cherche ä faire oublier la culture musulmane, si meme eile a developpe ses 
moyens d'expression et de penetration, eile a egalement fait connaitre aux musulmans les 
disciplines occidentales. (p. 2) 
Further unadulterated praise for France's civilising genius was to be found in a speech 
made at Verdun on 17 June 1956 by the (then) President of the Republic, Rene Coty. 
Although ostensibly commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the historic battle 
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fought at Verdun during World War One, Coty was also keen to praise French 
achievements in Algeria. For Coty, France's benevolent civilising enterprise had been 
undertaken for the good of all Algeria's citizens, Muslims and Europeans alike. He 
praised '1'oeuvre magnifique' that for 125 years successive generations had worked 
tirelessly to construct and which had resulted in 'une si prodigieuse metamorphose'. 35 
The French, he continued in his speech, were driven by the goal of spreading the 
revolutionary ideal of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity: `Nous saurons lä-bas autour du 
drapeau tricolore realiser toujours plus de liberte, d'egalite et de fraternite', he 
announced triumphantly. 36 
A Divided Society 
On the basis of such statements alone, a visitor to Algeria in 1955 might have 
expected to find deserts in bloom, a flourishing economy, and Muslim and European 
children strolling hand-in-hand to school; in sum, a land of prosperous, happy citizens 
playing their full role in a democratic, multicultural French Republic. Even the 
briefest of snapshots of the reality of French colonial practice reveals the veritable 
pays de cocagne constructed in pro-colonial discourse to be a gross distortion of the 
truth: widespread poverty and unemployment, political under-representation and high 
rates of illiteracy were the defining characteristics of Algeria's indigenous population 
at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. The vast difference between the lifestyles 
enjoyed by the settler population and those of the indigenous population was 
encapsulated in Fanon's portrait of the colonial city as a site of racially-determined 
division. Alongside the clean, sanitised, planned space inhabited by the coloniser lay 
the sprawling, uncontrolled misery of the colonised - two mutually exclusive worlds, 
separated by the police and Army whose function was to prevent the encroachment of 
the colonised into the European citadel (DT, 8). 
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Economically, Algeria was a fractured society, a land of enormous contrast between 
the European settlers and the indigenous population. In 1948, Muslims earned on 
average an estimated 16,000 old Francs per year whilst the European equivalent was 
450,000 Francs. 37 In the words of Droz and Lever, Algeria had `le visage d'un pays 
moderne et bien equipe' with `une economie europeenne en pleine expansion'. Yet 
three quarters of the Algerian population, almost without exception Muslim, lived in 
poverty. For the rapidly expanding Muslim population, `le volume des ressources 
oscillait dangereusement entre la stagnation et la recession'. 38 
The situation in which Algeria's Muslim population found itself in 1954 was, in fact, 
the culmination of a whole catalogue of discriminatory measures designed to keep 
them in a subordinate place. In 1840, a decree confiscated land from all those 
indigenous Algerians who had taken up arms against the French in the initial 
resistance to French rule. Following this, the Ordinances of 1844 and 1846 allowed 
the confiscation of non-developed land for which no justifiable titles under French law 
were held before 1830. In 1870, following a revolt in Kabylia, several million acres of 
land were confiscated from Muslims by way of punishment. An Act passed in 1863 
which had proclaimed tribes to be the rightful owners of land they had enjoyed in 
perpetuity, was offset by the Warnier Act of 1873. This later Act made communal 
land available for sale and which, once sold, remained subject to French land codes. 
Economic domination was permitted by, and went hand-in-hand with, European 
monopolisation of political power in Algeria. Under a law passed in 1865, Muslims 
became French subjects and were permitted access to the French Army and to minor 
civil functions. French citizenship, however, could only be obtained by abandoning 
personal status under Muslim civil law on such matters as marriage, divorce and 
inheritance. Indeed, perhaps the one area where the French fully applied a policy of 
assimilation was in the extension of military service to Muslims who were thus 
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expected to comply with the most dangerous of duties incumbent upon fully-fledged 
French citizens whilst receiving few of their rights. 
In 1919, in recognition of the efforts of the Muslims who had fought in the French 
Army during the First World War, legislation was introduced which allowed a limited 
number of them access to French citizenship, again with the proviso that they abandon 
their personal status. Since by 1936, only a few thousand naturalisations had taken 
place, the Blum-Violette project of that year proposed that a number of educated 
Algerians (around 25,000 from a population of 6 million) could become French 
citizens without this precondition. Such was the resistance of the European settlers to 
this initiative that it was not even discussed in the French parliament. 
The discrimination continued after the Second World War. The 1947 Statute of 
Algeria created an elected Algerian Assembly which had the power to modify laws 
passed in Metropolitan France which were of relevance to Algeria. This Assembly, 
comprising 120 seats, was elected by two separate colleges, each electing the same 
number of deputes. The first college comprised all French citizens which, Home 
reports, numbered about 500,000 in 1954, and around 60,000 Muslims who were 
considered sufficiently `Europeanised' to belong to this group. 9 The second electoral 
college contained the Muslim voters (excluding the women who had not yet been 
enfranchised and many thousands of males whose details were not held by the French 
authorities and consequently were not registered to vote), with the result that the vote 
of a European effectively counted around ten times more than that of a Muslim. 
Whilst the 1947 Statute contained a number of relatively liberal propositions 
including the extension of the right of suffrage to Muslim women, a more equitable 
administration system, and the teaching of Arabic to all levels, these measures relied 
upon the Algerian Assembly for their ratification. With half of the seats in this 
Assembly held by the pieds-noirs and a two-thirds majority required to pass any 
legislation, Algeria's European population had an effective veto over any measure 
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considered too progressive. Moreover, the French were not averse to election rigging 
in order to ensure that any Muslims with nationalist leanings were kept away from the 
Assembly. The most striking example was the 1948 elections which were 
systematically falsified by the Governor-General, Marcel Naegelen to ensure that 
Muslims favourable to the French presence and unlikely to question the status quo 
were elected. 40 
The French also attempted to silence those amongst the Muslim community most 
vocal in their calls for change. Messali Hadj, one of the earliest advocates of 
independence, was imprisoned or exiled on several occasions for his involvement in 
various political groupings which had called into question the legitimacy of the 
French presence. More moderate Muslims, such as Ferhat Abbas, a partisan of 
assimilation until the failure of the Blum-Violette project, saw their claims for an 
equalisation of rights and status constantly fall on deaf ears. As Hocine Alt-Ahmed, 
one of the founders of the FLN pointed out, the French commitment to Liberty, 
Equality and Fraternity smacked of arrant hypocrisy: 
D'un cote, il y avait la Republique francaise avec tous ses acquis democratiques dont on 
noun avait pane ä I'ecole, la liberte, la fraternite, I'egalite... De 1'autre, il y avait en Algerie 
un Etat colon oü nous, les musulmans, n'avions pas les memes droits que les Europeens 41 
Judging by the figures, one might add that Alt-Ahmed was relatively unusual in 
having had the opportunity to go to school at all. In 1954, only 12.7% of Muslims of 
the appropriate age were educated and the illiteracy rate amongst the indigenous 
population was 90%. 42 
Behind the electoral chicanery, the quasi-institutionalised political apartheid and the 
economic domination enjoyed by the settler population lay the very real threat of 
military repression. Outbreaks of nationalist violence invariably met with an even 
more violent response on the part of the French Army. Perhaps the most striking 
example prior to 1954 coincided with the end of the Second World War when 
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Muslims in the small Algerian town of Setif marked V. E. day with pro-independence 
demonstrations culminating in the massacre of around 100 Europeans, with many 
others wounded. The response of the French Army was bloody and disproportionate. 
Even the lowest estimates put the death toll exacted by the French forces at around 
1,000, whilst Algerian nationalists and their sympathisers placed the total nearer to 
45 , 000 
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The brevity of our survey of French colonialism naturally means that much is omitted. 
Rival statistics to the ones mobilised above could be cited to offer a more positive 
image of the French colonial presence. Certainly, the French built some schools and 
hospitals as the apologists for the continuation of the French presence, ultras and 
reformers alike, were keen to proclaim. Nevertheless, even the basic rappel des faits 
offered here makes a damning case against the French. 
The Impossibility of Reform 
For leading anti-colonial writers, it was not simply a case of disputing statistics. The 
miserable state in which Algeria's indigenous population found itself was not to be 
seen as an aberration, but was more properly to be regarded as the desired and 
inevitable product of colonialism. The sincerity of the coloniser's intentions was 
rejected, with any talk of helping the indigenous people a rhetorical side-show not to 
be taken seriously. To consider the `gap' between rhetoric and reality as constituting a 
failure of French colonialism was largely to miss the point since the colonial system 
did not, by definition, permit the possibility of its closure. 
For radical anti-colonialists, the coloniser's unwillingness to accept reform was both 
psychological and economic. Although not talking specifically about Algeria, Fanon 
in his work Peau noire, masques blancs challenged the notion that the French were 
concerned with the development of the indigenous peoples over whom they had 
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established their rule. He argued that the settlers and administrators within the 
colonial territories did not even pay lip service to this idea; Blacks and North Africans 
were considered to be fundamentally incapable of adopting the principles of French 
civilisation, incapable of logical reasoning and receptive only to the use of force. The 
European superiority complex did not only manifest itself in overt demonstrations of 
racism but equally in the paternalistic attitudes adopted by the coloniser towards the 
colonised. Fanon noted by way of example the way in which Europeans always 
addressed blacks in pidgin French, imprisoning the colonised within the subordinate 
role: Tarler, petit-negre, c'est enfermer le Noir'. 44 He continued along similar lines in 
Les damnes de la terre: 'L'indigene est declare impermeable ä 1'ethique, absence de 
valeurs, mais aussi negation des valeurs. Il est, osons l'avouer, 1'ennemi des valeurs' 
(DT, 10). Colonial subjects, relegated to the status of animals and described by a 
'langage zoologique' (DT, 11), could be deprived of the rights which Europeans 
enjoyed. In short, it was the original belief in the superiority of the colonial power 
which provided the ground upon which the racism of the colonial situation was based. 
Since the settlers believed themselves to be superior, they could not be persuaded to 
treat the colonial subjects as their equals. 
In Peau noire, masques blancs, he draws upon Cesaire's critique of the complicity of 
European liberalism with the holocaust to show that all involved with colonialism 
were guilty of endorsing the racism of the system. Whilst in Lan V de la revolution 
algerienne, he highlights the positive role played by some of the democrats in France 
and certain members of the European community in Algeria, those picked out for 
praise are not those who sought to reform colonialism but Europeans who had 
transcended the racial divide to join the forces of the rebellion 45 In Les damnes de la 
terre he reverts to his earlier line: 
Ce que le colonise a vu sur son sol, c'est qu'on pouvait impunement l'arreter, le frapper, 
l'affamer; et aucun professeur de morale jamais, aucun curd jamais, nest venu recevoir les 
coups A sa place ni partager son pain avec lui. (DT, 12) 
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Les damnes de la terre was prefaced by Sartre whose critique of colonialism, whilst 
written from a European perspective, was nonetheless equally condemnatory. His 
1956 article `Le colonialisme est un systeme' follows a fairly orthodox Marxist- 
Leninist line in its presentation of colonialism as a deliberate attempt to derive 
economic advantage: `La France a, du premier jour, depossede et refoule les 
Algeriens, puisqu'elle les a traites comme un bloc inassimilable, toute l'ceuvre 
francaise en Algerie a ete accomplie au profit des colons'. 6 In short, the misery and 
the despair of the Muslim population were `l'effet direct et necessaire du 
colonialisme' and would persist for as long as the colonial system was in existence 
(p. 40). 
Since colonialism was a totalising, immobile system which depended, for its very 
existence, on the absence of change, the notion that the settler community might 
embrace reform was a contradiction in terms. Sartre did not believe that any liberal 
grouping within that community would be able to take a reforming lead for the simple 
reason that one could not distinguish one type of coloniser from another: `Il West pas 
vrai qu'il y ait de bons colons et d'autres qui soient mechants: il ya des colons, c'est 
tout' (p. 27). In his preface to Memmi's Portrait du colonise, he stressed the way in 
which racism was ingrained in the very logic of colonialism. In order to reduce the 
cost of labour, the coloniser required the multiplication of the indigenous population. 
Yet such was the numerical superiority of the indigenous population that they could 
not be accorded democratic rights since this would immediately lead to the end of the 
colonial system. By not according these rights, the coloniser was compelled to see the 
colonised as sub-human: `Le colonialisme refuse les droits de 1'homme ä des hommes 
qu'il a soumis par la violence, qu'il maintient de force dans la misere et l'ignorance, 
donc, comme dirait Marx, en etat de sous-humanite' 47 
Memmi was less militant in his critique of colonialism than either Sartre or Fanon. As 
a Tunisian of Jewish faith he hovered, by his own admission, between the worlds of 
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the coloniser and the colonised. A thread of liberal humanism runs through his 
seminal critique of colonialism, Portrait du colonise. For this reason, Girardet, in his 
classification of four types of anti-colonialism, considers Memmi's writing to form 
part of `la protestation humaniste' as opposed to the `messianisme revolutionnaire' 
which he ascribes to Fanon and Sartre. 8 However, unlike the colonial reformers and 
even the liberal anti-colonialists about whom we will say more in Chapter Five, 
Memmi did not believe that colonialism could be redeemed in any way. He exposed 
the impossibility of a liberal outcome to the colonial situation even where this 
revelation was marked by a tinge of regret. For this reason, his views are incorporated 
in this study with those of the militant anti-colonialists. 
Memmi, like Sartre and Fanon, condemned what he saw as the lack of sincerity in 
French promises to transform the indigenous population. Realising the injustice of the 
colonial system, the behaviour of the 'colonisateur qui s'accepte' was driven by the `la 
condamnation fondamentale que tout colonialiste porte au fond de lui-meme' (PC, 80). 
The triumphalism demonstrated towards settler achievements in Algeria derived from 
the coloniser's `soif de justification' which created a psychological need to valorise his 
own events whilst simultaneously denigrating everything connected with those whose 
place he had usurped (PC, 77). The enthusiastic support for, and participation in, the 
parades which marked days of national commemoration corresponded to `un besoin 
profond de la vie coloniale' which served both to reassure the coloniser that his 
privileged place was not under threat and to impress the colonised (PC, 83). 
Memmi also attempted to explain the way in which reform was antithetical to the 
functioning of the colonial economy. Colonialism was not, in reality, intended to lead 
to the progressive emancipation of the colonial subjects: 
Les motifs economiques de l'entreprise coloniale sont aujourd'hui mis en lumi8re par tour 
les historiens de la colonisation ; personne ne croit plus ä la mission culturelle et morale, 
meme originelle, du colonisateur. (PC, 33) 
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The entire colonial system was based on the privileges enjoyed by the coloniser at the 
expense of the colonised: the coloniser enjoyed high living standards because those of 
the colonised were so low, he could benefit from a cheap and plentiful labour supply 
by exploiting the colonised, and, through his monopolisation of the legislative 
process, he was able to enshrine these practices in law (PC, 37). For this reason, 
assimilation was never seriously contemplated: 
La veritable raison, la raison premiere de la plupart de ses carences est celle-ci: le 
colonialiste n'a jamais decide de transformer la colonie A ('image de la metropole, et le 
colonise ä son image. II ne peut admettre une teile adequation qui detruirait le principe de 
ses privileges. (PC, 91) 
Since colonial society was supposed to be static rather than evolving, the coloniser 
mobilised all methods available to prevent the evolution of the colonised: `Tout est 
mis en oeuvre, enfin, pour que le colonise ne puisse franchir le pas' (PC, 141). For 
Memmi, even if colonialism was to be considered on its own terms, the benefits 
enjoyed by the indigenous people at the cost of their freedom were negligible: 
AprBs plusieurs d6cennies de colonisation, la foule des enfants dans la rue l'emporte de si 
loin sur ceux qui sont en classe ! Le nombre des lits d'höpitaux est si derisoire devant celui 
des malades, l'intention des traces routiers est si claire, si desinvolte A I'egard du colonise, si 
etroitement soumise aux besoins du colonisateur ! Pour ce peu, vraiment, la colonisation 
n'etait pas indispensable. (PC, 131-2) 
Memmi was prepared to concede that there were some colonialists who genuinely 
desired reform. Yet the possibility that colonial oppression might be successfully 
resisted from within the settler community was to be discounted. In the strict 
dichotomy between coloniser and colonised, the very fact of being born into the settler 
community located the reformer as part of the oppressor group from which there was 
no escape: 
La situation coloniale est de relation de peuple ä peuple. Or, [le colonisateur de gauche] fait 
partie du peuple oppresseur et sera, qu'il le veuille ou non, condanme ä partager son destin, 
comme il en a partage la fortune. (PC, 64) 
39 
Such was the nature of the system that the coloniser of good will was condemned to 
an irrelevant role. 'Les relations coloniales', Memmi asserted, 'ne relevent pas de la 
bonne volonte ou du gelte individuel' (PC, 64). It mattered little that the coloniser may 
have behaved humanely towards the members of the indigenous population with 
whom he came into contact. Since the colonial divide operated upon the society as a 
whole, the coloniser of good will, even if in no way guilty of oppression as an 
individual had a collective responsibility `en tant que membre d'un groupe national 
oppresseur' (PC, 65). 
Contemporary historians, even those who have nothing of the doctrinaire anti- 
colonialism which characterises a figure as politically committed as Sartre, and even 
where their analysis is less condemnatory, have largely upheld the twin themes that 
colonialism was by design oppressive and that the settlers were unwilling to 
contemplate reform. Home's reading of French colonial expansion is essentially one 
of dispossession and exploitation. 9 Droz and Lever, contemporary historians who are 
at times prepared to accept a certain amount of good will amongst some of those 
involved in the French colonial enterprise, are nevertheless highly critical of the 
destabilising effects of the French conquest on indigenous Algerian society. They 
emphasise the way in which competition from France ruined artisan industry in 
Algeria whilst the native farmers were jointly afflicted by expropriation, tax and the 
integration of Algeria into a market economy. French colonialism could be 
characterised as 'une entreprise consciente de destructuration de la societe musulmane 
et de ses institutions traditionnelles par l'introduction modulee du droit francais. ' In 
their eyes, the policy of assimilation was, in fact, 'une politique de soumission'. 5° 
Stora places particular emphasis on the period immediately after the First World War 
during which economic power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few 
settlers. Loans which were obtained to finance land irrigation programmes led to the 
concentration of land amongst a small sector of the settler population, while the 
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development of mechanisation led many small farmers into debt, ruining the artisan 
and causing massive unemployment amongst native Algerians, prompting them to go 
to France in search of work. This process of concentration of power continued during 
the 1930s, again working to the detriment of the Muslims with many peasants 
displaced to less fertile land where the soils were subject to erosion. 5' He also 
emphasises the extent to which the unanimity of settler views on reform were 
fashioned by the colonial system. Although a divided community in terms of ethnic 
origin, political affiliation, and place of residence, their status as French citizens, 
denied to the Muslims, welded them into a single block. 52 
Leconte, despite his own pied-noir origins, accepts, albeit to a lesser extent, that the 
settler community spoke with one unyielding voice. Whilst sympathetic to the 
`ordinary' settler, Leconte argues that by controlling the commanding heights of 
colonial society, the gros colons succeeded in imposing their perspective upon the rest 
of the population: 
Le gros colonat contröle le Credit agricole, la presse, l'administration et la police ; en 
somme tous les secteurs de la societe civile algerienne. Le dispositif colonial est donc en 
place pour empecher toute autre expression que la sienne qui, Beule, sera la norme s' 
Smith highlights the way in which the settlers sought to exclude the indigenous 
population from the process of industrialisation and modernisation. In the face of a 
rising birth rate amongst the indigenous population, per capita production amongst 
rural Muslims underwent a dramatic decline. Yet Europeans were not willing to allow 
the Muslim sector of the economy to modernise since this would have resulted in 
unwelcome competition. Where industry did develop in Algeria, the primary concern 
of the French was to find Europeans to work in these industries. Economic 
domination functioned in tandem with the monopolisation of political power in order 
to deny Muslims access to power. 54 
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This description of deliberate exploitation does not square with the image which we 
presented earlier in the chapter of a France convinced of the merits of her civilising 
mission, even where this was tempered by the mistaken belief that there was a 
'harmony of interests' between commercial advantage and the provision of French 
culture. It is therefore useful to draw a distinction between the settler community and 
the colonial establishment as whole. Commentators have contrasted the partial 
willingness of governments in Paris to press ahead with reform with the reluctance of 
the settler population to see any such reforms put into place. Writing in Foreign 
Affairs in 1960, Joseph Kraft portrayed the settlers as 'an oppressive, authoritarian 
movement aimed at asserting mastery over both the native population in Algeria and 
the government in France'. 55 Smith has noted that the differences in scholarly 
provision and educational achievement between Muslim children and their European 
counterparts was not simply a question of neglect but the result of a deliberate policy 
choice by politicians and administrators representing the European settler 
population. 56 Summarising the record of the French colonial presence in Algeria, he 
comments: 
One searches the historical record in vain for a single instance of a generous gesture by the 
European community to the Muslims. The settlers combated without exception every 
measure by Paris to improve the lot of the Muslim population. 57 
From the evidence available, those in Paris who were sincere in their belief that 
France should move towards a more equitable colonial relationship did not appear to 
be in a position to greatly influence the development of French colonial policy. 
The Inevitable Rejection of Colonialism 
For the anti-colonialists, the logic of the colonial system operated not only upon the 
coloniser but also upon the colonised. As Fanon put it: `La situation coloniale 
uniformise les rapports, eile dichotomise la societe coloniale de facon tranchee' (SR, 
113). Memmi adopted a similar tone: `De meme que le colonisateur est tente de 
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s'accepter comme colonisateur, le colonise est oblige, pour vivre, de s'accepter 
comme colonise' (PC, 110). 
Once colonisation had taken place, there was a certain extent to which the indigenous 
people adhered to colonisation (PC, 109). In order to attempt to escape from the 
colonial situation, the first step taken by the colonised was to attempt to become like 
the coloniser (PC, 137). The initial love of the coloniser was linked in Memmi's mind 
with the colonised's own self-hate. Assimilation entailed a deliberate process of denial 
of the self and of one's own cultural identity: 'Au nom de ce qu'il souhaite devenir, il 
[le colonise] s'acharne ä s'appauvrir, ä s'arracher de lui-meme' (PC, 138). The 
colonised became engaged in a systematic process of self-denial: skin colour, hair 
colour, art, music, and customs all had to be discarded in order to resemble the 
coloniser. Eventually, however, the colonised came to hate this process of self- 
destruction and wilful effacement of his own identity: 
Le candidat ä l'assimilation en arrive, presque toujours, ä se lasser du prix exorbitant qu'il 
Iui faut payer, et dont il n'a jamais fini de s'acquitter. II decouvre aussi avec effroi tout le 
sens de sa tentative. Le moment est dramatique oü il comprend qu'il a repris ä son compte 
les accusations et les condamnations du colonisateur ; qu'il s'habitue A regarder les siens 
avec les yeux de leur procureur. (PC, 140) 
The implacable logic of colonialism led the colonised to reject assimilation. `La 
situation coloniale, par sa propre fatalite interieure, appelle la revolte. Car la situation 
coloniale ne peut etre amenagee ; tel un carcan, eile ne peut qu'etre brisee' (PC, 144). 
Like Memmi, Fanon saw an almost inevitable historical logic behind the revolt of the 
colonised. In Peau noire masques blancs published five years before Memmi's 
Portrait du colonise, he had argued that the Black acquiesced in his oppression and 
developed an inferiority complex towards the white coloniser; to be white was seen as 
a way out of misery, Blacks saw the acquisition of the French language as a sign of 
evolution and black women wanted to be white (PN, 41). In L'an V de la revolution 
algerienne, the period of acceptance had given way to a violent rejection of 
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colonialism. The work depicts an indigenous population virtually unanimous in its 
rejection of the colonial situation and all its trappings. For Fanon, everything French 
or imported from France was tainted and was inevitably rejected by the Algerian 
people even where what was on offer was, objectively speaking, of benefit to them. 
The radio, seen as a symbol of modernity, was rejected because it broadcast the views 
of the colonial oppressor and even Western style medical techniques and European 
doctors were rejected because they belonged to the oppressor, synonymous in the 
minds of the Algerian people with teachers, engineers and paratroopers. (SR, 109). 
However, when it served the interests of the rebellion, attitudes towards modernity 
shifted dramatically and change was embraced (SR, 113-4). 
In Les damnes de la terre, Fanon synthesises and refines his earlier positions and 
seeks to distinguish between the reaction to colonialism of the intellectual elite within 
the indigenous society and that of the masses. It was the members of the former group 
who sought to ingratiate themselves with the coloniser by undertaking '1'acquisition 
forcenee de la culture de 1'occupant' whilst at the same time criticising their own 
culture (DT, 166-7). Since their energy had been devoted to gaining entrance to the 
world of the coloniser, this colonised elite, whilst proclaiming the need for more 
freedom, did not want to see the system fundamentally overturned and therefore 
stopped short of recommending revolutionary violence (DT, 24). Condemned by 
Fanon as the lap dogs of colonialism, this elite formed 'une sorte de classe d'esclaves 
liberes individuellement' or `esclaves affranchis' and their claims were thus restricted 
to 'la possibilite d'organiser une authentique classe d'affranchis' (DT, 25). 
Fanon placed a much greater and a perhaps over-optimistic faith in the masses who he 
regarded as the truly revolutionary element within colonial society. When faced with 
the coloniser's deliberate attempt to destroy the indigenous culture, the masses took 
refuge in their traditional cultural practices. Whilst the violent reaction of the masses 
to colonial oppression was initially turned inwards and exacted upon their own 
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community (DT, 18-19), the exploitation, misery, famine resulting from this 
oppression eventually led them to realise the need for a violent confrontation with 
colonialism and to reject the coloniser's values (DT, 168). 
Propaganda produced by the FLN during the conflict largely sought to present the 
Muslim population as united in its bid to overthrow colonialism. Thus an article 
appearing in an FLN newspaper in 1957: 
Le FLN est devenu une organisation puissante, plongeant ses racines profondes dans toutes 
les couches du peuple: paysans et etudiants, ouvriers et commercants, femmes et jeunes, 
tous les Algeriens sont mobilises dans la lutte liberatrice. 
Le FLN est partout dans tout le pays, dans chaque ville, village, mechta, quartier, entreprise, 
ferme, universite, college. 58 
For Alain, one of the characters in Jean-Louis Hurst's novel Le deserteur, the 
paternalism of certain French Army officers was a peripheral aspect of the war which 
in no way altered the fundamental injustice of continued French rule over Algeria: 'Il y 
a de l'autre cote de la Mediterranee un peuple qui souffre, un peuple qu'on prive de 
liberte, de dignite. Le paternalisme des meilleurs officiers SAS n'y changera rien. '59 
The inevitable process towards the rejection of the coloniser which Memmi and Fanon 
highlight can be set alongside the view that the end of colonialism was part of an 
unstoppable global process to which it was impossible for the French to remain 
immune. Having been subjected to a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Viet-Minh 
at Dien-Bien-Phu and with Morocco and Tunisia acquiring their independence, it 
could be argued that Algeria was almost destined to follow the same route. As an 
editorial to an FLN publication Resistance algerienne put it: 
Quand les fruits sont trop mars ils tombent d'eux-memes des branches. II en va des colonies 
comme des fruits. Si le dix-neuvieme si8cle a ete celui de la colonisation ä outrance le 
vingti8me est celui de la liberation. En Asie comme en Afrique, les peuples soumis au joug 
etranger se IibBrent les uns apres les autres. 11 faut croire qu'un certain determinisme 
historique existe ici-bas 60 
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For the British historian John Strachey, writing in 1959, the endeavours of the French 
Army to retain Algeria under the umbrella of French rule in any meaningful way were 
doomed to failure. Colonial powers needed to recognise the realities of the twentieth- 
century situation. Independence for the colonies was an inevitable process, whether or 
not the colonial power fought against it or agreed voluntarily to it. By fighting what he 
described as `a series of hopeless and bloody "rearguard action" colonial wars', the 
imperial power only succeeded in compromising its own future development as well 
as that of the soon to be independent colony. 61 
Imagining an Alternative Ending 
Stora has classified Algerian resistance to French occupation into three stages: firstly, 
the post-1918 generation who claimed the right of national self-determination; 
secondly, the generation emerging after the Front Populaire who rejected the illusion 
of assimilation and looked to an Arab and Islamic heritage to provide the ideological 
foundation of their resistance to French rule; finally, the post-1945 generation who 
believed in the need to undertake armed action in order to throw off colonialism. 62 For 
Stora, it was essentially the lack of reforms which pushed the Algerian people towards 
greater militancy: 
Comme il apparalt de plus en plus clairement - au cours de longues annees d'echec 
politique - qu'aucun gouvernement francais n'est capable d'entreprendre des reformes, et 
que s'affirment la mauvaise volontts et l'incapacite francaise ä faire des concessions, les 
nationalistes militants commencent A gagner du terrain, et s'accentue la tendance aux 
operations clandestines pour un renversement brutal de l'ordre existant 63 
As Hocine Ait-Ahmed commented in a 1994 interview, the continual refusal of the 
settler community to accept any reform `verrouillait 1'espoir chez les gens et rendait la 
situation explosive'. He continued: `Nous estimions aussi qu'il fallait recourir ä la 
lutte armee puisque la voie electorale etait totalement bloquee'. 64 Whilst it was 
undoubtedly the case that the lack of concessions given to gradual demands for 
change led to a hardening of resistance, Ait-Ahmed's remarks appear to give some 
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credence to the idea that a liberal policy pursued earlier might have avoided the 
bloody struggle for national liberation altogether, leading, if not to a harmonious co- 
existence between coloniser and colonised, to a velvet divorce. This leads one to ask 
whether a figure like Ferhat Abbas, who in the words of Stora, became `un decu de la 
"francisation"' could have taken the helm of an independent Algeria retaining most, if 
not all, of its links with France if only the Europeans had been willing to go along 
with it. 65 
Smith points to an historical window of opportunity during which, had a genuine 
attempt to integrate the Algerian economy with that of France been made, it might 
have been possible to end French colonialism in another way. However, the French 
never seriously contemplated such measures with the result that, from around the turn 
of the century onwards, France was socially and economically too weak to absorb 
Algeria; making Algeria French: 
... would have required political and economic policies that were obviously not the order of 
the day in the first quarter of this century. But only a dogmatist would insist the process was 
inconceivable. If France, for example, had recruited from Algeria a far larger labour force 
for industrial work than was the case, and had associated a Muslim elite with the exercise of 
power locally and nationally, the relationship between these two peoples might have been 
far different. 66 
Once this opportunity was missed, the retention of French sovereignty and the 
application of a liberal policy for Algeria were, for Smith, irreconcilable objectives. 
The settlers who consistently refused reform were more logical in their attempts to 
preserve French sovereignty than those liberals who naively believed that they could 
offer reform as a means of deflecting Muslim demands to be rid of the French: 
One wonders if those metropolitan liberals who so ceaselessly denounced the 'stubborn 
blindness' of the settlers on the subject of reform were not themselves more truly blind. 
Political freedom and economic mobility were pious daydreams for a land where deep 
cultural antagonism had come to be compounded by economic conflict. The Muslims had all 
the grievances of a defeated and despoiled race. 7 
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Since both Memmi and Fanon saw colonialism as incapable of evolution, there was 
no reason for them to speculate at length about what might have happened had the 
French attempted a genuine programme of reform. Memmi's work does, however, 
suggest an answer to this question. Excluded from any of the usual rights enjoyed by 
citizens, the colonised's sense of citizenship and of nationality, he argued, developed 
more slowly under colonialism than in the countries where the inhabitants participated 
more fully in the life of the nation. He therefore held out the possibility that 
colonialism had retarded the development of the national consciousness of the 
colonised: 
On rep6te que la colonisation a precipit6 la prise de conscience nationale du colonise. On 
pourrait aussi bien affirmer qu'elle en a moddrd le rythme, en maintenant le colonise hors 
des conditions objectives de la nationalite contemporaine. Est-ce une coYncidence si les 
peuples colonises sont les derniers i naitre ä cette conscience d'eux-memes ? (PC, 116) 
Colonialism as it was actually constituted stifled the national identity of the colonised 
only to later re-create a more violent nationalist opposition dedicated to its overthrow. 
However, a more benevolent colonialism, even if it had been possible, would not have 
prevented the eviction of the French but might possibly have speeded it up by creating 
a national consciousness amongst the indigenous population earlier. Memmi's 
arguments place colonialism in an untenable situation in which both liberalism and 
repression give rise to the same outcome. 
The Cost of Reform 
However benign the intentions of reformers may have been, and even if backed by 
both the settler and indigenous populations, plans to remake Algeria stood little 
chance of success without the support of the inhabitants of Metropolitan France. 
Between 1950 and 1962, France's Gross Domestic Product grew by 4.6% per annum 
despite the wars in Indochina and Algeria. 68 Whilst this did not mean that economic 
growth could pay for the resolution of all of Algeria's problems, it certainly implied 
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the possibility that there was surplus capital available for investment. However, the 
availability of state-raised capital for investment in Algeria depended as much upon 
domestic willingness to make Algeria a spending priority as it did upon ability to pay 
in an absolute sense. It was the people of France who would have been required to 
find the necessary financial wherewithal to underwrite both the protracted military 
campaign and the work of economic reconstruction. 
Termed by Girardet, `un anticolonialisme de repli hexagonal', opposition to French 
overseas expansion based around the position that the Empire did not pay had always 
found a limited audience within French political and intellectual circles. 69 Between 
1954-62, this economic anti-colonialism was most closely associated with the 
journalist Raymond Cartier, the well-known intellectual Raymond Aron, and 
ultimately General de Gaulle. 
Cartier's position was outlined in three articles appearing in Paris-Match during 
August and September 1956.70 Although centred on France's sub-Saharan territories, 
Cartier's 'anticolonialisme utilitaire' had obvious ramifications for Algeria. 7' 
Essentially, Cartier argued that the colonies cost more money than they brought in, 
retarding the development of Metropolitan France. Pointing to the relative wealth and 
stability of other former colonial powers such as Holland, Cartier advocated a policy 
of Metropolitan preference which made the improvement of domestic conditions the 
spending priority. Similarly, Aron, in two fairly short pieces on the Algerian war 
written in 1956 and 1957 and published collectively under the heading La Tragedie 
algerienne, argued that any policy which sought to vastly improve the welfare of the 
Muslim population would prove too great a financial burden for France to shoulder, 
particularly in the light of Algeria's rapid population growth. 72 This work was 
followed in 1958 by another book L'Algerie et la Republique which, as Pickles has 
commented, seemed `primarily intended to show up the fictions and unrealities of M. 
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Soustelle's plans for integration' and demonstrated `the practical impossibility of 
economic integration'. 73 
Fanon, too, joined this debate. In order to reduce the appeal of nationalist movements 
through economic transformation, he argued, measures that had not been taken in 
Metropolitan France itself would have been required. For Fanon, Cartier's 'amertume 
desabusee' was a reaction to the state's preoccupation with the colonies whilst so many 
French people lived in financial straits. Cartier's bitterness illustrated the impossibility 
of transforming colonialism into a 'programme desinteresse d'aide et de soutien' 
(DT, 142-3). 
On 3 October 1958, de Gaulle announced the Constantine Plan which set out a 
number of goals for the transformation of Algeria. Welcomed by reformers as a sign 
of de Gaulle's commitment to Algeria, this plan envisaged new industrial 
developments in Algeria to take advantage of the resources discovered in the Sahara, 
the construction of new houses for a million people and the creation of 400,000 new 
jobs. By 11 April 1961, however, de Gaulle was adopting a very different line, 
declaring: 'L'Algerie nous coüte, c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire, plus cher qu'elle ne 
nous rapporte'. 74 This transformation in de Gaulle's declared policy can be explained 
not only by his determination to extricate France from a war which he saw as 
economically debilitating but equally by the strong dose of political realism which led 
him to discount the viability of I Algerie francaise and by his desire to augment 
France's standing as a world power. 
As the powerful Head of State between 1958-62, de Gaulle was in the privileged 
position of being able to turn his thoughts into policy. Yet he would have been unable 
to do so without domestic support. In an analysis which proves particularly damning 
for the reformers, Ageron's study of French public opinion on the conflict as 
manifested in numerous surveys carried out between 1954-63 by the Institut francais 
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d'opinion publique reveals that, even before de Gaulle's return to power, popular 
opinion was both sceptical about the chances of preserving Algeria and far from 
convinced of the merits of integration. By 1958, the situation had evolved to such an 
extent that 'aucun gouvernement n'aurait pu en 1958 et dans les annees suivantes 
imposer une politique d'integration: 1'opinion francaise etait alors majoritairement 
ralliee ä l'idee d'une Algerie autonome, puis ä la fin independante'. 75 
De Gaulle's reluctance to prolong the Algerian war was clearly in tune with the mood 
of the country. Rioux notes that his progressive disengagement from Algeria was 
carried out `en collant au sentiment majoritaire de 1'opinion publique' whilst Ageron 
observes that his was 'la politique algerienne souhaitee par la majorite absolue du 
peuple francais'. 76 This conclusion is confirmed both by the results of the referendum 
held on 8 January 1961 which provided a resounding popular endorsement of both de 
Gaulle and his policy of an Algerie algerienne (75.26% of the votes cast), and by the 
90.7% approval rating for the Evian Accords which brought the conflict to an end. 
It was not simply the French public as a whole that lacked the political will to support 
the continuation of the French presence in Algeria but investors, too. The work of 
Jacques Marseille is particularly useful in highlighting the relationship between 
French capitalism and Algeria. Marseille argues that from 1880 to 1930 the protected 
market offered by the possession of the colonies benefited a large section of the 
French economy because it retarded the end of the `family' firm structure of 
production. Following 1930, the harmonious relationship between French capitalism 
and the retention of Empire became more shaky, coinciding with changes in the nature 
of production and the demise of the family firm: 'A partir de cette date, s'entame la 
procedure de divorce'. 77 Continued changes in methods of production, the pressure of 
international competition and the opening-up of the French economy required large- 
scale restructuring and investment in the domestic economy leading to a massive 
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flight of capital and lack of investment in Algeria from 1955 onwards. As Marseille 
concludes: 
Cette mutation industrielle necessitait aux yeux de ceux qui en &taient les acteurs et les 
comptables la rupture des liens politiques qui forcaient la puissance publique ä gaspiller 
dans ('empire des capitaux considerables sans aucun benefice 78 
Daniel Lefeuvre's analysis of the failure of the 1959 Constantine Plan further 
reinforces Marseille's assertion that French investors were reluctant to commit to 
Algeria. Intended to run over a five-year period, by 1961 the Plan had yielded very 
little in the way of tangible evidence for improvement; only 13% of the projected 
investment had taken place, light industry had met less than 8% of its targets, and only 
14,000 new jobs had been created. 79 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the critique which has been developed in this chapter, it is possible to 
formulate a number of questions to be put to the reformers, their answers to which 
will be analysed over the course of this thesis. Firstly, how did they respond to the 
accusation that the coloniser had no interest in reform? Secondly, even if their own 
reforming intent is accepted, how did they seek to answer the case that they were no 
more than colonisers of good will whose impact upon the colonial situation as a whole 
could be no more than minimal? Thirdly, on what grounds did they believe that the 
Muslims actually wanted the changes which they proposed? Finally, how could they 
explain the growing popular disillusionment with the war and the increasing 
reluctance of French companies and private finance to invest in Algeria other than by 
admitting that their own position was inherently flawed? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTRODUCTION TO THE REFORMERS 
Having drawn up a broad critique of colonialism in the opening chapter, the purpose 
of this chapter is to highlight some of the central tenets of the reformers' vision of the 
colonial world. By drawing predominantly on the example of Soustelle's integration 
programme, the first section introduces the principal themes which appear in their 
writing, noting the values which they held and the way in which these were anchored 
in the ideology of the civilising mission. Subsequent chapters will then provide much 
finer detail to the outline sketch offered here. 
The second section deals with reformers within the French Army. The French Army in 
Algeria now has few defenders, and rightly so, for the atrocities which it committed in 
the name of preserving Western civilisation in Algeria run contrary to a strong 
humanitarian tradition in Western thought. The chapter will identify where the 
pockets of pro-reform sentiment within the Army were to be found and highlight the 
way in which the conditions under which the war was fought led many soldiers to 
believe that their mission necessitated the promotion of the well-being of Algeria's 
indigenous population. 
Key Themes of the Reformers 
Justifying Colonialism 
Colonial reformers such as Jacques Soustelle, contemplating the future of the French 
presence in Algeria after 1954, were both approving and critical of the underlying 
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ideology of the mission civilisatrice: approving, in the sense that they maintained that 
the French had a duty to help Algeria's indigenous population; critical, insofar as they 
promised to show more respect for the latter's cultural differences than had previously 
been contemplated under the (largely unapplied) policy of assimilation. 
In Soustelle's eyes, colonisation was not a priori illegitimate, but was instead to be 
judged upon its merits. In an attack on his anti-colonial opponents of the day, he 
argued that colonisation was more rightly interpreted as part of an ongoing historical 
process, admittedly a destructive one, but one which brought about a transfer of 
knowledge and culture, and which thereby enabled the colonised to emerge from a 
primitive state and acquire the trappings of civilisation. 
Quant aux pieux progressistes qui se voilent la face et se couvrent la tete de cendres au Beul 
mot de 'colonisation', et selon qui tout ce qui est 'colonial' doit etre a priori condamne, je 
leur demande ce que seraient l'Occident et la France si nos pays n'avaient dte colonises par 
Rome. Toute l'Histoire est faite de ces mouvements de peuples et de ces transferts culturels 
sans lesquels nous en serions encore ä aiguiser des lames de silex dans les grottes de la 
VezBre. En ce qui concerne, du reste, l'Afrique du Nord, que sont donc les Arabes qui y 
vivent, ninon des colonisateurs qui y ont apporte, souvent au prix de terribles destructions, 
une grande religion, une langue, une civilisation. (ET p. 30) 
Within this general endorsement of colonialism are to be found three interwoven 
themes intended to legitimate a continued French presence in Algeria. Firstly, the 
reference to the history of France sought to provide both a precedent and a 
justification for overseas expansion. Working on the understanding that his reader 
would concur that France had become a `civilised' country, Soustelle attributes French 
progress from cave-dwellers to modern society to an initial colonisation by the 
Romans. To deny any benefit to colonisation was therefore to reject the foundations 
upon which French society was built. If France had benefited from colonisation so, 
too, could Algeria. This comparison was, of course, an incomplete one for it omitted 
to mention that the French had resisted their colonisation by the Romans from whence 
sprung the whole legend of Asterix, popularised in children's books. ' 
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Secondly, by not acknowledging any particularities to the brand of colonialism 
practised by the European powers, Soustelle attempted to deny the role of victim to 
the Arabs in the French-dominated colonial situation of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The Roman conquest of France, the Arab colonisation of Algeria and, by 
implication, the ongoing French occupation of Algeria are not really distinguished. 
The natural order of things dictated that where the Arabs had once been conquerors 
bringing language, religion and civilisation, albeit at a price, they were now the 
conquered, supplanted by the superior French civilisation. 
Thirdly, Soustelle's reference to the Arab colonisation of Algeria performed an 
important function in the legitimisation of the claims of the European settler 
community to have an inalienable right to live there. Dine has argued that 'whether 
born in Algeria or not, the European population could never be of the land in the way 
that its indigenous population all too plainly were'. In contrast, Soustelle's reasoning 
blurs the distinction between `colonisers' and the `indigenous population'. Since the 
only difference between the Arab and European colonisation of Algeria was one of 
timing, the French presence could only be disputed by the imposition of some 
arbitrary distinction over the amount of time that `colonisers' had to inhabit a 
particular territory before becoming `indigenous'. Arabs could not, according to his 
logic, denounce the evils of colonialism without denying their own legitimacy as 
inhabitants of Algeria. This point was made explicitly in Le drame algerien: 
Dites-vous bien, et que chacun se dise bien, que ces Francais d'Algerie ont le droit d'¬tre lä- 
bas, autant que tout autre. Depuis les Puniques jusqu'aux Francais, en passant par les 
Romains, les Vandales, les Arabes et les Turcs, personne n'est entre en Algerie autrement 
que par la conquete. Si la presence francaise est illegitime, seuls les BerbBres peuvent 
invoquer un droit qui se perd dans les brumes de la proto-histoire. (DA 23-4) 
Soustelle accepted that the principle of the `One and Indivisible Republic' applied to 
Algeria, stating that, `L'Algerie n'est pas une colonie, mais une province' (DA, 62); 
Algeria and France were joined by unbreakable bonds, and history could not be 
rewritten to make it otherwise: 
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Qu'on le veuille ou non, il ya une Algerie ; cette Algdrie n'est pas, n'en deplaise aux sots 
qui rdpPtent des slogans, une «colonie ». C'est une creation, une symbiose (... ) Il ne seit de 
rien de dire ou de penser qu'il eüt mieux valu ne pas debarquer A Sidi-Ferruch: nous n'y 
pouvons plus rien. Nous sommes lids ä 1'Algerie pour le meilleur et pour le pire. (DA, 36-7) 
As a pied-noir, Camus was equally reluctant to embrace the possibility of Algerian 
independence. In an open letter written in 1955 to an Algerian militant, he called for 
`des reformes necessaires et decisives qui relanceront la communaute franco-arabe 
d'Algerie sur la route d'avenir'. 3 He failed to anticipate the manner in which the 
combat would ultimately be resolved, seemingly unable to countenance the possibility 
of an exclusively Muslim Algeria: `Le "fait francais" ne peut etre elimine en Algerie 
et le reve d'une disparition subite de la France est pueril'(p. 128). Once the fighting 
ceased, he believed that the Europeans and Muslims of Algeria would still have to 
share the same country and for this reason asserted that the war could profit no-one: 
'Cette guerre sera sans vainqueurs reels et qu'apres comme avant eile, il nous faudra 
encore, et toujours, vivre ensemble sur la meme terre' (p. 129). By 1958, he at least 
recognised the possibility that the conflict might end in a French withdrawal but 
remained equally ill-disposed towards it. 
Beyond Colonialism 
Whilst reformers did not view colonialism as intrinsically blameworthy and rejected 
independence, they claimed not to support the colonial status quo. In 1965, Soustelle 
was to describe integration as `vraiment chargee de progres humain (... ) veritablement 
decolonisatrice', continuing: `L'integration n'etait pas le colonialisme mais son 
contraire' (PT, 130). Clearly, he entertained a different understanding of the term 
`decolonisation' to the one that might be more conventionally understood, believing 
that it was possible to somehow go beyond colonialism without necessarily bringing 
the French presence to an end. J. Reis, writing for the Revue Socialiste in 1958, 
maintained a similar perspective: `Le depassement du Stade colonial par une colonie 
n'aboutit point forcement ä la secession', he proclaimed. 
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Within these promises to move beyond existing colonial practice was an admission 
that the colonial status quo was discriminatory. Reis exhorts his fellow countrymen to 
avoid previous errors: "Ne recommenrons pas en Algerie ce qui fut la faute d'un 
siecle un quart'. 5 Likewise, Albert Bayet, Vice-President of the Ligue des droits de 
1'homme and a figure of impressive democratic credentials, accepted that France's 
civilising mission had not been entirely benevolent: `Que nous ayons commis des 
fautes en Algerie, nul, je crois, ne le conteste. '6 He argued that the war could only be 
justified if seen as a new departure, rather than a retrograde defence of the old colonial 
order: 'S'il etait question de recourir ä la force pour maintenir des abus, pour defendre 
des privileges, notre protestation serait unanime'. 7 For Colonel Roger Barberot, the 
privileged positions enjoyed by Algeria's European population had to be overturned. 
The purpose of the French Army's combat was to forge a new, liberal Algeria in 
which both communities had their rightful place rather than to maintain an outdated 
and discriminatory colonial order: 
Si la France est obligee de poursuivre la lutte, eile doit bien preciser qu'elle ne se bat pas 
pour la domination et le maintien des privileges mais pour imposer les institutions liberales 
qui empecheront une communaute d'opprimer 1'autre. 8 
A commitment to reform necessarily required action to address the desperate poverty 
in which many Muslims found themselves. Reformers believed that the French people 
had a duty to undertake the financial commitment to transform Algeria. Responding to 
the argument that the partisans of integration would swiftly recoil when presented 
with the bill for Algerian reconstruction, Reis countered that there was an overriding 
moral imperative to help born of humanitarian duty and left-wing fraternity. To accept 
the financial sacrifice of keeping Algeria was, for Socialists, both a 'vertu' and a 
'devoir' even though it was possible that living standards in mainland France would 
suffer as a result. Rather than reluctantly resign themselves to this eventuality, it was 
better that Socialists accepted it 'par un sens de la fraternite ou si Pon prefere par une 
mystique de 1'egalite sans laquelle le socialisme democratique risquerait de se 
dessecher'. 9 
57 
In Le drame algerien, Soustelle accepts that the implementation of a radical long-term 
plan to transform the Algerian economy would not be pain free for the French 
taxpayer: `Que 1'Algerie exige de nous un effort enorme d'investissements, je crois 
avoir ete un des premiers ä en faire prendre conscience ä l'opinion' (DA, 30). 
Comparing Algeria to mainland France as he was prone to do, he caustically observed 
that the logical extension of Aron's economic anti-colonialism was that the poorest 
provinces in France should also be accorded their independence: 
L'Algerie est une charge, done il faut la larguer: avec un tel raisonnement, je ne crois pas 
que la Corse, la LozBre, les Causses, les montagnes des Cdvennes aient beaucoup de chances 
de demeurer dans la communaute francaise. Si l'on en croyait M. Aron chaque departement 
devrait presenter son bilan de fin d'annee, et les provinces qui coütent au lieu de rapporter 
subiraient leurjuste chätiment: l'independance. (DA 29-30) 
In defence of the reformers, this willingness to commit France to a long-term 
renovation of Algeria was evidence of their good will. Yet whilst the likes of Reis and 
Soustelle could make the case that Algeria ought to have been supported, they could 
not, of course, answer for the rest of France. 
`La France se nomme diversite' 
Reformers' calls for an end to colonial exploitation did not merely amount to an 
endorsement of the traditional rhetoric of the civilising mission. Armed with good 
intentions to make amends for the historical 'failures' of the French colonial presence 
in Algeria as he understood them to be, Soustelle declared his intention to move 
beyond the unfulfilled policy of assimilation. He recognised that there were obvious 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences between native Algerians and the people of 
mainland France and considered integration to be a more enlightened version of the 
previous policy insofar as it recognised and celebrated the separateness of the Muslim 
personality rather than seeking to suppress it. He quoted approvingly from the Special 
Commission of the Fourth Congress of the Indigenous Peoples of the Americas in 
which integration was described as part of an egalitarian ideal, tolerant and respectful 
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of differences and which in no way implied the domination of one section of the 
population over another: 
L'integration sociale d'un pays ne semble pas exiger que tous ses habitants deviennent 
culturellement uniformes. Elle demande simplement qu'ils developpent un ajustement 
mutuel chaque jour meilleur, qui leur permette de reconnaltre 1'existence d'une nation 
commune ä tous. Elle n'exige pas non plus que les habitants d'un territoire national se 
transforment en non autochtones. 10 
Like Soustelle, Bayet also pledged his support for a pluralistic, multi-cultural 
conception of Frenchness, offering a comparison between the ethnic diversity of 
Algeria and the cultural differences amongst the inhabitants of Metropolitan France: 
Les provinces qui composent aujourd'hui la France ont W durant un long temps trios 
diffrentes les unes des autres. Si differentes qu'elles se battaient sans cesse. II a fallu 
conquerir la Bretagne, conquerir la Flandre, conquerir l'Alsace, conquerir la Franche- 
Comtd. Et puis un jour, l'unite s'est faite. Certes, Bretons, Flamands, Alsaciens, Francs- 
Comtois ont garde leurs originalites, et nous nous en felicitons. Qui dit diversite dit richesse. 
Au sein de cette indivision, pourquoi les Algeriens n'occuperaient-ils pas une place 
semblable A Gelles qu'occupent les Bretons, les Normands, les Flamands, les Provencaux ?" 
Bayet's comparison was based on the apparently reasonable and liberal assumption 
that, in spite of the diversity of its inhabitants, a national community could not only 
survive but flourish. The individual character of the provinces of Metropolitan France 
was invoked as evidence that Algeria's different religious, ethnic and cultural mixture 
did not render it in any way incapable of being integrated. Just like Soustelle's 
references to the colonisation of Europe by the Ancient Romans, Bayet's comparison 
does not stand up to closer scrutiny. The differences between Savoie, a geographically 
adjacent territory incorporated into the French state, and Algeria, separated from 
France by the Mediterranean are obvious. 12 When one adds to this the differences in 
religion, ethnicity, forms of social organisation and technological sophistication, 
Bayet's comparison appears somewhat fanciful. Even where one wishes to support the 
view that peoples of different ethnicity, religion and language can enjoy peaceful 
cohabitation within the same nation against theories of ethnic or religious separatism, 
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the case is not advanced by an over-simplistic comparison which goes to the other 
extreme by assuming an unproblematic integration. 
Furthermore, what Bayet perhaps unwittingly provides here is a mandate for any form 
of imperialism in which notions of the consent on the part of those to be integrated 
can effectively be ignored. Although Bayet sought to atone for the original seizure of 
Algeria by arguing that Metropolitan France was also enlarged through conquest, this 
in turn ignored both the specific character of nineteenth century imperial expansion 
driven by a belief in European superiority over the colonised peoples and the ongoing 
discrimination which the latter suffered at European hands. As Dine puts it: 
Colonialism's expropriation of the indigenous population is not in the nature of a single, 
properly punctual, injustice; it is rather a process, a continual denial of the colonized's 
natural rights. It is, in consequence, not liable to be forgotten, still less forgiven; it exists or 
it does not, it cannot be rendered more humane. " 
The `consent potential' 
On other occasions, reformers were more careful in claiming that Algeria's indigenous 
population did indeed want to be integrated. Reviewing his integration project in 1961 
as Algeria edged ever closer towards independence, Soustelle wrote: 
Or, dans mon esprit, il n'etait nullement question d'imposer de force l'integration et le 
ralliement des Musulmans constituait bien une condition sine qua non, dont j'etais sür 
d'ailleurs qu'elle serait remplie si les circonstances 6taient favorables. (ET, 33) 
This `consent potential' as we might term it, was pivotal to the reformers' 
representations of the colonial situation since it allowed them to reconcile their 
support for the war with liberal principles. Muslims were perceived as sympathetic to 
plans to make them French citizens apart entiere whilst the FLN were thought to be 
unrepresentative of Muslims' aspirations. Since, for reformers, the continuation of the 
French presence was welcomed by the vast majority of Muslims, the prosecution of 
the war against the FLN could be justified on the grounds that it was both democratic 
and respectful of the right of national self-determination. 
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This belief that the consent of the Muslim population could still be obtained puts 
reformers' criticism of colonialism into perspective. When Soustelle wrote Aimee et 
Souffrante Algerie in 1955, he still believed in the recoverability of Algeria. Although 
admitting that damage had been done to the position of the French, he did not think 
that the deficiencies of French colonialism prior to the outbreak of the rebellion had 
sounded the death knell of Algerie francaise. Despite expressing fears over 'les 
consequences de tant de refus (comme celui du projet Blum-Violette) et de tant 
d'atermoiements', he believed that it would be foolish not to make a last attempt to 
integrate Algeria: 'Cependant ce serait folie que de ne pas faire cette ultime 
tentative'. 14 His actions throughout the Algerian war can be viewed as a constant 
attempt to carry out this final effort. 
Rather than dwell upon the faults of the past, reformers urged all those connected with 
the Algerian problem to look to the future. As Smith has observed, for many French 
people 'to acknowledge past injustices only increased the French desire to do right in 
the present. And it was by no means obvious that the right course of action meant 
leaving Algeria to its own devices'. '5 In fact, almost by definition, the belief that past 
mistakes had been costly but not to the point where Algeria remained irrecoverable 
was shared by all those who favoured colonial reform. Jacques Chevallier, the pro- 
reform mayor of Algiers, writing just after the return to power of General de Gaulle, 
remained convinced that, provided sufficient good will was exhibited by the 
Europeans, Algeria could still be saved: 
Rien ne sera perdu non seulement en Algdrie, mais encore en Afrique du Nord si les 
Algeriens trop souvent aveugles par la conscience de leur seul merite savent enfin avoir une 
conscience non moins egale de leurs erreurs, et, en en tirant mati8re ä enseignement positif, 
en evitent le renouvellement. 16 
Camus, like Soustelle, expressed concern that failure to implement reform in the past 
had been severely detrimental to relations with Muslims. The events of Setif in 1945, 
he claimed, should have been sufficient to make the Europeans realise the error of 
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their ways. Far from stifling any hint of rebellion amongst the Muslim population, as 
many had believed, Camus argued that Setif was instead `un signal de depart'. '? He 
believed manipulation of the electoral process had caused a further haemorrhage of 
support for the idea of French citizenship amongst the Arab population: 
Les elections truquees de 1948 en particulier ont ä la fois illustre le mensonge et decourage 
definitivement le peuple arabe. Jusqu'ä cette date les Arabes voulaient tous titre francais. A 
partir de cette date, une grande partie d'entre eux n'a plus voulu 1'etre. 1$ 
Whilst this might be a selective reading of Algeria's history, ignoring the nationalist 
or proto-nationalist movements which had existed prior to 1948, Camus' main point 
was that the nationalist demands had been stoked by lack of generosity and fairness on 
the part of the French. Nevertheless, as we saw earlier, Camus did not see any real 
alternative to reform and still believed that Europeans and Muslims could find some 
way in which to cohabit peacefully. Moreover, he stressed that the European settler 
population should not be permanently blamed for previous failings and thought it a 
time for reconciliation: 
Il est dangereux de lui demander de s'avouer seule coupable et de la vouer a une penitence 
perpetuelle. Je crois en Algerie ä une politique de reparation, non ä une politique 
d'expiation. C'est en fonction de l'avenir qu'il faut poser les problemes, sans remAcher 
interminablement les fautes du pass&. 19 
Comments like these have led Smith to attack Camus for never really grasping the 
nettle of settler responsibility for colonial injustices and for consistently referring to 
his European counterparts `as though they should be Good Samaritans'. 20 Calls to 
essentially wipe the slate clean, or at least that part of it which the colonial reformers 
saw as negative about the French presence, although not bereft of good intentions, 
neatly side-stepped the issue of just how blameworthy the French were for the 
situation in Algeria. 
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Reformers within the French Army 
The Sections Administratives Specialisees (SAS) 
In order to implement his plans for remaking Algeria and to facilitate the full 
integration of the territory into mainland France, a task which would have been 
difficult enough under peacetime conditions let alone against the backdrop of the 
FLN's armed struggle, Soustelle required the help of the French Army. For this 
reason, he created the SAS, special detachments based on the Bureaux Arabes of 
France's colonial past which were sent into the heart of the Algerian outback to deal 
with any of the problems which the local inhabitants faced . 
21 The prime directives of 
the SAS officers were not to crush the FLN by force of arms but to discredit it in the 
eyes of the Muslim masses, promote the benefits of French rule and prepare the 
ground for a long-term integration. Their mission was predicated upon a belief that 
there would be a continued French presence in Algeria for many years to come, 
supported by increased investment. Herein lay the recognition that the Muslim 
community had legitimate grievances with regard to the social and economic 
conditions under which it was forced to live. Although the name suggests that the 
SAS were primarily intended to play an administrative role, a soldier attached to this 
corps often found himself fulfilling a multitude of tasks such as engineer, doctor, civil 
servant and planner. As Colonel Barberot comments: 
Voilä qu'on avait commence ä lui faire comprendre qu'il fallait s'occuper de la population, 
manipuler le mercurochrome, les antibiotiques et les sulfamides, contr6ler et recenser la 
population, lui donner du travail, parler bulldozers et ponts et chaussdes, routes, credits, 
apprendre ä la population ä s'administrer, entrer dans la politique locale, etc., et qu'on lui 
demandait d'etre la bonne ä tout faire de la nation. 22 
In these multiple roles, the soldiers of the SAS had to be flexible enough to adapt to 
the particularities of the circumstances in which they found themselves. Writing in Le 
Monde in 1957, Philippe Herreman speculated that of the 600 SAS units operational 
at that time, no two carried out exactly the same mission. 23 
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It should be noted that strictly military considerations were not totally absent from the 
duties of the SAS officers. Muslim villagers were actively encouraged to take sides 
against the FLN with the goal of forming local militias which would then be able to 
contribute to the ongoing pacification effort. In brief, the mission of the SAS, as John 
Ambler has noted, was both socio-political and military whereby 'arming local 
villagers, winning the confidence of the local population, and increasing economic 
prosperity in the pacified zone (... ) prepared the population in progressively larger 
areas in turn to accept French authority' 24 
Perhaps the theme most commonly associated with the French Army's role in the 
Algerian war is that of war atrocities. In the light of the now largely uncontested 
reports, widely circulated in newspaper articles, periodicals and first-hand testimonial 
accounts, the conventional wisdom now holds that the Army played an inglorious and 
entirely repressive role. The paratrooper is singled out for special vilification; as 
Patrick Rotman comments, in the eyes of the world, `le para d'Algerie fut un salaud, 
un tortionnaire, un casseur de fells'. 25 
The SAS have, to a certain extent, escaped some of this criticism and their activities 
have not been as uniformly denounced as other sectors of the Army. For Ambler, 
those selected for leadership of an SAS detachment 'understood the requirements of 
lasting pacification' and 'were usually aware that random and uncontrolled brutality 
was self-defeating'. 26 For Frank Giles, the SAS offered `a practical expression of the 
presence francaise which was at once humane and effective'. 7 Horne has referred to 
the SAS as `a selflessly devoted and courageous band of men' and argues that their 
role in improving living standards amongst Algeria's Muslims made them particular 
targets for the FLN28 Schalk, in his comparative study of the Algerian War and 
American involvement in Vietnam, argues that soldiers became more aware of the 
wider social implications of the conflict and started to see themselves as reformers: 'In 
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both wars, through "pacification" programmes, this new breed of more educated 
soldiers came to believe that they had the power to enact social reform. '29 
There is, nonetheless, enormous potential to romanticise about the SAS officer. 
According to Pierre Sergent, the activities of the SAS officer can be compared to the 
humanitarian missions carried out by relief agencies around the world: 
Que les mddecins sans fronti6res, les membres des organisations humanitaires d'aujourd'hui 
lisent Ce t6moignage. Its decouvriront que les `soldats colonialistes' dont ils ont appris ä 
condamner l'action n'avaient pas d'autres motivations que le mieux-¬tre des populations qui 
leur etaient confides 30 
Sergent's role as former head of OAS-Metro and his present-day connections with the 
Front National do not mark him out as a reliable commentator. Supporters of the 
Front National, with their scarcely concealed racism and strident anti-immigrant 
rhetoric, most vehement when directed against immigrants of North African origin, 
are not the most qualified to pronounce upon the generosity of France's intentions 
towards Algeria's Muslim population and the benevolence of her civilising mission. 
Even if Sergent's status is ignored, his comparison remains wide of the mark. The 
actions of the SAS in Algeria bore no more than a passing resemblance to the work 
undertaken by organisations involved in the process of humanitarian aid. Unlike the 
French in Algeria, Medecins sans frontieres and other aid agencies are non- 
governmental, have no overt political agenda and their dispensation of aid is largely 
unconditional. 
In addition, such eulogies of the SAS only tell part of the story for they ignore the fact 
that the dictates of the war and the shortage of skilled Arabic and Berber-speaking 
specialists in France often meant that officers were sent to the Algerian outback 
lacking in competence and having received very little training. Perhaps for this reason, 
there were those in the SAS detachments who often ignored the humanitarian 
concerns upon which their mission was supposedly based and who carried out the 
kind of atrocities more often associated with the paratrooper regiments. 
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The Cinquieme Bureau 
During the war, the activities of the SAS were widely reported by the Army's 
Cinquieme Bureau, the main source of military propaganda. The spin doctors of their 
day, soldiers attached to the Cinquieme Bureau were assigned the specific task of 
interpreting events so as to promote the benefits of a continued French presence. 1 By 
virtue of the predominantly socio-administrative role that was assigned to them, it was 
the SAS who were often shown in tracts or posters as the human face of the French 
military presence. 
The Gin quieme Bureau produced pamphlets, tracts, radio broadcasts and films for the 
consumption of the Muslim population. These were simplistic in nature and drew 
strongly on the themes of the civilising mission: the French brought civilisation, 
progress and well-being whereas the FLN offered only misery, ruin and destruction 32 
Given the proliferation of French Army atrocities, it is tempting to view Ginquieme 
Bureau material as no more than a gloss, a desperate grope for a sanitised rhetoric 
amidst the brutality of the conflict. That military propaganda deliberately exaggerated 
the Army's commitment to reform is certainly true but does not constitute the whole 
story. It only partly explains the fact that, by 1957, the Army had adopted integration 
as its own policy for Algeria and, in so doing, had gone further and had been less 
ambiguous in the elaboration of its goals than the government in Paris. 33 Similarly, it 
only partially accounts for the fact that during the turbulent month of May 1958, 
amidst the coup of sorts unleashed in Algiers by the settler community, French 
soldiers had busied themselves in the Casbah 'coaxing the Muslims to turn out and 
stirring them up with heady assurances of equality and reform' 34 
Rather than view French military propaganda as either blatant falsification or, at the 
other extreme, as indicative of a sincere and deep-felt commitment to reform within 
the Army, it is more appropriate to view the espousal of integration by many, if not 
the totality, of influential figures within the Army as a marriage of reason, a pragmatic 
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choice as much as it was a sincere one. As Kelly has observed: `Dynamic social 
improvements for the Muslims were often favoured, not just for their own sake, but as 
a rational instrument for winning the conflict. '35 Girardet confirms this point noting 
that integration was for the French Army a `politique empirique (... ) etroitement He 
aux imperatifs et aux modalites de la lutte quelle a pour mission de mener'. 36 
The reason for this is to be found in the nature of the conflict. Against the assembled 
might of the French Army, the FLN would have been swiftly crushed in a face-to-face 
battle fought along traditional lines. The nationalists, perhaps encouraged by the 
successful application of guerrilla warfare tactics against the French by the Vietminh 
in Indochina, avoided wherever possible direct military confrontation and made 
control of the civilian population its primary goal. As J. Cayol, writing in Le Bled puts 
it: 
Il s'agit de conquerir non plus le terrain, mais les esprits. Les populations indochinoises ont 
connu ce nouvel aspect de la lutte qui consistait ä faire precher un veritable catechisme 
rouge par le Vietminh communiste. Dans l'affaire algdrienne, nous retrouvons ces memes 
methodes employees cette fois par le FLN. 37 
Also like the Vietminh before it, the FLN had a clear goal with which the Muslim 
population of Algeria could identify: independence. For Cayol, the promise held out 
by the nationalists of an independent Algerian nation could be considered as `une We 
suffisamment dynamique et simple pour abuser toute une population'. 38 To avoid a 
repetition of the failure in Indochina, French theorists of counter-subversive warfare 
(1a guerre revolutionnaire), argued that the Army in Algeria needed to offer a political 
project equally unambiguous and attractive. As Paul-Marie de la Gorce has observed, 
`Le besoin d'un "but de guerre", clair et definitif, parut indispensable au corps des 
officiers. '39 Girardet confirms this point, noting that the Army required `une autre foi 
ä la foi qui animait les rebelles', a vision of the future capable of combating `la 
puissante mystique que proposait et que vehiculait avec eile la rebellion' 40. Reform 
was thought to hold the key to victory, hence the Army's adoption of integration. 
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Algeria's Muslim population was not the only target audience for French military 
propaganda. Without an understanding of the aims and objectives for which he was 
fighting, the French soldier, in most cases a conscript or reservist, could not 
effectively attempt to win `hearts and minds' for France. The aim of the publications 
of the Cinquieme Bureau was to turn every soldier into a political activist, capable of 
demonstrating through both word and deed the merits of French rule: `Il s'agit de faire 
du soldat un combattant actif, d'obtenir son adhesion aux missions qui lui sont fixees', 
observed Captain Souyris, one of the more prominent military writers of the day. 41 As 
a military manual produced in 1957 for troops on active duty in the Sahara stated: 
Chaque militaire, quel que soit son grade, doit savoir que dans cette lutte, il joue ici le role 
essentiel, car c'est par lui et i travers lui, que la France sera connue, comprise, aimee, 
voulue. 11 est le premier instrument de la pacification. Mais pour jouer ce role, il doit ¬tre 
un partisan, convaincu de la cause francaise et de l'importance decisive que lui, soldat, peut 
avoir pour le triomphe de cette cause. 42 (original emphasis) 
The main organ of military propaganda destined for French troops was Le Bled, a free 
newspaper delivered throughout Algeria which sought both to entertain and educate 
the soldier, combining puzzles and trivial news from 'back home' with more serious 
discussion on the conflict and reports on the evolution of government policy. Proof of 
the importance attached to this propaganda can be found in Colonel Lacheroy's claim 
that Le Bled was an important tool of psychological action. 3 Le Bled had a circulation 
of 350,000 which was almost as great as Le Figaro, nearly twice as many as Le 
Monde and more than any weekly in Metropolitan France. One of its editions was also 
produced in Arabic for those Muslims who served in the French army. Almost all of 
the early issues carried the slogan `De Dunkerque A Tamanrasset' alongside the title, 
demonstrating commitment to the continuation of a French presence on Algerian soil. 
Its pages were filled with numerous accounts of harmonious co-operation between 
French soldiers and Muslims and of the benefits of the French presence. Messages of 
encouragement to the troops from sympathetic political figures such as Guy Mollet, 
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Robert Lacoste, Jacques Soustelle and Max Lejeune were a staple component of many 
issues. 44 
The key elements of the reform strategies articulated by civilian commentators such as 
Soustelle were mirrored in the pages of this newspaper as they were in brochures, 
communiques and pamphlets produced for the French soldier by the Cinquieme 
Bureau and which were intended to legitimate the French military undertaking and 
stress the benevolence of the Army's intentions. According to a 1957 manual, by 
choosing to give their allegiance to France, the Algerian people would receive: 
La paix, la prosperit8, la satisfaction de toutes les legitimes aspirations des deux 
as communautes, le maintien de ses libertes et de ses croyances, un avenir digne d'elle 
Equally typical is a pamphlet entitled Maintenant vous connaissez 1'Algerie produced 
for French conscripts who were about to be demobilised which set out the nature of 
the Army's task in the following manner: 
Il s'agit simultane ment: 
De relever le niveau de vie des population musulmanes encore trop souvent miserables 
D'e quiper, d'industrialiser ce territoire pour cre er de 1'emploi ä une population sans cesse 
croissante. 
Et aussi 
De poursuivre la lutte contre l'ignorance et I'analphabetisme 
De former encore plus de cadres et de techniciens 46 
Dissenting Voices 
The Army was not a homogeneous body and cannot be seen as essentially 'knowable' 
by subsuming the currents of thought to be found amongst its soldiers into a single, 
linear narrative adopted by the Cinquieme Bureau in which the contradictions and 
differing positions are swept away. To our argument that the support for reform can be 
considered as a 'marriage of reason' on the Army's part, certain caveats must be 
attached. Firstly, whilst almost every military publication from 1954 onwards 
contained an article on the nature of counter-subversive warfare, not all amongst the 
upper echelons of the military, particularly those who had not served in Indochina, 
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were won over to the guerre revolutionnaire doctrine, especially in the early stages of 
the conflict. 7 Secondly, Ambler's research has shown the Army in Algeria to be an 
ideologically divided body even amongst those who accepted the basic tenets of 
guerre revolutionnaire theory. He identifies three distinct currents of thought. The 
first group, broadly sharing the ideals of integration, was closest to the official line. 
The pro-integration camp was flanked on one side by officers motivated by 'an 
integriste style of Catholicism which rejected liberal democracy and drew an 
authoritarian political philosophy directly from a dogmatic view of Catholic theology' 
and whose views were most closely represented by the publication, Verbe. It was 
flanked on the other side by a group of officers, who, vehement in their opposition to 
Communism, whose agents they imagined the FLN to be, were no less opposed to 
what they saw as the decadence of Western capitalism. The clear fascist tendencies of 
this grouping were perhaps most closely associated with Colonel Antoine Argoud 48 
Reservations must also be expressed about the extent to which the sentiments 
expressed in Cinquieme Bureau propaganda were even read, let alone shared, by 
French conscripts and reservists. Whilst some supported the Army's aims, many more 
were indifferent and many opposed them on ideological grounds. 49 
In summary, the pro-reform sentiments emanating from the Cinquieme Bureau cannot 
be dismissed as totally divorced from the opinions of the soldiers in the field. 
Cinquieme Bureau support for reform was part propaganda, part elaboration of best 
practice consistent with the theme of integration that should have been followed by 
soldiers. The sentiments expressed therein were those of a reforming current which 
had to co-exist with several other schools of thought within the French Army. It is 
with this reforming current that our interest lies in this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
READING THE COLONIAL PAST AND 
ANTICIPATING THE TASK AHEAD 
Reformers' assessments of what was to be done in Algeria were, in part, informed by 
their interpretation of what had 'gone wrong'. Since they continued to believe in a 
future French presence, the task of explaining away the miserable living conditions of 
most Muslims generated by 130 years of French colonialism required a great deal of 
verbal and intellectual subterfuge. The purpose of this chapter is to track the different 
readings adopted by reformers of France's colonial past and to explore their 
understanding of the size of the task that faced them. Accordingly, it analyses the way 
in which reformers responded to the charge. levelled by anti-colonial thinkers that 
colonialism was as an immobile system of exploitation, incapable of reform. Their 
responses are grouped into a number of categories ranging from genuine regret at the 
treatment which many Muslims had received at the hands of the French through to a 
spirit of self-congratulation in the face of France's colonial `achievements'. The final 
section of the chapter will present the over-optimistic assessment produced by 
reformers of the ease with which the problems in Algeria could be solved. 
Reformers and the Failings of Colonialism 
The European superiority complex 
Amongst the faults of French colonialism seen as contributory factors in the outbreak 
of the rebellion, reformers cited the disdain of the settler for the Muslim. Settler 
attitudes, they claimed, were unacceptable. In a series of articles on the state of 
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poverty in Kabylia, appearing in Alger republicain in 1939, Camus argued that the 
Europeans had much to learn from the inhabitants of Kabylia who he sought to portray 
as a reflective people capable of giving `des lecons de sagesse aux conquerants 
inquiets que nous sommes'. He proclaimed them to be a noble people, 'plus sage' than 
their mediocre French conquerors who were driven by 'cette fievre et ce besoin de 
pouvoir'. t Such statements have led Schalk to comment that the Camus of 1939 was 
`extremely ambivalent and perhaps a little guilty about colonization. In 1958, Camus 
condemned the collective failure of the European settler population to appreciate the 
worth of the indigenous people, critiquing the `attitude souvent meprisante ou 
desinvolte de beaucoup de Francais'. Settler arrogance created amongst the Muslim 
population the 'complexe d'humiliation qui est au centre du drame actuel' 3 
Like Camus, Soustelle denounced the 'complexe de superiorite culturelle et raciale' 
which had historically characterised some of the attitudes of the Europeans towards 
the Muslims (AS, 67). These attitudes, he claimed, were all the more intolerable when 
adopted by ill-educated Europeans: 'Ces attitudes, toujours condamnables, deviennent 
intolerables lorsqu'elles sont le fait d'individus ignorants et grossiers s'adressant ä des 
gens plus "evolues" qu'eux-memes' (AS, 68). He had expressed similar sentiments in a 
communique sent out in 1955 to civil servants in Algeria in which he had stressed 
that, whilst the `danger du mepris' was less than it had been in the past, Europeans 
still did not treat Muslims with the respect which he felt they deserved. 4 
For Jacques Mercier, writing in the military review Contacts in 1958, the settler 
population was reaping what it had sown. By refusing to treat the Muslims with 
dignity, settlers had created the conditions for the nationalist revolt: 
Plus leurs oreilles etaient rebattues de I'affirmation 'I'Algerie, c'est la France', plus leur 
cceur s'humiliait, plus leur esprit se rdvoltait contre la distance ou la familiarite blessante 
que les Francais de souche avaient ete accoutume d'adopter ä leur egard. Le mouvement de 
revolte qui a pris naissance en Algerie s'explique en partie par une soff de considerations s 
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A very similar analysis was produced in a 1958 Cinquieme Bureau study into the 
methods by which settlers and Muslims might be brought closer together. The report 
stated that amongst the European population there was `une certain forme de racisme 
se trahissant par un complexe de superiorite qui entraine lui-meme la constitution 
d'une societe "fermee", hostile au musulman'. 6 One of the causes of the rebellion, the 
report argued, was `l'attitude de la population europeenne qui, vivant derriere un 
ecran n'avait 'avec les autochtones que des relations de superieur a subordonne, 
d'employeur ä employe'. 7 
An article appearing in early 1958 in one of the more modest divisional bulletins of 
the French Army cited the case of a young, educated Muslim woman who recalled 
how she had joined the rebellion because she had never been treated with equal status 
by the Europeans for whom she was always a `mauresque' or `fatma'. For the authors 
of this bulletin, such a fault had to be rectified: `Sans vouloir excuser l'egarement de 
cette jeune fille, il serait criminel de negliger ce reproche'. 8 
If the expression of such sentiments showed reformers to be partially sensitive to the 
existence of the European superiority complex, they were not completely so. Dine has 
drawn attention to the difference between Camus' political activity in favour of the 
indigenous population and his literary production, arguing that Camus' representation 
of the Arab in his fictional works replicated those attitudes of European superiority 
which elsewhere he sought to denounce .9 The charge of (unconscious) 
hypocrisy 
might, with equal justification, be levelled at Soustelle. In this and subsequent 
chapters, we will see how Eurocentric attitudes permeated his reforming intentions. At 
this stage, we are simply concerned to show that both Soustelle and Camus recognised 
that settler attitudes towards the Muslims had been unacceptable and that these had 
contributed to the deterioration of the colonial situation, even where they were not 
always mindful of their own role in perpetuating it. 
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The Intolerable Conditions 
Another frequent reproach brought against colonialism by reformers was the way in 
which it had led to an uneven distribution of wealth and opportunity. In the conclusion 
to the Chroniques algeriennes, Camus pointed to the economic inequities yielded by 
the colonial system as an issue which needed to be addressed, citing the unfair 
distribution of land and wealth, worsened by the rapid birth-rate amongst the Muslim 
population. 1° It was, by this stage, a familiar theme of his writing about Algeria. His 
1939 articles set out his opposition to the colonial system which had kept Algeria's 
Muslim population in a position of permanent poverty. He denounced the idea that the 
Muslims had fewer needs than their European counterparts, stressing that there was 
`rien de plus meprisable que ces arguments'! 1 That Muslims managed to eke out an 
existence hardly implied that they were happy with their lot. The conditions under 
which the Kabylian peasants worked were appalling, `un regime d'esclavage' as he 
termed it (p. 51). He also criticised the settler belief that the Kabylians were lazy and 
for this reason deserved to be poorly paid. Such an argument derived from `une 
logique abjecte' according to which workers, lacking money to buy food, had no 
strength to work which, in turn, resulted in lower pay (p. 55). He also attacked the 
French for their failure to provide adequate schooling opportunities for the Kabylians. 
Money had been unwisely spent on a small number of well-equipped schools, ill- 
adapted to the needs of the indigenous population for whom there was a desperate 
shortage of school places. These showpiece schools had been built `pour les touristes 
et les commissions d'enquete' sacrificing `au prejuge du prestige les besoins 
elementaires du peuple indigene' (p. 63). Moreover, if the aim was really to turn 
Algerians into fully-fledged French citizens, it was a mistake, Camus believed, to 
separate the schooling of the Muslim children from that of the Europeans (p. 64). 
The dual assertions that Algeria's indigenous population wished to escape from 
poverty and that the French had been derelict in their duties towards them was echoed 
by other reformers. Soustelle also recognised that the standard of living amongst 
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Algeria's indigenous population was unacceptable on the economic, political and 
social front: `Moi tout le premier j'ai dit, et je le repete, que les conditions de vie qui 
regnent dans ce pays au point de vue social, economique et politique sont 
insuffisantes, qu'il faut unir nos efforts pour les ameliorer' (AS, 67). Reforms had to 
be implemented `sans retard, sans excuse, sans hypocrisie' (AS, 154). Like Camus, 
Soustelle attacked those advocates of the colonial status quo who sought to justify the 
poverty of the indigenous population on the grounds that Muslims, because they were 
less civilised, were happy to accept lower standards of living. For Soustelle, such 
beliefs were ill-founded and needed to be dispelled: `Il serait absurde d'imaginer que 
le Musulman algerien de la ville ne tient pas autant qu'un autre ä un minimum de 
confort et de commodite' (AS, 63). 
As the rebellion gathered momentum, other reformers mirrored Soustelle's concern at 
the deficiencies of French rule. Bayet attacked the French for their broken promises to 
the indigenous population over reform, for the fact that a large percentage of the 
Algerian population had been denied the opportunity to go to school, and for the 
absolute poverty in which too many Algerians lived. 12 The 1958 Cinquieme Bureau 
study into settler-Muslim rapprochement also recognised `la condition inferieure qui a 
ete faite au musulman en lui refusant pendant trop longtemps 1'acces ä l'instruction, ä 
la propriete, ä la fonction publique. 13 Again, the authors held that such a policy could 
not be justified on the grounds that Muslims were happy with their lot since they had 
`une aspiration tres naturelle ä des conditions de vie plus larger et ä la 
modernisation'(p. 2). However, in the authors' eyes, this aspiration was juxtaposed 
with `un respect aveugle de coutumes perimees'(p. 2). This dismissive attitude implied 
a hierarchy with European culture at the pinnacle and the values and culture of 
indigenous society at the bottom. Even though critical of the settlers, the report 
nonetheless left intact the basic assumptions of the civilising mission. 
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By recognising some of the failings of the French, the Cinquieme Bureau report was 
able to link the outbreak of the rebellion to the fact that the material aspirations of the 
Muslims remained unfulfilled. The authors argued that the rebellion `trouve ses 
sources et ses arguments dans le mecontentement, pour une bonne part justifie, de la 
population musulmane'(p. l). This echoed a point made by Soustelle in Aimee et 
souffrante Algerie with reference to a visit he had made to Kabylia during 1955. 
Support for the rebellion, he argued, had been garnered on the back of poverty and 
unemployment: `Les forces de desagregation (... ) trouvent leur origine dans le 
mecontentement, on pourrait meme dire le desespoir, d'une population livree au 
chömage et ä la misere' (AS, 42-3). In Soustelle's eyes, the insurrection was not the 
product of an unstoppable nationalist urge but derived from a specific economic 
problem which, with the application of specific resources, could be solved. 
That the causes of the rebellion were primarily economic and social is an argument 
which has received the endorsement of Droz and Lever who write of the `dramatique 
disparite des conditions sociales dans laquelle le nationalisme algerien a trouve sa 
legitimite et l'insurrection son principal atout'. 14 What Soustelle, and to a lesser extent 
Droz and Lever, fail to appreciate, however, was that the rebellion was also 
underpinned by the properly political goal of national independence. As Sartre argued, 
assuming the voice of the Algerian people, no amount of economic and social reform 
could compensate for the lack of political liberty: `Meme si nous etions heureux sous 
les baionnettes francaises, nous nous battrions'. 15 Whilst, as the next chapter will 
illustrate, Sartre's was not a truly accurate representation of the aspirations of the 
totality of the Muslim population, he was certainly correct to point out that the 
nationalist movement could not be described simply as a protest against poor living 
conditions. 
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The Speed of Change 
Although critical of the French colonial presence, and in part aware of some of the 
problems created by it, reformers were not always willing to accept full French 
responsibility for its `failures'. In the words of Smith, by failing to appreciate their 
own exploitative role `the French could have an easy conscience about Algeria and 
argue, seemingly in good faith, that the Muslim community would surely benefit from 
a genuine effort on the part of Paris to pursue its "civilising mission" in North 
Africa'. 16 Rather than argue, with the anti-colonialists, that the coloniser never 
intended to improve the status of the colonised, Soustelle claimed that French colonial 
policy in Algeria had always favoured greater equality for Muslims. Its principal 
failure lay in the speed with which such reforms had been promulgated: 'Il est 
regrettable', he noted, 'qu'on n'ait marche dans cette voie ni assez vite ni assez loin' 
(AS, 68). Like Soustelle, Mercier contended that it was the slowness of the reform 
process which had created the hostility amongst the Muslim population. 
La lenteur avec laquelle ce pays tendait ä atteindre le niveau de la metropole dans le 
domaine de 1'equipement, de l'instruction et du travail, jurait avec la structure 
departementale de son administration, pourtant prometteuse d'egalite. Cette contradiction a 
pu We interprt tee comme une odieuse duperie par les populations autochtones qui ne 
bent ficiaient en fait que d'un vague statut colonial. " 
This emphasis of the slow pace of reform was important since, whilst critical of 
colonialism's failings, it gave the impression that colonialism was capable of 
evolution rather than, as the anti-colonialists claimed, immobile. And since 
colonialism was moving in the right direction, it was, for reformers, simply a matter of 
speeding up the process. 
This attitude had its parallel in the argument that it was not the French presence which 
had created the misery of the native population but, rather, a French absence. Much of 
the poverty in Algeria, Soustelle argued, resulted from a failure on the part of the 
French to have a sufficient number of administrators distributed throughout the 
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country and to work at a grassroots level with the rural poor. Looking back over a visit 
to Algeria undertaken in November 1954, he commented: 
Je sentais ä chaque pas combien noun avions laiss6 le vide se creuser derriere le decor de 
1'administration reguliere, planant trop haut alors qu'il faudrait se tenir en quelque sorte au 
ras du sol aver ceux qui vivent et qui souffrent dans ces 6tendues. (AS, 26) 
French colonialism, for Soustelle, was not inherently flawed, but had simply been 
wrongly targeted. The problem, as he saw it, was that France had tried to rule Algeria 
without putting in place adequate resources: 
Alors qu'il eflt fallu ranimer la vie locale et lui donner une impulsion energique et continue, 
on avait cru possible d'administrer aux moindres frais, en laissant ce peuple d'ombres aux 
prises avec son dur destin. (AS, 26) 
The same argument was taken up in Le Bled early in 1956. Seeking, like so many 
other articles, to explain the causes of the rebellion, the editorial evoked the 
distribution throughout Algeria of `personnel insuffisant en nombre et pas assez 
specialise' . 
18 This deficiency had been compounded by an inappropriate use of a pro- 
French Muslim elite to administer large parts of the country whereby Muslim cafds 
had often been sent to villages with which they had had no prior contact and to which 
they had no attachment. 19 
In similar vein, Captain X, an anonymous contributor to the military review Contacts, 
stated that French rule over Algeria had not been beneficial to many of those forced to 
live under it. The French, concerned only with a small Muslim elite, had ignored the 
misery of the masses and allowed native Algerians to be exploited. His suggested 
remedy to atone for 130 years of colonial neglect lay in a renewed contact with `la vie 
des petits et des pauvres, de ceux qui ont ete exploites ä notre insu'20 The charge he 
brought against the French was merely one of ignorance rather than wilful neglect; the 
true agents of colonial oppression were elsewhere and it was now incumbent upon 
those of good will to rectify the wrongs that had been done. Of course, we might 
counter this by arguing that ignorance is no defence and the extent to which French 
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authorities were truly ignorant of the exploitation taking place in Algeria is, at best, 
questionable. 
A number of historians have supported the argument that the Algerian territory was 
under-administered. Home, for example, refers to `the acute problem of under- 
administration' leading to a situation `whereby many an Algerian never encountered a 
representative of France'. I Others have argued that when the rebellion broke out in 
1954, the French were to have cause to rue these deficiencies as Algeria's chronic 
under-administration was soon exposed and exploited. The inadequacy of France's 
judicial and administrative structures enabled the FLN to establish a territory-wide 
network of contacts and activists. Ambler attributes the success of the FLN to its 'solid 
political-administrative organisation which (... ) pulled the native population out from 
an undermanned French administration'. 22 Kelly goes further arguing that prior to the 
massive reinforcement of French troops, the FLN was a force for order and stability in 
many parts of Algeria, bridging the gap between an inefficient French colonial 
administration and the former tribal rule which colonisation had upset. 23 
Whilst it might be conceded that the absence of a French administrative presence 
allowed the FLN to establish itself and build popular support in some areas without 
being subject to surveillance and repression, the 'under-administration thesis', 
particularly when offered by the likes of Soustelle, neatly side-steps the question of 
French exploitation. As Smith has pointed out, to blame the rebellion upon under- 
administration is `to deny the extent to which the Muslim problem lay in the character 
of the French presence, and to insist instead that the primary shortcoming of French 
rule was not its domination but its neglect of the Muslim population'. 24 Moreover, the 
under-administration thesis legitimated the European superiority complex. Since the 
problem lay with a `lack' of colonialism, it followed that, when left to their own 
devices, the 'natives' could not cope and that French rule was therefore necessary. It 
also appeared to take it for granted that a more benevolent and comprehensive control 
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would have led to an unproblematic acceptance of colonial rule and would have 
prevented the rebellion. Although it must remain a matter of historical speculation, 
such an assumption ignores the possibility that a revolutionary opposition to French 
control might have developed sooner amongst Algeria's indigenous population had 
French rule been more visible. 
Lost Opportunities 
Speculation about what `might have happened' in Algeria had French rule been 
different is, in fact, a common feature of writing about the conflict. 25 It figured in the 
accounts of reformers whilst the war was still ongoing and whilst, in their minds at 
least, Algeria remained eminently `saveable'. Their intention was to explain that the 
outbreak of the rebellion could have been avoided altogether if only the French had 
been more liberal in their policies prior to its outbreak. However, upon closer 
examination, these so-called `lost opportunities' for reform were intended to reinforce 
a discriminatory colonial order rather than transcend it. Writing in 1955 with regard to 
the French failure to promote with sufficient vigour Algeria's indigenous elite, 
Soustelle notes: 
Entre les deux guerres mondiales, l'elite musulmane souhaitait ardemment &tre integre eä la 
France, et lui integrer 1'Algerie. Les projets `Blum-Violette', cependant bien timides, furent 
enterres, tragique occasion manquee. On en arriva A denoncer comme anti-francais des gens 
qui exigeaient d'etre Francais. Il fallut la deuxieme guerre, la part importante et souvent 
heroique qu'y prirent les Musulmans, le developpement des idees reformistes sous le 
Gouvernement provisoire, pour qu'on reprit la marche en avant, non sans avoir gaspille un 
temps prdcieux. (AS, 68) 
Whilst attacking the rejection of these projects, Soustelle's critique can be seen as only 
partial. His assessment relies upon a optimistic picture of the reforming nature of the 
provisional government following the liberation and makes no mention of the 1945 
massacres at Setif nor the limited nature (and unapplied) provisions of the Statute of 
Algeria of 1947. It was, after all, the 1947 Statute which had introduced the notion of 
the double electoral college, which, if an improvement upon previous practice, was 
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hardly the kind of sweeping transformation that would have shown a French 
commitment to real democracy in Algeria. Although criticising settler illiberalism, 
Soustelle did not attack the 1947 Statute for seeking to enshrine some of the principles 
of European domination. 
A similar attempt to valorise these failed plans for reform which replicated rather than 
challenged colonial dominance is found in Chevallier's 1958 work Nous, Algeriens. 
Like Soustelle, Chevallier saw the Blum-Violette project and the 1947 Statute as 
`occasions manquees'. Had it functioned properly, the Algerian Assembly created by 
the 1947 Statute would have provided `un excellent moyen de contact oü se seraient 
exprimees, discutees et confrontees librement les opinions les plus diverses, quitte ä 
ce qu'une opposition se manifestät, quitte meme ä ce qu'elle soit encouragee plutöt 
que detruite ou muselee' (NA, 74-5). There is certainly an element of reforming good 
will present here insofar as Chevallier saw the Assembly as a forum in which the 
grievances of the indigenous population could be aired and dealt with. Lacking, 
however, was sufficient recognition that the nature of the Statute itself, with its 
institutionalised European superiority, might have been a source of chagrin for 
Muslims. In his criticism of the Assembly, Chevallier went no further than to attack 
the non-implementation of some of its provisions and what he regarded as the 
obstructive attitude of the administration: 
Elle [l'Assemblee] aurait pu devenir excellente et asseoir pour de longues anndes la paix et 
1'amitie entre les populations si la haute administration algerienne n'etait devenue 
maladroitement de plus en plus envahissante, comme pour reconquerir pas ä pas les 
prerogatives legalement devolues d 1'Assembiee. (NA, 78) 
This attitude is perhaps surprising since, elsewhere in his work, he recognised the 
centrality of the single electoral college as a means of showing the Muslims that they 
were French people with the same rights and the same duties. Chevallier also 
appeared to be blind to the reality that a strong opposition movement within the 
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Assembly would have furthered the cause of Algerian independence, precisely the 
reason the settlers wanted to stifle it in the first place. 
Extraneous factors 
Another tactic employed by reformers to account for Muslim poverty was to blame 
factors over which the French had no control, or to present poverty as an unfortunate 
side effect of an ongoing development of Algeria which, in itself, constituted a `good'. 
Soustelle relied upon a number of explanations to account for widespread rural 
poverty amongst Muslims - the land was infertile (AS, 57), the subsistence farming 
methods which they employed were inappropriate and too dependent upon the whims 
of the climate (AS, 58), the differences in property laws made it difficult to obtain 
credit (AS, 58), and the high birth rate meant that the land could not easily support so 
many extra mouths (AS, 60). The Muslims themselves were also seen as partly 
responsible for their own plight. With the exception of the 1.5 million Muslims 
belonging to the modem economy, supplemented by a small indigenous bourgeoisie, 
the remainder of the population `[demeure] dans le secteur archaique et [s'attarde] 
dans un moyen Age technique qui est souvent aussi un moyen age mental' (AS, 61). 
Without doubt the climate was extremely harsh and large areas of land throughout 
Algeria were not particularly suitable for farming. However, in seeking to shift the 
responsibility for Muslim poverty away from the French by according a preponderant 
importance to such factors, or worse still, to a perceived backwardness of the 
Muslims, Soustelle did much to undermine the liberal credentials which he claimed to 
espouse. 
Perhaps the work which goes furthest in shifting the blame for the 'failings' of French 
colonialism away from the notion of a totalising system of exploitation onto 
uncontrollable extraneous factors is Germaine Tilliön's reforming treatise L'Algerie en 
1957.26 Tillion was a professor at the Sorbonne but more importantly had spent a good 
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part of her life living in Algeria and was living in the Aures mountains at the time of 
the outbreak of the rebellion. The essence of Tillion's argument is that French 
colonialism had done both too much and too little for Algeria. The French had 
introduced changes into the Algerian economy with good intentions, yet whilst these 
changes had destabilised the sustainable, but archaic, economic system of pre-colonial 
Algeria, they had not been far-reaching enough to raise material conditions for the 
indigenous population to the same level as those enjoyed by the French. A key theme 
of Tillion's work is that the French had led the Algerians `au milieu du gue'? 
7 By 
introducing medical techniques, the French had helped to reduce the death rate 
without, by that stage, managing to stem the extremely high birth rate. This factor, she 
argued, had led to a population increase which in its turn had resulted in a process of 
over-grazing and more extensive land cultivation than could be supported. In other 
words, the Algerian population had grown whilst at the same time resources had 
diminished, trapping them in a downward spiral of poverty and malnutrition (AL, 30). 
Widespread rural poverty and an economy unable to absorb such a large population 
growth had led to a process of clochardisation with vast numbers of Muslims lacking 
the means by which to support themselves. Accepting that the obvious answer to this 
problem would have been to introduce birth control, Tillion explained that such 
arguments would have fallen on deaf ears amongst those populations where the aim 
was to have as many children as possible to ensure their survival in old age. 
Tillion's argument, at first glance, appears to condemn the French for having disturbed 
one pattern of living in the name of imposing another economic model upon an 
unwilling indigenous population which, while more technologically sophisticated, was 
not necessarily more beneficial. However, this is not strictly the case, for Tillion's 
description of an Algeria trapped in a kind of no-man's land between traditional 
society and modernity is placed within the context of an inevitable contact between 
under-developed and developed countries. In other words, the problems faced by the 
Algerians were not specifically of French making but were the unavoidable outcome 
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of a world in which societies at different levels of economic development have to co- 
exist. The French were thus not to blame for the state of the indigenous population in 
Algeria. Unlike thinkers such as Memmi, Tillion did not support the hypothesis that 
the French had deliberately under-developed Algeria. Although the French had caused 
poverty and misery amongst Algeria's indigenous population, they had done so 'sans le 
vouloir et sans le savoir' (AL, 13). She writes of a global problem arising out of the 
contact between civilisations which had undergone an industrial revolution and those 
which had not. She summarised the extent to which the French could be blamed for 
the prevailing conditions in Algeria the following manner: 
Responsabilites et non culpabilite, car le malheur actuel de 1'Algerie etait vraisemblablement 
inevitable - dans la mesure oil il est de sormais impossible d'8pargner ä un peuple archaique 
tout contact avec ce monstre prodigieux qu'est la Civilisation Planetaire et dans la mesure 
oii ce contact est fatal au peuple au peuple non prepare qui le cubit. II n'en est pas moins 
vrai que notre presence en Algerie a accelere le phenom8ne de d8sintegration sociale de ce 
malheureux pays. Disons, si vous preferez, que si l'Alge rie etait restee independante, sa 
population aurait seulement double, alors qu'elle a quadruple avec noun (ce qui aggrave 
considerablement sa position actuelle et contribue ä la rendre insoluble). Mais c'est une 
consequence imprevue et involontaire du «paternalisme colonial », dont nous sonunes ä la 
fois responsables et innocents - aussi responsables et aussi innocents que ceux qui en sont 
victimes. (AL, 67-8) 
The misery of the Algerian people could be attributed to the `suppression mondiale 
des epidemies, commercialisation mondiale des richesses, diffusion mondiale des 
idees, des decouvertes et des evenements' (AL, 36) (original emphasis). Running 
throughout Tillion's work is a deep sense of pessimism about whether the afflictions 
suffered by the lesser-developed countries could indeed be solved. She believed that 
piecemeal intervention on the part of the Western powers would only accentuate what 
she saw as the existing problem of countries trapped between two different 
civilisations: 
N'esperez pas qu'on puisse s'en tirer au rabais, avec un sixiPme de bulletin de vote (comme 
en Algdrie), quelques ampoules de vaccin, une gendreuse distribution de nos « invendus », et 
la «lutte contre l'analphabetisme» prönee par 1'UNESCO. Toutes ces marques de 
sollicitude ne peuvent avoir qu'un seul resultat (celui qu'effectivement elles ont): 
effondrement fatal des valeurs, des techniques et des traditions d'un peuple, accroissement 
demesurr de sa population, diminution ininterrompue de ses ressources et une distorsion 
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sociale de nature d'autant plus explosive que la sollicitude aura ete plus suivie sans titre 
suffisante. (AL, 56) 
Looking at the global picture she argued: 
En supposant (hypothese peu probable) que tous les pays privildgies se mettent rapidement 
d'accord pour s'imposer les plus grands sacrifices afin de "declochardiser" le reste de 
l'univers, en auraient-ils les moyens? 11 semble bien que non. (AL, 6 1) 
Tillion is correct to point out that the rise in the indigenous population was 
problematic, in the same way that spiralling population growth continues to prove 
problematic for some of the poorest countries in the world today. As Droz and Lever 
note, the rapid growth in population brought with it `un processus de pauperisation, 
qu'en 1'absence de toute reforme de structure les autorites francaises n'etaient plus ä 
meme de maitriser'. 28 Tillion's attempt to evoke the impersonal Juggernaut-like 
march of `Planetary Civilisation' as the principal reason for global poverty was, 
however, an excuse to let the European powers, and the French in particular, off the 
hook. Tillion phrased the problem in absolute terms - too many mouths, not enough 
resources - rather than as one, at least in part, of distribution. What she failed to 
consider is the extent to which the impact of the population explosion might have 
been cushioned had the French not monopolised the most productive areas of land. As 
Dine has noted, the need for the coloniser to provide further food to the indigenous 
population should be seen as 'an indictment of the colonial relegation of the 
indigenous inhabitants of the territory to the most marginal of its constituent lands'. 29 
Moreover, Tillion appeared to take it for granted that the contact between the 
industrialised and the non-industrialised world could only have been problematic. 
Even if we accept that the meeting of different models of organising society at very 
different levels of technological development will potentially generate problems, 
Tillion rather assumed that the colonial relationship as it was in practice constituted 
was the only possible outcome of this interaction. As the following quotation from 
Bhikhu Parekh illustrates, this need not have been the case: 
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Thanks to the great geographical explorations from the sixteenth century onwards, 
Europeans came into close contact with non-European societies. They could have responded 
to the latter in a variety of ways, such as leaving them alone, quietly settling down among 
them as newly arrived immigrants, establishing regular trade relations and returning home, 
rejoicing in the diversity of human life, learning about the native ways of life and using that 
knowledge to acquire a better understanding of their own, killing the natives, conquering 
and ruling over them, and so forth. Without exception Europeans took over the countries 
they had `discovered', and in some cases exterminated or uprooted those already settled 
there. They were largely motivated by the desire for wealth and domination, and took full 
advantage of their technological and material superiority. 30 
Of course, one can only speculate as to what might have happened had the European 
powers opted to pursue a different type of relationship with the inhabitants of the 
territories which they colonised. Yet at the very least one might challenge the 
assumption, in a way that Tillion never does, that European colonialism, with all its 
inherent inequalities and resultant problems of population explosion, was the only 
possible type of relationship that could have been forged. 
Another question largely ignored by Tillion is the way in which France arrived in the 
group of countries best adapted to cope with, and indeed accelerate, the vast process 
of global civilisation. For Tillion, it was simply a question of good fortune. Her work 
stresses that France had `la chance d'etre dans le peloton de tete de la civilisation au 
bon moment' (AL, 57). She reaffirmed this point, noting that `nous avons eu de la 
chance, puisque, au moment voulu, nous nous sommes trouves dans le clan des 
gagnants' (AL, 66). Admittedly, Tillion does not fall back on the myth that the 
Europeans enjoyed some innate superiority. Nevertheless, her failure to give the 
question any real consideration appears as a gap in her work. 
Reformer Indignation 
`La raise en valeur' of Algeria 
At times, this tendency towards an overly-generous reading of the French presence 
degenerated into the blatant self-congratulation associated with the more unyielding 
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apologists for French colonial rule. Supporting their arguments by citing all the things 
that France had done for Algeria, reformers often adopted what Dine has termed `the 
system of myths developed by the settler community, and repeated by its metropolitan 
defenders, in an attempt to legitimize European minority control of the colony'. 1 
If Soustelle thought that the French had not done everything in their power to help 
Algeria's indigenous population, he would have had no truck with the idea that the 
French had actually contributed to worsening conditions in Algeria. For him, pre- 
colonial Algeria was not to be valorised but was a land beset by tyranny and 
pestilence: 
C'8tait en realite une epoque oü les endemies, les epidemies et la mortalitd infantile 
liquidaient une large part de 1'excedent de population, et oü les guerres intertribales 
disposaient du reste; ä ce prix, les survivants (2 millions et demi environ) vegdtaient dans un 
pays encore vaste pour eux, non sans subir durement les famines, tandis que des nudes de 
mesquines subsistaient grace aux aumönes des grands proprietaires et que les depouilles de 
la corse maritime enrichissaient les rays d'Alger. (AS, 62) 
Studies such as Lucette Valensi's account of the Maghreb prior to colonialism tell us 
that there were repeated outbreaks of plague, smallpox and other fatal diseases 
throughout the region during the eighteenth century and the early part of the 
nineteenth century. Valensi also stresses that in pre-colonial Algeria climatic factors 
often led to famine. 32 That this was the case hardly exculpates French colonialism or 
validates Soustelle's argument that French colonialism had been generally beneficial 
if a little slow in making its results felt. Moreover, Valensi points to social practices 
within the Maghreb which compensated for the technological inferiority of the region 
compared to Europe, such as the ma'una, or mutual help and assistance, which 
consisted of collections held amongst the entire community for those farmers who had 
suffered a particularly severe harvest or who had lost much of their flock due to 
disease. 33 
87 
Soustelle's praise for the settlers' contribution to the mise en valeur of the Algerian 
territory was adopted by many others who claimed to favour colonial reform. A 
brochure issued by the Cinquieme Bureau in 1956 sought to cast the French coloniser 
in the role of saviour: 'Ce pays, que nous avons sauve de 1'anarchie et de la misere, 
nous 1'avons peuple. i34 Similarly, in an article provocatively entitled `Accusee de 
Genocide.. La France repond' published in Le Bled in 1957, Michel Denis and Jean 
Dallier aspired to convince their military readership that, under French tutelage, 
Algeria had been turned into nothing short of a land of milk and honey: 
En 127 ans, le visage de 1'Algerie s'est compl6tement transforme. D'un pays sous- 
developpe, o& la population vivait dans l'anarchie et dans la misfire, la France a fait un pays 
en pleine expansion economique. Grace ä ses efforts constants, le niveau de vie de la 
population s'est sans cesse ¬leve, des terres incultes sont devenues fertiles, des usines se 
sont construites. L'Algerie moderne est une oeuvre de la France 35 
One might also cite an article published by Le Bled in 1958 by the pseudonymous 
Frederic which asserted that those who criticised French achievements in Algeria must 
have been unaware of the state of the country prior to the French arrival. These critics, 
he commented sarcastically, perhaps believed that 'd'un coup de baguette magique le 
pays est devenu aussi merveilleux' 36 Like other reformers, the author singularly failed 
to appreciate that Algeria was not so marvellous for the overwhelming majority of its 
inhabitants who had suffered at the hands of the French. Furthermore, reformers 
appeared to assume that the slower pace of Algerian society and the lower level of 
technological sophistication would have been a permanent condition had it not been 
for the French presence. Such eulogies of the French pioneering spirit did not 
recognise any capacity for indigenous development. The idea can at least be 
entertained that the instruments of change within Algerian society might well have 
been generated internally, rather than being reliant upon the French; as Memmi put it: 
`Pourquoi devons-nous supposer que le colonise se serait fige dans l'etat oü 1'a trouve 
le colonisateur ? '(PC, 131). 
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At times, reformer triumphalism went even further, taking on a decidedly racist tone. 
An expose given by a Captain Caniol under the aegis of the Cinquieme Bureau argues 
for example that ten centuries of Arab domination had effectively ruined Algeria: 
10 si8cles d'occupation arabe avaient compl8tement aneanti la civilisation de l'Afrique 
Romaine. 
I siecle de presence francaise allait redonner ä I'Algerie la place qu'elle merite au sein du 
monde moderne. 7 
For the captain, the initial good work done by the Romans had been undermined and 
was only at that moment being reconstructed by the French. The racial and cultural 
bias of the author is revealed in the language employed; the Arab 'occupation' is 
contrasted with Roman 'civilisation' and the French 'presence'. This attack on Arab 
civilisation goes beyond Soustelle's attempts to valorise colonisation as a positive 
development which we discussed in the previous chapter for, on that occasion, there 
was muted praise for the Arab colonisers too. Here it is white, European colonialism 
which is attributed with positive, transformative value whereas Arab colonisation is 
seen as retrograde and destructive, a kind of anti-civilisation. 
Dealing with International Criticism 
Confident in the beneficence of French intentions, reformers were not prepared to 
tolerate international criticism. Soustelle stressed the specificity of French 
colonialism, presenting it as more enlightened than that of other colonising nations. 
The French, he claimed in 1961, had been `plus disposes ä ouvrir aux Noirs ou aux 
Jaunes les portes de leur societe et de leur culture' - than the British, the North 
Americans or any other imperial power (ET, 19). Five years earlier his attack on the 
opponents of French colonial practice had been much more pointed. In his indignation 
at international criticism directed at French attempts to remain in Algeria, particularly 
from the United States and the Soviet Union, he had countered that France's treatment 
of the populations of her colonies bore favourable comparison with the policies 
adopted by her critics: 
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De ceux qui nous font la mauvaise querelle du colonialisme, tel n'est pas parvenu ä sa 
grandeur que par 1'extermination massive des peuples autochtones, et pratique encore les 
plus blessantes discriminations raciales ; tel autre liquide physiquement des communautes 
entieres et deporte aux confins de son empire les debris de populations mal assimilees ; 
d'autres encore tol8rent chez eux la vente et l'achat d'esclaves sur le marche, la misfire 
indicible de leurs paysans, les famines cycliques. Et nous, qui n'avons pas tout fait, tant s'en 
faut, mais qui n'avons certes pas extermine les Algeriens autochtones, qui melons dans nos 
ecoles nos fils et les leurs, qui nous soucions sinc8rement d'effacer tout vestige de regimes 
depasses et qui luttons contre la maladie et le denuement, c'est nous qui serions 
condamnes ? Vraiment, c'est trop d'injustice et de sottise. (AS, 75) 
Soustelle believed that, although not perfect, France had behaved better than all the 
other powers and that, metaphorically speaking, she had (almost) clean hands. In his 
opinion, many countries which enjoyed the full rights of sovereignty were in fact far 
more subject to an exploitative external control than Algeria: `Bien des pays pretendus 
'independants', mais domines par de grandes puissances qui exploitent leurs ressources 
sans y bätir une ecole ni un höpital, sont cent fois plus que 1'Algerie asservis ä un 
colonialisme hypocrite' (AS, 74). 
The belief that the French were fairer colonisers than other powers was taken up by 
Soustelle's successor in the position of Governor-General of Algeria. Robert Lacoste 
argued that the French could have waged a more vigorous assault on the rebellion, but 
that this would have led to a `guerre d'extermination' - an unconscious admission that 
the French Army was opposed by a great deal more of the indigenous population than 
anyone associated with the war effort was prepared to admit. 38 Such a war, Lacoste 
pointed out, would have been `semblable ä celle qu'ont menee, dans un passe recent, 
bien des pays qui aujourd'hui nous censurent'. 39 This was not merely an attack on 
what Lacoste saw as the hypocrisy of other powers that might have deigned to criticise 
the French, but almost went so far as to proclaim that the indigenous population of 
Algeria ought to have been grateful to the French for their `restraint'. 
The reasoning of both Soustelle and Lacoste is flawed on two counts. Firstly, the 
injustices of French colonialism which were legion, are hardly excused by the fact 
that, relatively speaking, they might be considered less pernicious than the massacre 
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of North American Indians or the forced resettlement policies undertaken in the Soviet 
Union under Stalin. Secondly, the fact that the French had not themselves embarked 
upon a systematic genocide in Algeria was arguably influenced by reasons other than 
their civilising magnanimity. Following Sartre, the extermination of the indigenous 
population, even though perhaps desired by the coloniser, could not have been 
contemplated since it would have brought an end to the coloniser's privileged place 
within colonial society which depended upon an exploitable indigenous mass 40 
Algeria Versus the Arab world 
Another feature of the triumphalist discourse at times adopted by reformers was to 
offer favourable comparisons between social and economic conditions in Algeria and 
those of other Arab nations. A Cinquieme Bureau brochure published in 1956 argued 
that France had nothing to be ashamed about as far as her colonial role was concerned: 
'Nous n'avons pas', the authors commented, 'ä rougir de ce que nous avons realise 
dans nos departements d'Outre-Mediterranee. ' The reason that France could take pride 
in her colonial achievements was that Algeria's Muslim population enjoyed a higher 
standard of living than was to be found in any other Arab country in the Middle East. 
The authors invited their reader to compare the number of hospitals and the number of 
roads per 10,000 inhabitants between Algeria, Egypt and Iraq, in which Algeria 
emerged as the clear winner. 1 
A 1957 report from Governor-General Lacoste's office strikes a similar tone. Those 
who attacked French policy in Algeria, the authors argued, would do well to recall that 
rather than simply exploit the Algerian land for their own gain, the French had 
directed a considerable amount of revenue towards improving the economic well- 
being of Algeria's indigenous population with the result that conditions had improved 
markedly `surtout si Pon etablit une comparaison avec les pays arabes' 42 
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Rather than offer excuses for the failures of the past, the French were even prepared to 
proclaim their achievements to the indigenous population of Algeria itself. For 
instance, the following extract from a tract produced by the Cinquieme Bureau for 
initial contact with the Muslim population confidently lists the benefits which the 
French had brought to Algeria. Naively proclaiming that the Algerians had `never had 
it so good' and with the implication that without the French they would never have it 
so good again, the authors strove to convince Muslims to put their trust in France: 
La France est venue en Afrique pour lutter contre 1'anarchie, developper les ressources et 
ameliorer les conditions de vie. 
La France a fait abolir 1'esclavage en Afrique et dans le monde. 
La France a sorti de votre sol des villes, des cites ouvri8res, des höpitaux, des ecoles. Elle a 
cree des routes, des chemins de fer, organise des points d'eau. 
La France a construit des logements pour vos parents qui travaillent dans la Metropole. 
Beaucoup de musulmans ont profite de ces bienfaits. Il ya des Prefets, des Magistrats, des 
fonctionnaires, des officiers, des avocats musulmans. 
Nous savons qu'il ya encore beaucoup ä faire, et c'est pour cela que nous creons des ecoles 
nombreuses. 43 
Besides the obvious point that, given the living conditions of the vast majority of 
Algeria's indigenous population, the French had far less on which to congratulate 
themselves than they actually imagined, the very fact that they thought it appropriate 
to produce such self-eulogising propaganda testifies to, at best, a considerable amount 
of self-delusion and, at worst, outright hypocrisy. 
Looking to the Future 
The process of clochardisation which Tillion described was so widespread that, 
whether Algeria became independent or continued under French tutelage, the future of 
the country was bleak. Even with a genuine commitment to reform on the part of the 
French, Algeria's problems would have remained enormous. Reformers did not seem 
to appreciate this fully. Since they under-estimated or deliberately underplayed the 
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nature of the problem, their assessments of what was to be done were, at times, 
correspondingly overly optimistic. 
As far as the demographic question was concerned, Soustelle was convinced that 
industrialisation would have a positive effect, ameliorating living conditions which in 
its turn would constitute `un puissant facteur de stabilisation demographique' 
(DA, 35). A similarly optimistic assessment of the redemptive powers of 
industrialisation was offered by Denis and Dallier writing in Le Bled: `C'est surtout 
l'industrialisation du pays qui permettra en creant des richesses nouvelles et des 
emplois en nombre suffisant de rdtablir l'equilibre entre la population et les 
ressources' 44 Attributing the problems of the Algerian economy to a lack of 
industrialisation, itself resulting from the lack of an energy source, Reis naively 
believed that newly found resources in the Sahara would remove this obstacle to 
economic take-off: 
Ce qui freinait toute hausse reelle du niveau de vie des masses musulmanes, ce qui a produit 
une clochardisation incontestable (... ) 6tait 1'absence d'industrialisation, consequence du 
defaut de toute importante source dnergetique. Or ce defaut a disparu. 45 
On the ground in Algeria, the French Army's plan to deal with the huge problem of 
unemployment was, in the short term, to open up vast building sites to create a new 
infrastructure. Somewhat optimistically, a report appearing in Le Bled on one 
particular detachment of the SAS carried the subtitle `Chömeur: un mot qui tend ä 
disparaitre' 46 The article tells how formerly unemployed Algerians were engaged in 
constructing roads. Without this work, the article informed its military readership, 150 
men would be reduced to misery. 47 Of course, what it neglected to mention was the 
fate which would befall these men once the road building was complete. 
The testimony of a Lieutenant Le Merre, a French soldier attached to the SAS and 
posted to a small village, provides a similar example of such naivety. 48 In the sector 
falling under his jurisdiction, Le Merre was confronted with the problem of 
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widespread rural unemployment, particularly amongst the young, bringing poverty and 
discontent in its wake. The social malaise which this created, in his opinion, made the 
inhabitants of rural communities more susceptible to the message of the FLN. He 
decided to solve this problem by constructing rudimentary sporting facilities 
comprising a football pitch, high jump and long jump areas, and courts for basketball 
and volleyball. Girls as well as boys were encouraged to use these facilities, despite 
the initial resistance of some of the male heads of family. According to the report, not 
only did these facilities become a centre of attraction for the youth of the village, their 
construction also absorbed the energies of a significant proportion of the adult male 
population 49 
Other articles advocating colonial reform proved to be more circumspect. However, 
whilst they recognised that the economic transformation of Algeria would be mired in 
difficulty, they typically retained a belief in the possibility of a successful outcome in 
the long term with the application of sufficient good will on the French part. 
An anonymous document emanating in 1957 from Governor-General Lacoste's 
advisors recognised that the rising birth rate was certain to cause problems for 
Algeria's future. As the authors of the document noted, `le fait demographique domine 
tous les autres problemes algeriens en imposant aux travaux, aux recherches et aux 
realisations, une cadence toujours plus rapide. '50 The high level of unemployment 
which Algeria was experiencing at the time of the outbreak of hostilities was seen as 
'la consequence presque fatale de l'accroissement demographique' (p. 37). Even in 
periods of growth, the Algerian economy, the report stated, 'ne peut absorber le 
surplus des populations actives que l'accroissement constant des naissances amene 
regulierement sur le marche du travail' (p. 37). Given this situation, the report argues 
that the opening of vast building sites would offer the best method of fighting against 
unemployment (p. 38). However, there was a certain recognition that this could be no 
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more than a short term palliative and that what was required was a real economic 
expansion: 
Le probleme de sous-emploi ne sera pas regle par le developpement illimite de ces 
chantiers. Le chomage ne disparaitra en Algerie qu'avec une expansion 6conomique reelle. 
(p. 38) 
Pierre Chaussade, a high-ranking civil servant attached to the Algerian ministry, also 
acknowledged that there was no 'recette miracle' capable of putting Algeria on the 
road to development. 5 'A solution to her problems could not be found even with a 
decade of economic expansion. That this was so, however, did not constitute 'une 
raison pour s'abstenir devant une action que ces besoins rendent contraignante' (p. 30). 
This arduous task could not be completed unless French sovereignty was maintained. 
For Chaussade, the permanence of the political ties between France and Algeria 
constituted 'un instrument determinant des apports des capitaux et des techniciens 
necessaires ä 1'Algerie' (p. 26). A less stable Algeria would be a less attractive site for 
French investors, worried about the potential risks involved. Strong political ties were 
also, in his eyes, necessary to secure support for the provision of publicly-funded state 
aid; people would not make sacrifices unless they could see the benefits of their 
investment (p. 32). 
Tillion was rather less optimistic about the possibility of private capital from France 
flowing into Algeria, believing that the prohibitive cost of energy, the lack of 
infrastructure, the scarcity of a technically-qualified labour force, the lack of spending 
power amongst the vast majority of the population and, finally, the risk of terrorist 
violence would deter all but the most audacious of investors (AL, 115). Nevertheless, 
she maintained that only under continued French tutelage could the kind of investment 
in non-profit-making enterprises such as schools and agrarian reform be secured. 
Although pessimistic about global under-development in general, Tillion apparently 
believed in the capacity of the public purse to solve the problems which the territory 
was facing: 'Or, ces problemes, nous avions entrepris de les resoudre et ils etaient 
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desormais solubles, au prix d'un effort enorme, mail qui n'excede pas nos moyens' 
(AL, 79). To this end, she proposed that 2 billion old francs be invested over a five- 
year period to pay for the complete education of the indigenous population and the 
creation of 300,000 new industrial jobs in the Sahara; secondly, that an absolute 
priority be given in the French job market to Algerian workers over those from other 
former colonies or other European countries in order to ensure that sufficient money 
would flow back into Algeria; thirdly, that all those involved in the Grandes Ecoles 
d'Agriculture et d'Administration be required to undergo a period of compulsory 
service of two years in Algeria (AL, 115-118). 
Another document produced in 1957 for distribution amongst soldiers shared Tillion's 
optimism about the willingness of the French to contribute to the development of 
Algeria and in particular to contribute to non-profit-making enterprises. The report 
pointed out that France could choose the easy path of only investing in those sectors 
of the Algerian economy which would yield an immediate reward. 52 However, the 
improvements would not be felt by the disinherited masses of the population for a 
much greater time period: 
Dans cet optique, l'amdlioration du sort des masses desheritees ne peut provenir que de leur 
passage du secteur dconomique traditionnel au secteur moderne, c'est-ä-dire d'un 
deracinement total; pour l'ensemble de la population, ce passage ne peut s'effectuer qu'en 
une periode de plusieurs annees, et, en attendant, le plus grand nombre ne beneficie 
pratiquement d'aucune amelioration. (p. 14) 
Such a development of the Algerian economy did not require the continuation of the 
French presence for the same kind of investments could be made by other nations. 
France, however, had embarked on a much more generous path which was not 
concerned solely with the financial rewards that could be reaped from Algeria but 
with alleviating the poverty of all its inhabitants 'en axant particulierement son effort 
sur les plus desherites d'entre eux' (p. 15). 
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Whilst the analyses of Tillion and Chaussade were more sophisticated than the rather 
naive pronouncements that industrialisation would solve all Algeria's problems, they 
remain, nonetheless, flawed. The willingness to contribute to Algeria on the kind of 
scale which the reformers wanted was not present amongst private investors. As 
Marseille argues, it was not in the interest of French capitalism to invest in Algeria 
since the changing nature of the international economy meant that it was more 
profitable for it to invest elsewhere. Nor was the desire to commit vast sums of money 
to Algeria present amongst the French public in general. 53 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have seen that it was with a mixture of contrition and indignation 
that colonial reformers re-read the history of France's colonial presence. Whilst they 
were prepared to concede that, prior to 1954, France had not always fulfilled its (in 
their eyes, largely benign) civilising mission, this recognition of previous errors was 
far from total. Reforming zeal and commitment to change was, at times, juxtaposed 
with blatant triumphalism in French colonial achievements and annoyance that the 
benevolence of the French presence should be called into question. Whereas the 
militant anti-colonialists saw colonialism as immobile, reformers saw it as moving in 
the right direction and where the anti-colonialists saw a systemic problem, reformers 
recognised no such barriers to the evolution of the colonial system. From this, three 
main points arise which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Firstly, because of 
their unwillingness or inability to recognise colonialism's exploitative nature, 
reformers' plans to transform Algeria were almost guaranteed to be stymied by the 
same 'colonial mindset'. Secondly, the triumphalism with which reformers proclaimed 
the merits of the French presence casts aspersions over their own good will as 
reformers, making them perhaps willing bedfellows with some of the more militant 
defenders of the French presence. Thirdly, because they did not perceive colonialism 
to be static, reformers were able to contemplate the 'reformability' of the settlers. In 
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READING THE MUSLIM POPULATION: 
THE "CONSENT POTENTIAL' 
Of all the component parts of the reformers' assessments about the future French 
presence in Algeria, the 'consent potential' was the most important. Without it, their 
calls to extend the same democratic rights and duties to Algeria's Muslim population 
as to every other French citizen simply collapsed, leaving a policy of permanent 
repression or withdrawal as the only options. The essential irony, even perversity, of 
attempting to make Muslims into French citizens when they had no wish to become so 
was perfectly encapsulated in the Manifeste des 121. This petition appearing in 
October 1960 signed by 121 of France's leading intellectuals decried a war `menee 
contre des hommes que 1'Etat affecte de considerer comme Francais, mais qui, eux, 
luttent precisement pour cesser de Z'etre'. ' 
Reformers declared the vast majority of Muslims to be well-disposed towards the 
continuation of French rule. Where this consent was not already present, it was felt to 
be obtainable on condition that a process of reform was implemented. To support this 
argument, reformers declared the FLN to be a violent movement interested neither in 
democracy nor in the welfare of the Muslim population in whose name it falsely 
claimed to speak. Handing over Algeria to the FLN was, in reformers' eyes, anything 
but a liberal solution to the conflict. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the reformers' case that the `hearts and 
minds' of the Muslim population could be won. It considers the arguments which they 
employed and the evidence which they assembled in order to challenge the view 
expressed by the radical anti-colonialists that the Muslim population was irretrievably 
wedded to the nationalist cause. Our analysis will show that whilst there were 
elements within the indigenous population prepared to collaborate with the French, 
these were not sufficient in number to gain the critical mass needed to defeat the FLN. 
Representing the Muslims: A Common Past and a Shared Destiny 
For Smith, given that the goal was to preserve French rule over Algeria, settlers who 
refused to accept any reforms were more logical than the liberals who condemned 
them; as he puts it, `One wonders if those metropolitan liberals who so ceaselessly 
denounced the "stubborn blindness" of the settlers on the subject of reform were not 
themselves more truly blind. '2 However blind to colonial realities reformers may 
have been, Smith is prepared to accept a certain amount of good will on their part. He 
argues that there was a time between 1944 and 1948 of `naive optimism' that 'genuine 
liberalism and French sovereignty would each serve the ends of each other'. This 
optimism ended when it became apparent that liberalism would `only aid the Algerian 
nationalists to separate their destiny from that of France'. 3 From 1948 onwards, the 
French were obliged to adopt repressive policies such as the falsification of elections, 
the banning of political parties or the threat of force in order to keep the nationalists 
under control. From 1954 onwards, Smith argues that the contradiction between 
liberalism and French sovereignty was fully exposed when the last fig leaf of 
liberalism was stripped away by the decisive commitment to force which occurred 
under the premiership of Mollet 4 
Smith's analysis underestimates the degree of sincerity which underpinned reformers' 
proposals for Algeria. Certainly, Soustelle had no intention of compromising French 
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sovereignty, but neither did he view this as completely antithetical to the application 
of a liberal policy. He protested that `le ralliement des Musulmans constituait bien une 
condition sine qua non' of his integration programme (ET, 33). Writing in 1958, Reis 
had made the same point: `Encore faut-il que cette integration soit voulue par les 
individus appeles ä s'integrer'. 5 Chevallier also writing in 1958, concluded that 
Muslims were not anti-French, although they risked becoming so: `Le musulman 
algerien n'est pas antifrancais. Peut-titre le deviendra-t-il demain, mais jusqu'ä present 
ont menti tous ceux qui lui imputaient 1'intention de nous chasser d'Algerie' (NA, 
33). Had Muslims really wanted to bring an end to the French presence, Chevallier 
contended that they would have done so before, in particular in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War. There seems to be a process of selective memory 
at work here since the events of Setif can be interpreted as precisely such an attempt to 
overthrow French rule. 
The same optimism can be witnessed in French Army circles. According to a 
Cinquieme Bureau communique dating from July 1956 written by three sergeants 
located in Kabylia and distributed to all the troops on duty in that region, the goal of 
the French Army was to have the Muslim population of Algeria endorse, in free and 
fair elections, candidates favourable to a continued French presence: 
[Nous devons] les faire voter, et ce qui complique un tantinet les choses, pas ä la mode de 
Staline ni de Franco ni de Nasser (vous savez..... 90% des voix) mail librement. (... ) Il faut, 
sans jamais nous meler de designation de candidats et encore moins de cuisine electorale, 
que nous fassions le necessaire pour qu'ils votent un jour librement mais pour nos amis, en 
n'ecoutant que leur cceur. 6 
In their reference to the falsification of the democratic process, the sergeants mention 
Stalin, Franco and Nasser but would have been equally well advised to mention 
Naegelen. Underlying the sergeants' assessment of the Army's task was the 
conviction that the majority of Algeria's Muslim population had not already 
irrevocably sided with the rebellion and that France, through the actions of her Army 
and her government, should offer some incentive for these Muslims to choose to 
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remain in the French camp. Although the circular did not constitute a statement of 
official government policy, since the time had not yet come when the Algerian people 
would be offered a vote upon their own political destiny, the sentiments expressed 
therein did reflect the notion that consent was crucial to an eventual French success in 
the conflict. 
If Smith was wrong to assume that reformers were aware that the French presence 
could only be maintained through an illiberal policy of repression, his allegations of 
`blindness' seem more apposite. One possible reason for this `blindness' is offered by 
Ageron who points out that because the Algerian political parties with nationalist 
tendencies were largely divided amongst themselves in the early years of the 1950s, 
the French underestimated the scope of revolutionary feeling which was bubbling 
beneath the surface. By way of evidence, Ageron points to much of the poetry, writing 
and theatre appearing during this period in which pro-nationalist sentiment was clearly 
evident, although overlooked by the French. 7 
The belief in the inherent 'goodness' of France's colonial exploits also perhaps 
explains the tardiness with which the French realised the seriousness of the situation 
in Algeria after 1954. Any attempts to break away from France could only be 
indicative of the ingratitude of a small section of the colonial peoples. As W. W. 
Kulski points out, in the eyes of the majority of French people, those seeking 
independence in Algeria were `a small minority of malcontents who were unable to 
appreciate the benefits that France was conferring on her colonial subjects by her 
civilising mission'. 8 
The failure of the French to appreciate the seriousness of the challenge to their rule 
was evident in the immediate reaction of the Army to the outbreak of hostilities where 
the destruction of the FLN's armed bands was given. a higher priority than the task of 
persuading ordinary Muslims of the merits of French rule. The rebellion in Algeria 
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was thought to be akin to the periodic outbursts of popular discontent which had 
punctuated the French presence in North Africa. As General Cherriere was to 
comment in 1956, analysing his own failing and that of his colleagues: 
Les suites immddiates (de l'insurrection) firent d'abord croire qu'on se trouve en face d'un 
soul8vement tribal, analogue ä ceux qui jalonnent notre histoire nord-africaine. On admet 
donc qu'il suffit pour l'arm8e de reduire les tribus dissidentes bien localisees, mettant en 
oeuvre des effectifs trPs faibles et sans grand appui materiel de 1'etranger. 9 
Reformers failed to appreciate that the international climate had moved on and 
Muslim opinion with it. They continued to look backwards to a time when the 
nationalism of Algeria's indigenous population had been less fully developed. Those 
occasions when Muslims had fought in the French Army were a particular locus of 
nostalgia. The apparent willingness of thousands of native Algerians to take up arms 
and even sacrifice their lives for France, as many had done during the First World 
War, reassured the French that their presence was appreciated and that the gratitude of 
the indigenous Algerian people had not diminished. French attitudes towards the 
colonies in general were governed, as Smith puts it, by `the belief, widely shared in 
French political circles, that in their majority the colonial peoples appreciated the 
benefits of French rule as they had demonstrated their loyalty throughout the war'. 10 
Le Bled devoted a double page spread to praising the heroic Muslims who had taken 
up arms for France. From the 2,000 zouaves who had helped General Bourmont in 
1830 through to the Second World War, Muslims had demonstrated their loyalty and 
devotion. " Tillion argued that since the Algerians had spilt their blood in three wars 
for France, the mother country had contracted duties towards them (AL, 58). For 
Mercier, the fact that so many Muslims had died in defence of France meant that it 
was incumbent upon the French to remain in Algeria; France was obligated `ä tous les 
Algeriens qui sont morts dans les rangs de nos armees pour defendre la patrie 
francaise dont ils n'avaient certainement jamais pense qu'on püt un jour contester 
qu'elle fiat la leur'. 12 Not only did reformers appear to assume that all the Muslims 
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who fought in the French Army were willing volunteers as opposed to reluctant 
conscripts, they also ignored the point that if France did indeed have certain 
obligations towards Muslims, the first of these might have been to concede the right 
of national self-determination. Even once hostilities had ended, Soustelle, reflecting 
upon the loss of Algeria with which he had still to come to terms, denounced the 
racism encouraged by the FLN-led government in order to break the link between 
France and Algeria and which took no account of `tant d'annees vecues ensemble, tant 
de sang arabe et berbere verse sur les champs de bataille de l'Europe dans le sillage de 
nos drapeaux' (PT, 15). 
Soustelle and the Direction of History 
A further explanation for Soustelle's belief in the `consent potential' was to be found 
in his refusal to accept that there was some kind of historical inevitability impelling 
Algeria towards independence, a theme which he first took up in Le drame algerien: 
`Quand cessera-t-on de nous rebattre les oreilles du caractere ineluctable et sacre des 
nationalismes extra europeens? ' (DA, 15). There was no `fatalite historique' which 
drove the process of Algerian nationalism (DA, 15). Had such a thing existed, he 
ventured, Europe would have fallen under Communist control in 1945, or fallen under 
the thousand-year domination of the Third Reich in 1940. By the same logic, no 
nationalist revolt whether African, Asian or Arab in origin was either inevitable or 
irresistible (DA, 48). 
Despite the fact that by the time Soustelle came to write L'esperance trahie in 1961, 
Algeria was virtually independent, he refused to change his opinion. Those who saw 
the end of the French presence in Algeria written into the very logic of the colonial 
system were no more than the misguided `partisans de 1'abandon' (ET, 27). History 
had no definitive ending, 'J'ai beaucoup cherche le "sens de 1'Histoire" et je ne 1'ai 
jamais trouve', he proclaimed (ET, 27). In his eyes, to evoke such a rationale was 
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merely a comfortable alibi for those who wanted to take the path of least political 
resistance `comme si la volonte des hommes et des peuples ne comptait pour rien' 
(ET, 29). 
Once more it was the events of World War Two which were invoked to justify this 
point with, on this occasion, Soustelle's own personal credentials as a resistant de 
premiere heure thrown in to bolster the case. Most people had considered any 
resistance to be futile since, in 1940, all the indicators seemed to point in the direction 
of a victory for Hitler and the forces of Nazi Germany: `Resistants, noun commettions 
une erreur, presque un sacrilege, en nous dressant sottement contre la vague 
irresistible' (ET, 28). It was precisely the willingness to defy these apparent historical 
realities which, for Soustelle, made de Gaulle such a great figure: `De Gaulle fut grand 
parce qu'il ne crut pas ä cette fatalite, supreme argument de la collaboration' (ET, 28). 
References to the Second World War were, in fact, a frequent feature of writing about 
Algeria. As the title of an article by Dine aptly puts it, there was a kind of `inescapable 
allusion'. 13 
Soustelle was, of course, correct to point out that there are no strange, mystical forces 
directing the path of history. The course of world events is shaped by tangible factors 
such as economic power, military might and human agency. By the same token, it was 
a combination of tangible factors which made French defeat in Algeria inevitable, the 
lack of consent amongst the Muslim population not the least amongst them. 
Bilans de la Pacification. 
Another factor which allowed reformers such as Soustelle to continue to believe that 
the `consent potential' was realistic was their conviction that the French Army was 
winning the war. Declarations of French success were particularly prominent in 
military publications and it is to these that we now turn our attention. 
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The failure of initial attempts at military repression in the opening months of the 
conflict coupled with the growing influence of the guerre revolutionnaire school 
within the Army saw a greater emphasis placed on the attempt to win the `hearts and 
minds' of the population. Le Bled related the successes of SAS officers in rallying the 
indigenous population to the French cause. An article by Andre Hempe appearing in 
April 1956 is typical of the accounts published. It tells of a remote Muslim village 
which, prior to the arrival of the SAS detachment, had been largely abandoned by the 
French administration and the population cowed into submission by a recent attack by 
the FLN. As might be expected, the article recounts that the diligence and patience of 
the SAS had managed to restore the confidence of the population; the elders of the 
community rallied to the SAS officer and the villagers cast aside their superstitions 
about French medical techniques when a child's life was saved at the last moment 
following treatment by the French doctor. '4 
In an editorial to Le Bled published in August 1956, Governor-General Lacoste, 
probably acting on the information passed on to him by the military, cited the fact that 
in the preceding few weeks 215 villages had rallied to the French side in Kabylia and 
that in the Oran and the Constantine regions, new settlements came each day to 
demand French protection. Such work, he stressed, had to continue for it was 
necessary for `n'importe quel observateur de bonne foi' to be able to appreciate `la 
massive montee d'un mouvement de collaboration avec la France chez les Algeriens 
de naissance' thereby allowing the French to present themselves as acting in 
accordance with the wishes of Algeria's civilian population if the Algerian case came 
to be discussed in the United Nations. 15 
Similar positive balance sheets also appeared in divisional bulletins. One such bulletin 
reports that 8,500 FLN members had been killed and 5,000 arms recovered in the 
Oran region during 1957.16 To this impressive total, the authors add: 
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II faut ajouter ä notre actif la conquete des cceurs: combien de populations revenant vers 
nous, que de douars assurant leur autodefense et hissant le drapeau tricolore, que de 
regroupements de populations dans une atmosphere de confiance en une Algerie franraise, 
garante de la prosperite et de la paix. 17 
Along similar lines, a pamphlet produced for French conscripts about to be 
demobilised contained photographs designed to emphasise the co-operation taking 
place between Muslim villagers and French soldiers. Muslim women are shown 
bringing their children to be examined by a French doctor, a Muslim male is 
photographed coming to draw water from a pump manned by a French soldier, while 
in another a smiling Muslim with a child in one hand and a rifle slung across his 
shoulder poses for the camera. The accompanying text emphasises that such images 
were typical of Algeria and that the Muslim population had placed their trust in the 
French: 
Qui veut la paix avant tout 
Qui n'aspire qu'ä mieux vivre 
Qui continue a faire confiance ä la France pour laquelle beaucoup sont morts sur les champs 
de bataille. 
Vous avez vu des musulmans ddfendre ä c6te de vous leur famille, leur libertd, leur vie. 
La communaute Franco-Musulmane n'est pas un vain mot. 18 
Clearly, military propaganda appearing in Le Bled or in tracts expressly designed to 
raise morale amongst French soldiers deliberately amplified the extent to which the 
Army's pacification effort was succeeding. However, similar assessments of the state 
of the Muslim population also appeared in restricted military communiques where the 
need to convince a wider audience of the smooth conduct of the war was less 
apparent. By way of example, let us consider the months of July and August 1957. 
General Allard gave a cautious endorsement of the Army's efforts. By dint of diligent 
work in the field, the Army was gradually beginning to win support amongst the 
indigenous population for the French cause: 
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Les efforts rdalisds depuis de longs mois dans le domaine de la pacification commencent ä 
porter leurs fruits. 11 n'y a pas de resultats spectaculaires, mais revirement certain dans les 
esprits, propre ä redonner confiance. 19 
General de Labarthe, commanding the French forces in Northern Constantine, whilst 
recognising that the French administrative structure was not ideally suited to the type 
of warfare in which the Army was engaged, believed that real progress had been 
made: 
Malgre de nombreuses difficultds causees ä la fois par faction de 1'ennemi et la lourdeur de 
noire appareil administratif civilo-militaire, le mois de juin a marque de reels progr8s qui se 
concretisent par nos contacts de plus en plus nombreux avec la population. 20 
In a communique from the Northern Oran region, General Dudognon admitted that the 
work of the French soldiers could be undermined by FLN action. However, even 
where this was the case, caution rather than hostility became the watchword of 
ordinary Muslims who feared FLN reprisals. 
La persistance des actions terroristes en juin se traduit par une regression des marques de 
confiance et une attitude plus mefiante qu'hostile de la part des populations musulmanes, 
soucieuses en prioritd de ne pas se compromettre aux yeux des rebelles 2' 
In the view of General Desfontaines, Muslims were more than willing to rejoin the 
French political community once the rebel hold over them had been lifted. 
Partout oü nous avons reussi A faire se relächer l'emprise rebelle sur la population, cette 
derni8re a manifeste son ddsir de reprise de contact avec les autorites. Les ceremonies 
organisees ä I'occasion du 14 juillet en ont fourni la preuve 22 
Although less governed by the need to present the results of the French Army's 
pacification activities in a positive light, it might be argued that communiques such as 
those cited above were produced by officers who relied upon their subordinates for 
reports on nationalist activity in the sector under their jurisdiction and who, from self- 
interest, wanted to present a favourable picture. A situation in which some reports 
exaggerating French success could have continued along the chain of command is not 
inconceivable. However, it is difficult to envisage circumstances under which a vast 
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array of military reports, bulletins and communications would all have deliberately 
falsified the truth for the purposes of convincing a superior officer that the war was 
proceeding more successfully than it actually was in reality. 
The FLN and the Rule of Fear 
As a necessary corollary to these innumerable accounts of individual Muslims or 
entire villages rallying to the French cause churned out by the Cinquieme Bureau, the 
FLN was depicted as a movement lacking in mass appeal. Since there could be no 
denying that the FLN benefited from the passive complicity of certain sections of the 
indigenous population who provided food, money, shelter and information, reformers 
claimed that such support was given only through fear. 
Fond throughout his work of quoting speeches or documents from FLN leaders as a 
means of establishing the validity of his argument, Soustelle asserted that, once the 
FLN had eliminated the leaders of a particular community in a particularly brutal and 
exemplary fashion, the fear of suffering a similar fate scared the civilian population 
into co-operating with the insurgents: `bans un douar oü les principaux notables ont 
ete egorges ou mutiles, "le peuple suit par la terreur" selon 1'expression du chef 
rebelle Zighout Youcef' (AS, 215). In an open letter penned to those intellectuals in 
France critical of the French Army's efforts, Soustelle claimed that `deliberement, 
methodiquement, les rebelles s'attachent ä dominer par la terreur'23 Writing in Le 
Bled in 1956, Soustelle's successor as Governor-General, Lacoste adopted a similar 
stance, claiming that if Muslims followed the orders of the FLN, it was under 
duress24 Propaganda produced by the Cinquieme Bureau made the same point. 
Conscripts about to return to Metropolitan France, for example, were informed that 
the fanatical rebel bands that they had encountered `brülent, pillent, massacrent tout ce 
qui est Franrais ou Francophile, elles terrorisent' (their emphasis). 25 The whole text is 
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supplemented by a picture of a half-destroyed village with dead livestock strewn over 
the ground. 
Likewise a Cinquieme Bureau produced `Fiche de Contact' containing a script for 
French soldiers to use when coming into contact for the first time with Muslim 
villagers reflected back at the Muslim population the image which the French Army 
had formed of them as unwilling collaborators with the rebellion: 
Qui etes-vous? Nous le saurons par vous-memes. 
Vous fites terrorises par les fellagha et leurs hommes de mains. Vous avez eta obliges de 
ceder ä leur loi, faute d'une protection suffisante. Its vous font beaucoup de mal. 
Nous savons, par les propres declarations des chefs rebelles, que la grande majorite d'entre 
vous subit ä contrecceur cette loi 26 
Of course, whilst reformers claimed that the Muslim population gravitated towards the 
FLN primarily out of fear, the French Army itself was hardly an innocent party. In 
addition to the torture, the collective reprisals and the summary execution of prisoners 
perpetrated by the field units, the Cinquieme Bureau was not averse to using threats of 
retribution against those who collaborated with the FLN. Thus tracts produced by the 
Cinquieme Bureau declared: `Les complices des rebelles eux aussi seront punis. 
Parlons". In one such tract, the accompanying cartoon shows two Muslims cutting 
down telegraph poles under the watchful eye of an FLN combatant followed in the 
next caption, by all 3 figures being arrested by French soldiers. In another, a Muslim 
is pictured handing over money to the FLN collector. Predictably, the next caption 
shows both figures handcuffed by a French soldier. 27 
May 1958 
In the particular imaging of the Muslim population in which reformers were engaged, 
the events of May 1958 came to occupy a special place. The events of 13 May 1958 
are well known to any observer of contemporary French society. This was the date on 
which a mass of Algeria's European population stormed the offices of the 
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Government-General in Algiers with, at least, the tacit support of sections of the 
Army, and set off a chain of events which swiftly led to the overthrow of the Fourth 
Republic, the return to the political arena of General de Gaulle and the eventual 
adoption of a new Constitution. The events of 16 May at the Forum in Algiers (and on 
a number of subsequent days throughout Algeria) in which Muslims and Europeans 
joined hands in an apparent show of unity, in which all joined in the singing of the 
Marseillaise and in which Muslim women tore off their veils are generally seen as a 
continuation of that movement. 
For reformers, the presence of so many Muslims at pro Algerie francaise 
demonstrations was seen as indicative of their desire to affirm their national identity 
as Frenchmen and women. As Soustelle puts it: 
C'etait lä un fait capital, d'une signification bouleversante, car le FLN deconcerte et coupe 
de sa base voyait son emprise sur la population se relächer, les Europeens acceptaient 
l'integration avec toutes ses consequences et les Musulmans la reclamaient. (ET, 37-8) 
The words Algerie francaise were not the slogan of a minority but'le cri qui a jailli du 
cur de dix millions de Francais qui, quels que soient leur origine, leur confession, 
leur prenom ou leurs vetements particuliers, veulent titre ä jamais des Francais' (ET, 
40). 
There is little doubt that on the day prior to the fraternisation which took place on 16 
May in the capital, French soldiers had attempted to win support from the Muslim 
population for a policy of integration. Some of those Muslims who attended the 
demonstrations undoubtedly did so under duress. Nevertheless, French soldiers in 
Algiers hoped that around 5,000 Muslims would attend the Forum whereas in reality 
around 30,000 assembled. Explaining away the vast numbers of Muslims who turned 
up represents something of a difficulty for those who simply wanted to conclude that 
the whole event was meaningless. As Soustelle has argued, such an explanation over- 
estimates the extent to which the Army's propaganda machine could influence 
opinion: `Des manifestations d'une teile ampleur, s'etendant ä tout le pays, ne 
pouvaient pas se ramener ä cette explication simpliste'(PT, 80). In his eyes, `pretendre 
n'y voir qu'une mise en scene, une mystification, est faire preuve d'une ignorance 
abyssale en meme temps que d'un aveugle parti pris' (ET, 37). Along the same lines he 
added, `Il est evident, pour quiconque connait l'Algerie, que les fraternisations furent 
reelles et sinceres' (ET, 38). 
For Soustelle, had these demonstrations not been sincere, and had they had no overall 
impact upon the war, the FLN would have had no difficulty in sabotaging them by 
throwing a grenade into the crowd or by the random assassination of a European: 
Combien il eüt ete facile, pourtant, au FLN, de saboter le prodigieux elan humain qui 
soulevait alors les masses algeriennes! Facile... si le FLN lui-meme n'avait pas ete atteint 
dans ses oeuvres vives. S'il n'y eut pas d'attentats, c'est parce que les chefs desorientes et les 
executants, ebranles ou conquis, ne purent pas en organiser. (ET, 40) 
Soustelle's positive interpretation of the events of May 1958 was, predictably, shared 
by Le Bled. The edition of 24 May 1958 was devoted almost in its entirety to reporting 
on the fraternisation between Europeans and Muslims. 'L'integration, fait acquis', 
proclaimed one headline. In the eyes of the reporting journalist, the massive 
participation of Muslims in the Forum of Algiers and throughout Algeria constituted, 
'1'un des faits capitaux des journees historiques que nous vivons'. 28 Such events 
brought 'un dementi formel ä tous ceux qui doutent du fondement humain de 1'Algerie 
francaise' (p. 5). Whilst others might have considered the events to be in some way 
miraculous, the author of this article claimed that it was simply 'l'expression tangible 
de ce que les Musulmans n'ont cesse de (... ) dire depuis le debut de la rebellion' (p. 5). 
Although France was experiencing her most turbulent period since 1789, Muslims had 
not hesitated to affirm the fact that they were French, prompting the journalist to 
comment: `En agissant ainsi, nos freres musulmans se sont comportes comme de purs 
patriotes, comme des Franrais de vieille souche' (p. 5). 
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The same edition of Le Bled also reports a speech given by Azem Ouali, president of 
the Federation of Mayors of Grande-Kabylia in which he proclaimed that the events of 
16 May constituted 'un sursaut irresistible'. Throughout Algeria, he declared, could be 
heard'l'echo rassure de ceux qui, il ya quelques jours, hesitaient' 29 
The following pages of this special edition of Le Bled were given over to short reports 
from around 30 towns in Algeria where demonstrations of pro-French sentiment had 
taken place. The introduction to these reports resumed the events which had taken 
place throughout the country in the following manner: `Il s'agit d'un vaste mouvement, 
d'un elan de foi et d'enthousiasme qui groupe, fraternellement unies, les populations 
musulmanes et europeennes. ' 30 
Reformers' claims of success have received a partial endorsement from contemporary 
historians. Droz and Lever argue that Muslims were partly coerced and partly came 
willingly to the Forum and that, tired of being caught between the French and the FLN 
bid for domination and control, they were expressing a genuine desire for peace rather 
than the endorsement of any political program per se. 1 Home arrives at a similar 
conclusion, arguing that Muslims wanted peace and believed that de Gaulle, as a 
figure who commanded great respect, would be able to deliver it. The demonstrations 
of 16 May were `rigged in part by the Cinquieme Bureau but also deeply and 
disturbingly symptomatic of the hope that the mere name of de Gaulle could inspire in 
the breast of many a simple peace-craving Algerian' 32 
For anti-colonial thinkers, on the other hand, the apparent demonstrations of new 
found fraternity between Europeans and Muslims which took place throughout 
Algeria between 16 and 20 May 1958 were no more than an elaborate pantomime 
orchestrated by the French Army and the interpretation of the events recounted by 
Soustelle and in large sections of the French press was simply 'une mystification'. 33 
Rather than the joyous multitudes reported in Le Bled, it was 'quelques dizaines 
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d'hommes au visage contracte, grimacant, encadre par les "Paras"' who arrived at the 
Forum (p. 7) whilst others were pressured into attending 'sous la menace d'une 
denonciation comme agent du FLN, donc d'une "disparition"' (p. 7). Those women 
who burnt their veils were either forced to do so by the French or by their husbands 
who had served in the French Army (p. 7). Throughout Algeria, the same scenes were 
repeated with the harkis in particular playing a leading role in terrorising the 
population into co-operating and providing them with pre-fabricated banners 
expressing sentiments of loyalty to France. 
Little did it matter, the article continued, that those involved in orchestrating this vast 
charade were themselves unconvinced of its veracity, since the whole purpose was to 
convince outside observers. The Left in France, unable to shed its arrogant civilising 
pretensions, had been taken in by this masquerade: 
La droite feint de croire a la sinceritd des ralliements. Une partie de la gauche, desemparde, 
est impressionnee par des manifestations qui flattent secr8tement son chauvinisme et son 
paternalisme: car les principes de 1789 sont immortellement francais et seule la France peut 
libdrer vraiment les peuples opprimes. (p. 2 ) 
Alongside the fraternisation of 16 May, Soustelle also attached considerable 
importance to the vote on the Constitution of the Fifth Republic which took place in 
September 1958. For Soustelle, the fact that both a radio broadcast from Algiers on 29 
August 1958 by de Gaulle and La voix de 1'Algerie combattante, a pro-FLN 
programme broadcast by Radio-Maroc had made the point that a vote in favour of the 
new Constitution would be indicative of support for integration only served to 
confirm his assessment of the significance of the consultation (ET, 64). De Gaulle's 
success in this referendum provided Soustelle with confirmation that the events of 
May 1958 had demonstrated the willingness of Algeria's Muslim community to 
accept integration. The FLN, by attaching such significance to the vote, had taken a 
risk which, according to Soustelle, had not paid off on three counts: because Muslims 
had registered to vote in large numbers despite express orders from the FLN that they 
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should not do so, because they had actually voted en masse, and because they had 
voted in favour of the new Constitution. Soustelle argued that this electoral snub for 
the FLN carried enormous significance: 
En ddpit de terribles menaces, la population musulmane s'etait prononcee, ä la face du 
monde entier, et le sens donne par tous, y compris le FLN, ä ce scrutin, n'etait pas niable. 
L'Algerie, 1'Algerie musulmane en tout premier lieu, avait dit 'oui' a la France, ä l'Algerie 
francaise. C'etait la consecration du 13 mai et surtout du 16 mai, de la fraternisation, par un 
vote dont le caract6re authentique ne pouvait Eire mis en doute par aucun esprit de bonne 
foi. (ET, 66) 
Mercier shared his opinion. Although the Algerian people had been `terrorise ä un 
point difficile ä imaginer' by the FLN, they had had the courage to defy the FLN 
openly and en masse. This committed France to protect them in the future: `[La 
France] ne peut abandonner un peuple aux brutes sanglantes qui foulent aux pieds la 
liberte et la vie des hommes' 34 
Navigating Between the Extremes 
On the one hand, Chapter One presented the radical anti-colonialists' vision of a 
people unanimous in its struggle to throw off colonial rule while, on the other hand, 
this chapter has highlighted the image offered in French propaganda of Muslims 
willing to embrace the positive changes which the French were bringing and co- 
operating with the FLN only through fear. One document which unintentionally goes 
some way towards narrowing the abyss between these rival portraits was actually 
produced by the FLN command in the Oran region. The purpose of the document was 
to explain the workings of the SAS and the methods by which its actions could be 
neutralised. At the same time, the article also recognised the positive reception which 
the SAS officer might be accorded by the civilian population: `Le chef de SAS sera le 
liberateur, le defenseur, l'apötre qui amen avec lui la paix et la bonne parole de la 
France. Ce dernier cas est peut-etre celui qui porte le plus. '35 The work of the SAS in 
providing irrigation systems and alleviating the problem of unemployment was also 
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viewed as highly damaging to the FLN cause: `Ce role, tout en etant limite, est peut- 
etre celui qui porte le plus, nos populations etant ä 90% des agricoles' (p. 22). Whilst 
the authors did not believe in the sincerity of the SAS-led project to rapidly transform 
the status of Algeria, they were certainly concerned that others, less engaged than 
themselves, would be taken in. The final section of the document epitomises the tone 
of the article: 
`Je sais ce que vaut se battre pour son pays, et cela me suffit'. Teile est la reponse que doit 
presenter chaque Algerien ä 1'officier de SAS. Mais c'est difficile car 1'homme est faible et 
souvent flechit devant les mirages sociaux et economiques que provoque la France. (p. 23) 
The Lack of Revolutionary Unity 
Such expressions of doubt were not entirely unfounded. Firstly, there were undeniably 
entire Muslim villages that pledged their allegiance to the French. Secondly, whilst 
the only choice was ultimately between the French and the FLN, a significant 
proportion of the indigenous population appears to have hesitated before deciding 
which side to choose. Ageron argues that, following the immediate outbreak of 
revolutionary violence, the reaction of the Algerian population was not unanimous: 
`La plupart se refugierent dans 1'attentisme', he informs us, arguing that it was not 
until much later that the revolution acquired a truly national character. 36 
Thirdly, in order to win control of the civilian population, the FLN was certainly not 
averse to using threats and violence. Would-be collaborators with the French were 
subject to reprisals. P. G. Schulte has noted, with specific reference to FLN activity in 
Algiers, the terrorists' `structural need to purge their territory, by violence or 
intimidation'. Particularly targeted were "`unreliable" elements such as criminals and 
drug addicts who would not resist Government pressure or bribes'. 37 
Fourthly, throughout the war fewer native Algerians fought in the ALN than served in 
the French Army as harkis. Stora points out that a report sent to the UN on 13 March 
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1962 estimated that there were around 263,000 people who were pro-French, 
including 20,000 career soldiers, 40,000 draftees and 58,000 harkis 38 This, at a time 
when many of the harkis had already deserted the ranks of the French Army or 
defected to the cause of the FLN through fear of reprisals at the hands of the 
victorious nationalists. This is not an indicator that Muslims favoured the French 
Army over the FLN since the strength of the nationalists could not be gauged, other 
than at a crude level, by the number of troops that it was able to put in the field. Nor 
should one make the mistake of believing that every harki was a passionate defender 
of the French cause. It does, however, offer an explanation of how reformers came to 
believe in the `consent potential'. 
Fifthly, although the FLN managed to establish itself as the most important pro- 
independence grouping, it was not the only nationalist organisation. The MNA under 
the leadership of Messali Hadj was also successful in marshalling a certain amount of 
support, particularly amongst those Algerians who worked in mainland France. 
Following the FLN-orchestrated massacre of the villagers of the MNA stronghold of 
Melouza, a leading figure in the MNA, Bellounis, defected to the side of the French 
with around 1,500 men. Ultimately, these forces were judged unreliable by the French 
and in July 1958 French paratroopers fought and defeated them. 9 Of course, the 
presence of a rival nationalist group hardly clinches the reformers' case that the vast 
majority of the Algerian population wanted to remain French, but it does further chip 
away at the image of an Algerian people united behind the FLN in its struggle to 
throw off the French colonial oppressor. 
For these reasons, Fanon and the other militant anti-colonialists were not only 
engaged in a process of wilful exaggeration of the strength of the rebellion for 
propaganda purposes but also over-estimated the unity of the revolutionary 
consciousness of the peasantry. As Stora puts it: 
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Cette histoire anticolonialiste, presque aussi simplificatrice dann ses conclusions que 
1'histoire coloniale traditionnelle, presuppose que 1'ensemble de la communaute berb8ro- 
arabe de l'Algerie etait anime d'une conscience nationale veritable, et aspirait ä 
l'independance. C'etait «oublier» que cent vingt-quatre ans de presence francaise avaient 
modifie la personnalite algerienne ou, plus simplement, l'avait empeche de venir ä maturite. 
Sinon, comment comprendre la phenom6ne harki, qui se developpera dans le cours de la 
guerre, et particulierement dans les campagnes 40 
Owing to the divisions that existed within the indigenous population, Stora describes 
the war as a 'double guerre civile', a war between the French but equally a war 
between Muslims 41 A similar description is provided by Pierre Vidal-Naquet who 
views the conflict as a 'triple war' - between the French Army and the FLN, between 
the FLN and the MNA but also `entre insurges et rallies a la cause francaise, dont le 
nombre ne fut pas insignifiant, et il ne s'agissait pas seulement des harkis' 
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Stora has highlighted the way in which this `mensonge du peuple unanime' has been 
perpetuated in Algeria since 1962. Official Algerian history of the conflict ignores the 
civil war between the activists of the FLN and the MNA as well as the quarrels within 
the FLN leadership itself. The state-authorised history portrays an anonymous war 
fought by a revolutionary movement without leaders since most of the prominent 
figures subsequently fell foul of the state and have been `written out' of history. 43 
The `False Dawn' of the Reformers 
Despite the inaccuracies of the portrait of revolutionary unanimity offered by the 
militant anti-colonialists, their image of the indigenous population was more accurate 
than the one offered by the reformers. Reformers were wrong to assume that the 
whole of the civilian population could be won over to the French cause if only the 
correct reforming strategy was applied. During the course of the war, the French 
mobilised an enormous amount of their military potential and given this 
overwhelming military presence, the FLN-led rebellion would have been quickly 
eclipsed without the support of the Muslim population. As Mao's defining principle of 
counter-revolutionary struggle had proclaimed, the revolutionary army, in this case the 
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FLN, had to be `in' the civilian population as the `fish is to water' in order to survive. 
The very fact that the French were unable to separate the `fish' from the `water' 
indicates that there was never enough support from amongst the civilian population at 
large for the French to gain a decisive victory. 
Similarly, if the FLN had had to rely on terror alone to extend its control over the 
civilian population then the sheer scale of the French presence would, without doubt, 
have been enough to wipe them out. As an article in Liberation appearing early in 
1959 put it: `Si eile [l'armee] n'avait eu affaire qu'ä des bandes isolees de la population 
musulmane - celle-ci prate a'fraterniser' ä nouveau - rien ne l'eüt empeche d'en venir ä 
bout' 44 
What allowed reformers, both civilian and military, to profess that the war was going 
well was the existence of islands of support for the French, never sufficient for a 
victory but substantial enough to feed a whole propaganda machine and sustain the 
reformers' conviction that the `consent potential' had not dissipated. The mistake of 
the reformers was to believe that the limited support which they received had the 
potential to expand into a truly popular appeal. Nowhere was this better illustrated 
than during the events of May 1958. The participation of so many Muslims in the 
fraternisations during this month was a true boon for the reformers. However, just 
like the examples of numerous villages rallying to the French cause, the events of May 
1958 alone did not substantiate the reformers' argument that sufficient Muslims were 
complicit with colonialism or prepared to trust the process of colonial reform. 
In similar vein, whilst the results of the vote on the Constitution of 28 September 
certainly prove a vexing matter for those who wish to offer an image of the Algerian 
people as solid in their support for the rebellion, it is difficult to sustain the argument 
that this vote constituted an explicit vote on the future of Algeria, despite the 
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significance which Soustelle and, at the time, de Gaulle and the FLN's propaganda 
machine sought to attach to it. 
The `consent potential' and with it reformers' dreams of a reconciliation between 
European and Muslim communities were indisputably discredited following the 
massive demonstrations in Algiers in favour of the FLN which took place between 11 
and 13 December 1960, described here by Ramdane Redjala: 
En sortant spontandment et massivement dans la rue avec une foret de drapeaux vert et 
blanc, en s'emparant de la formule du gendra1 de Gaulle, «Algerie algerienne », et en le 
depassant, les manifestants ont montrd leur maturitd politique et leur volontd de vivre 
independant. Les services psychologiques de l'arm8e ont subi un echec cuisant. En reality, 
1'ampleur de ces manifestations a surpris tout le monde y compris le GPRA 45 
As we shall see in Chapter Eight, however, reformers did not question their prior 
conviction that it was possible to win Muslim `hearts and minds'. Instead, de Gaulle 




LIBERAL ALTERNATIVES TO 
INTEGJRA TION 
Having looked in brief in the previous three chapters at some of the common themes 
which united reformers, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce some nuance into 
our definition of what reformers stood for, the nature of the problems which they 
faced, and the way in which their ideas on Algeria differed from figures with a similar 
political philosophy to their own. 
Between the extreme positions of, on the one hand, the FLN who embraced the need 
for revolutionary violence in the service of liberation from oppressive colonial rule, 
and, on the other, the unyielding defenders of French colonialism who sought no more 
than the eradication of the nationalist uprising and the return to the status quo ante, 
lay a number of potential solutions to the Algerian crisis of which integration was just 
one. The potential for confusion was recognised by Francis Borella writing for Esprit 
who lamented 'les querelles de mots entre fait national, personnalite algerienne, 
autonomie, independance ou droit a l'independance'. l As a means of navigating 
through this veritable semantic minefield, it is useful to distinguish between three 
broad schools of thought. The first of these was the integration camp. The second 
school might be defined as associationniste or federalist whose adherents believed 
that a considerable number of powers should be devolved to Algeria but with overall 
French sovereignty left intact. 2 A particularly succinct exposition of this position was 
articulated by General de Gaulle during his speech of 16 September 1959 on Algerian 
self-determination: 
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Le gouvernement des Algeriens par les Algeriens, appuye sur 1'aide de la France et en union 
8troite avec eile pour 1'economie, l'enseignement, la defense, les relations exterieures. Dans 
ce cas, le regime interieur de I'Algerie devrait ¬tre de type federal, afin que les 
communautes diverses: francaise, arabe, kabyle, mozabite, etc., qui cohabitent dans le pays 
y trouvent des garanties quant ä leur vie propre et un cadre pour leur cooperation. 3 
The third position can be characterised by support for what might be termed une 
independance francaise or alternatively, again in the words of de Gaulle, 'une Algerie 
algerienne (... ) etroitement unie ä la France'. By this, he seemed to mean an Algeria 
governed by a Muslim-dominated majority, yet closely linked to France in economic 
and cultural terms, and having a similar political system. In other words, the 
substitution of de facto French political control for a more enduring French influence; 
a case of partir pour mieux rester. The precedent for such a policy had been set out in 
the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946. Whilst, much like integration, this 
Constitution declared those living in the colonies to have equal rights to the citizens of 
Metropolitan France, its vision of the future relationship between the Hexagon and the 
colonies was somewhat different, apparently recognising that the territories over 
which France ruled would one day be sufficiently imbibed with the virtues of French 
democracy and culture to be able to govern themselves: 
Fidele ä sa mission traditionnelle, la France entend conduire les peuples dont eile a pris la 
charge ä la liberte de s'administrer eux-memes et de gerer democratiquement leurs propres 
affaires. s 
This chapter will consider both the federalist and the independance francaise camp, 
and Soustelle's reaction to both. First, the federalists. 
Integration versus Federalism 
Between association and integration there was a considerable overlap; both solutions 
envisaged that France should retain ultimate sovereignty over Algeria, both seem to be 
underpinned by the notion that France had a duty and a responsibility to complete her 
civilising mission, and both promised to respect Algeria's ethnic and cultural diversity 
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while offering to provide more equitable representation for the Muslim population. As 
Chevallier, himself a supporter of a federal solution, argued, the only apparent 
difference between the two solutions was the additional local autonomy which 
federalism would have given to Algeria: `[ Le systeme federal] permettait ä l'Algerie, 
autant que l'integration, mais ä moindre frais et avec plus de souplesse, de demeurer 
dans la Republique francaise' (NA, 18-19). Evidence of a common agenda can also be 
seen in Camus' belief, borrowed from an Algerian law professor, that a solution which 
would `[unir] les avantages de 1'integration et du federalisme' would prove the most 
equitable way of resolving the conflict. 6 Camus proposed that the French National 
Assembly contain representatives from Algeria's Muslim and European communities 
sitting alongside the deputes from mainland France in accordance with their 
proportional weighting within the total population (around 15 European and 100 
Muslims). This was to give rise to three different types of parliamentary session. First, 
the Assembly was to sit in plenary session on those matters which concerned all 
members of the French community. Second, the Algerian representatives (European 
and Muslim) were to be excluded from any discussions which only concerned 
Metropolitan France. Third, Muslim representatives were to retain exclusive 
competence in matters which were of relevance only to their community. How it was 
to be decided whether an issue was relevant only to the people of Metropolitan France 
or to the Muslims of Algeria, Camus did not say. His solution also overlooked the 
potential for governmental paralysis surpassing by far the worst excesses of the Fourth 
Republic resulting from the countless debates which would have ensued merely over 
which combination of deputes was appropriate to consider any substantive issue. The 
impracticality of the idea aside, the crucial point to retain here is the overlap between 
integration and a federal solution. 
A further example of the common ideological terrain occupied by supporters of a 
federal solution and of integration is revealed by Soustelle's revelation that, in the 
immediate aftermath of World War Two, he had envisaged that France and her 
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colonies (including Algeria) would form 'un seul Etat, riche par le nombre des 
hommes, la diversite des ressources et la variete des climats, et vivifie par la 
democratie' (ET, 21). Within this 'grand corps euro-africain', racial discrimination was 
to be eliminated and all would enjoy equal rights and equal opportunities. As to the 
form that this superstate would have taken, he noted: 'Je le concevais comme une 
republique federale, au sein de laquelle la France eüt ete 1'Etat le plus peuple et le plus 
developpe' (ET, 21). 
It is perhaps somewhat surprising, then, that the choice between integration and 
association gave rise, as Chevallier noted in 1958, to `de violentes controverses' (NA, 
18). This is a point confirmed by Girardet who claims that the disagreement between 
the integrationnistes and the associationnistes created a deep schism within the camp 
of the reformers: 
Cette contradiction fondamentale a fait qu'il etait absolument impossible de definir, pour les 
militants de l'Algerie francaise, une veritable politique algerienne. Cela ne tenait pas 
seulement A la multiplicite de leurs approches du probleme mais relevait d'une opposition 
fondamentale. 7 
Viewed from a contemporary perspective, any discussion amongst reformers about 
whether Algeria should have been fully integrated into the political structure of the 
French Republic or linked to France by a looser, federal arrangement seems somewhat 
spurious given that both solutions sought to enforce the retention of Algeria under 
French control. As Chapter One indicated, a number of arguments can be advanced to 
counter the reformers' claims that integration was a viable project: the unwillingness 
of the settlers to embrace change, the lack of political will amongst the French public 
and French investors, and, more importantly, the fact that insufficient numbers of 
Muslims wanted French rule of any kind and were determined to fight for full 
independence. The time spent arguing over the respective merits of integration and 
association now seems somewhat spurious. The reason for the dispute between 
reformers is only properly appreciated, however, if we accept their assessment of the 
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reformability of the colonial situation and, in particular, their central proposition that 
the 'hearts and minds' of the Muslim masses could be won (or lost). 
If winning Muslim 'hearts and minds' was the stated aim, then at first glance a federal 
solution seems a more promising option than integration. By promising more 
autonomy, it offered more political power to Muslims and seemed more likely to 
guarantee a greater amount of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. This 
argument was, however, flawed. If all reform strategies were ultimately doomed to fail 
through lack of Muslim support, what we will argue here is that integration was the 
most coherent of those on offer. 
Federalism and the Logic of the Conflict 
The first problem with a federal solution was its potential impact upon the Muslim 
population. Whilst, as we saw in Chapter Four, the French never managed to achieve a 
sufficient volume of support amongst Muslims to defeat the FLN, fewer Muslims still 
would have collaborated with the French forces, even in an enterprise as worthwhile 
as the building of a school or hospital, without a firm guarantee that the French would 
not abandon them to face FLN retribution. Whilst a federal solution did not 
necessarily imply a French withdrawal, it hardly created that climate of confidence 
which reformers believed vital for their plans to come to fruition. Launched into the 
deeply polarised Algerian situation, the announcement of a federal solution could only 
have hastened the French demise, leading to a loss of support for the French cause 
amongst the Muslim population. 
It was for this reason that Soustelle considered federalism an inappropriate solution to 
the Algerian problem. Under the conditions in which the war was being fought, and 
given the fact that no firm federal arrangements existed between France and her other 
colonies of the time, any federal solution, he argued, would be seized upon by the 
rebels with catastrophic consequences for the French hold on Algeria. 
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J'ai trop souvent prönd moi-meme la structure federale pour ('ensemble de la France et de 
1'outremer pour ne pas avoir mürement pest les avantages et les inconvenients de cette 
solution appliquee ä 1'Alg6rie. Je n'hesiterais pas ä la preconiser sans reserve si l'Algerie 
etait calme et surtout si des institutions föderales francaises existaient. Helas ! Il n'en existe 
point. Confier l'Algerie ä une federation sans pouvoirs federaux, lui conferer une autonomie 
d'Etat sans la situer dans un cadre plus vaste et solidement etabli, c'est l'aventure. Ce 
federalisme acephale conduirait droit ä la secession, car les forces de dislocation qui 
s'exercent contre la France n'y verraient que l'occasion propice pour arriver dans les 
moindres delais ä la secession totale. (AS, 92-3) 
In a communique sent to Edgar Faure and Maurice Bourges-Maunoury on 1 June 
1955, Soustelle had made the same point: 'Dans L'etat actuel des choses, eile [la 
federation] aboutirait tout droit au separatisme. '8 Almost six years later, his thinking 
had scarcely evolved: 'Le train `Algerie' brülerait la station de 1'autonomie interne 
pour ne s'arreter qu'ä celle de l'independance' (ET, 24). Any form of federalism, he 
asserted, 'declenchera un processus irreversible et probablement tres rapide qui 
conduira sans delai ä la secession totale' (ET, 26); Algeria had to be represented in the 
same way as every other French province, 'en excluant toute assemblee politique 
purement algerienne qui amorcerait la separation de l'Algerie et de la metropole' (ET, 
287). 
The second problem with a federal solution lay in finding the personnel to administer 
it from within the Muslim population. In the first instance, there was no possibility of 
negotiating a federal deal with the FLN as it was not only unacceptable to the 
reformers but also to the nationalists who, from the outset of the conflict, refused to 
compromise their demands for full independence. Serge Berstein and Pierre Milza 
write of `un durcissement permanent du FLN qui ne cesse d'affirmer sa determination 
ä ne discuter que de l'independance' 9 As an article appearing in July 1957 in the FLN 
newspaper Resistance algerienne put it: `Revolutionnaires, noun refusons tout 
compromis avec le colonialisme francais'. 10 An even stronger expression of the 
unwillingness of the nationalists to accept any political solution which stopped short 
of full independence is found in an article published in September of the same year by 
another FLN publication, El Moudjahid: `Accepter une formule centree sur une autre 
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chose que l'independance, c'est renoncer ä abattre le colonialisme alors qu'on en a la 
possibilite, c'est en laisser substituer les germes virulents qui auraient vite fait 
d'engendrer un systeme d'oppression plus monstrueux que le precedent. ' 1 
Nor could the French negotiate a federal solution with a `third force' since, in addition 
to its use of reprisals on potential French sympathisers, the FLN sought to establish its 
hegemony as the sole representative of the Algerian people by ruthlessly suppressing 
its political opponents or by forcing them to join its ranks. As Stora points out, rival 
nationalist groupings were either treated as enemies, such as Messali Hadj's MNA, or 
were dissolved and its members subsumed within the FLN on an individual basis. 12 
Such was the nature of the conflict. As Dine has commented, `In a revolutionary war, 
such as that fought by the FLN guerrillas against the French, only two positions are 
possible: pro and contra, with no intermediate stance being recognised either by the 
forces of colonial order or their insurrectionary challengers. ' 13 Schulte, reflecting on 
the strategic lessons of the Algerian war, notes that `by the time the French attempted 
to negotiate a compromise peace, they could find no "interlocuteurs valables ": no-one 
worth talking to outside the implacable FLN leadership who would accept only total 
French withdrawal'. 14 Likewise, Home, commenting upon the increasingly hardening 
attitude of Algeria's European population as well as that of the Muslims, laments `the 
sad, repeated failure of the moderates, or a "third force", to compete against opposing 
extremes'. 15 
This was recognised by some reformers. Soustelle argued that between integration 
and an independent Algeria under the control of the FLN, there was no `middle 
ground', writing of `la chimere d'une `troisieme force' musulmane ni pro-FLN ni 
integrationniste' (PT, 134). Camus argued that the descending spiral of violence and 
bloodshed had gradually led to the disappearance of political moderates, regretting `la 
disparition progressive de ce troisieme camp oü Pon pouvait encore garder la tete 
froide'. 16 
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Since negotiation with the FLN or with a chimerical third force could be ruled out, the 
only remaining option was to hope that a federal administration could be put in place 
under the leadership of precisely those Muslims who, under integration, would have 
sat as deputes in the French parliament. Such an option would have required victory 
over the FLN prior to its implementation, a victory which could only have been 
achieved with the support of the vast majority of the indigenous population. And, as 
we have seen, since signs of failing French resolve were more likely to harm rather 
than bolster popular Muslim support for the French, the announcement of a federal 
solution, according to Soustelle's logic, led inexorably to a French withdrawal. In 
actual fact, since all reform plans were destined to fail, the announcement of a federal 
solution could only hasten the onset of a French withdrawal rather than create the 
conditions of its own possibility. Nevertheless, from within the reformers' view of the 
world, Soustelle was correct to point out in his 1955 telegram to Faure that 'la 
federation n'est concevable qu'ä long terme, une fois resolus les problemes les plus 
aigus'. '? In Aimee et souffrante Algerie, Soustelle indicated that it was possible to 
move from integration towards federation but not the reverse: `J'ajoute qu'on peut 
passer de 1'integration ä la federation, et non l'inverse' (AS, 93-4). In other words, by 
adopting a policy of integration, federation still remained on the table as a possible 
option once the situation in Algeria had calmed down sufficiently. If federalism was to 
be the preferred solution, it could only have been advanced by stealth and not revealed 
as the declared policy until after the defeat of the FLN. 
Reformers and Liberal anti-colonialists 
The `Intermediary Margin' 
Commenting in 1992, Girardet claims to have been surprised, on reading Jean 
Daniel's largely anti-colonial account of the Algerian conflict, to find a considerable 
amount of common ground between the stance adopted by Daniel and his own 
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position as a supporter of Algerie francaise. From this, he concludes that there existed 
an intermediary margin straddling the pro-independence and pro-French Algeria 
camps: 
II y a, dann une large fraction des deux camps, des Bens qui se trouveraient A peu pres 
d'accord sur les memes valeurs, sur un meme but ä atteindre et qui ne parviennent jamais ä 
se rencontrer. Et apr8s tout, le reve d'une Algerie fraternelle, r6conciliee dans la mouvance 
francaise, c'est ä peu pres ce que nous voulions, et c'est au fond ce que souhaitait aussi M. 
Jean Daniel. 18 
Girardet is perhaps vulnerable to the accusation that he is attempting to rehabilitate 
the cause of French Algeria by stressing his proximity to the pro-independence 
faction, thus distracting from the many elements of unyielding, reactionary 
colonialism with whom he had to share his platform. He also over-estimates the 
amount of common ground which he had with Daniel who, from as early as 1956, was 
arguing for the need to deal with the FLN and highlighting the possibility that the 
settler community would have no place in an independent Algeria. 19 In essence, 
however, Girardet's general point about an intermediary margin is valid since both 
supporters and opponents of Algerian independence laid claim to liberal values as a 
means of justifying their stance. Given that 'liberal' is such a blanket term, it is useful 
to draw a distinction between the partisans of either integration or federalism - the 
colonial reformers - and the independance francaise camp, the supporters of which we 
might term liberal anti-colonialists. 20 
A set-piece elaboration of the liberal anti-colonialist position was expressed in Esprit 
by Marius Chatignon. Although holding the view that Algeria should be independent, 
Chatignon refused to accept that this independence was to be gained at any price. He 
presents himself as a revolutionary, defending the cause of truth and justice against 
tyranny and oppression. By condemning the French effort in Algeria, he saw himself 
as preserving the honour and vocation of France. At the same time, he declared that he 
would only support the FLN on condition that they respected the same liberal 
ideology: 
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Il faut leur dire [aux hommes du FLN] que nous n'avons pas pour but l'independance 
politique de 1'Algerie A tout prix, que nous refusons d'etre les dupes ou les victimes de la 
haine sacree du `roumi'. Nous defendons, en meme temps que la vocation et l'honneur la 
France, la vraie cause du peuple algerien. Nous ne luttons pas uniquement pour qu'il y ait 
demain une jeune nation qui s'appelle Algerie, mais pour que 1'exploitation du peuple 
algerien cesse, pour qu'il n'y ait pas de nouveaux maitres (seraient-ils Algeriens! ) pour qu'il 
accede ä une condition de vie humaine. En bref, nous sommes des revolutionnaires, notre 
cause est partout celle de la verite et de la justice. Nous ne sommes - de cmur - avec les 
nationalistes algeriens que s'ils sont, aussi, des revolutionnaires algeriens 2' 
A similar view was held by Esprit's editor-in-chief, Jean-Marie Domenach who, 
although supporting the view that the Algerian people be given the right of national 
self-determination, was nonetheless bitterly critical of the FLN: 'Il prepare les 
meurtres generiques, la guerre totale. Cest une mauvaise philosophie, indigne d'un 
i22 peuple en lutte pour sa liberation. 
There are key points of both similarity and difference between these liberal anti- 
colonialists and the reformers. In terms of the similarity, the emphasis on 
humanitarian and democratic values led both groups to have a marked dislike for the 
methods and the ideology employed by the FLN. There is a clear resemblance for 
example between the above statements from Chatignon and Domenach and the 
condemnations of the Algerian nationalists made by reformers. In an open letter to a 
number of unnamed intellectuals dated 14 November 1955, Soustelle sought to 
discredit any notion that the actions of the FLN were justified on humanitarian or 
democratic grounds: 
`Nos principes' (je suppose qu'on entend par lä ceux de la libert8, de la democratie et du 
respect de 1'homme), justifient-ils la fureur raciste et la fanatisme qui se sont assouvis par le 
massacre des ouvriers europeens d'El-Halia et de leurs families ? 23 
In Nous avons pacifie Tazalt, Jean-Yves Alquier claimed to accept the right of peoples 
to decide their own political destiny, yet rejected the idea that victory for the FLN 
would in any way secure this right for the Algerian people. In his mind, national 
liberation was incompatible with the anti-democratic, anti-progress actions of the 
FLN. He claimed that the villagers with whom he came into contact existed in a 
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constant state of fear and anguish owing to the particularly savage nature of FLN 
activities. For these villagers, the soldiers of the FLN were merely `les sauvages'. 24 
Writing in the wake of a series of FLN reprisals against villagers co-operating with his 
SAS unit, Alquier attacked those intellectuals who, isolated from the realities of the 
conflict, constantly denounced the French presence on the grounds that it violated the 
right of people to national self-determination: 
Qu'en pensent messieurs les doctrinaires de la liberte des peuples ä disposer d'eux-memes, 
pour qui seuls les egorgeurs du FLN reprdsentent le peuple algerien? A Tazalt, nous n'avons 
jamais ete plus partisans de cette 'liberty; chaque jour, nous sommes plus convaincus que 
notre role est precisement de la retablir pour permettre ä l'immense majorite du peuple 
algerien d'affirmer sa fidelite ä la France sans courir le risque d'etre egorgd 25 
Michel Henry in an editorial to Le Bled in 1958 took up the theme, attempting to 
dismantle any proclaimed link between the principles of the Algerian revolution and 
the right of national self-determination. Since 1945, Henry argued, this right had been 
the main argument mobilised by the nationalists in order to justify their resistance to 
colonialism, an argument which had succeeded in gaining some currency at the United 
Nations. However, for thousands upon thousands of men, women and children in 
Algeria, such lofty principles meant very little; their mobilisation simply provided a 
`magnifique pretexte' to `des bandes de tueurs' to establish their rule of terror. The 
victory of the so-called oppressed nationalist movements would be no more than the 
triumph of an illiberal and fanatical regime. 26 
The difference between the liberal anti-colonialist position and that of the reformers 
is, however, equally crucial. Since the reformers believed in the `consent potential', 
they were able to give their unequivocal support to the French Army's pacification 
effort. Since, in their eyes, the FLN sought to establish its rule through terror alone, it 
was the French who were defending the cause of political liberalism and democracy. 
Liberal anti-colonialists, on the other hand, by supporting in principle the cause of 
Algerian independence, did not believe that the majority of Algeria's indigenous 
population wanted to be French. This placed them in a dilemma which the reformers, 
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by the logic of their position, did not face. This dilemma was typified by Chatignon 
who opposed both the French Army's aims and the ideology of the FLN. His liberal 
principles were in conflict with his desired solution to the conflict. 27 
An escape from this dilemma could not be found by replacing the 'consent potential' 
with another, equally implausible notion, which we might term the 'separation 
potential' allowing the Muslim masses, recognised to be favourable to independence, 
to be imagined separately from the FLN. A re-examination of Chatignon's 
condemnation of the FLN cited earlier reveals that this was, in part, what he was 
attempting to do. Chatignon wanted to defend the cause of the Algerian people not 
only against French colonial oppression but also against the Algerian nationalists. 
Whilst this position allowed him to maintain a certain amount of ideological good 
faith, it bore little relation to the balance of forces on the ground in Algeria; as we 
have seen, there was no alternative nationalist voice to the FLN commanding 
widespread support. The liberal anti-colonialist was faced with a stark choice: either 
seek to influence the FLN to adopt a more liberal approach or support the French 
forces in the hope that they would be magnanimous in victory. 
Trapped Between the Extremes: The Dilemma of the Liberal Anti-Colonialist 
On the one hand, liberal anti-colonialists such as Chatignon would have found very 
little to offend their ideological sensibilities in some of the material produced by the 
FLN, such as the following extract from an article appearing in Resistance algerienne: 
[Notre] doctrine est d'inspiration tout ä la fois universaliste et algerienne, c'est-ä-dire 
elaboree d'apri s notre propre experience des autres nations et des valeurs essentielles du 
monde moderne. 
Notre nationalisme participe essentiellement du `principe des nationalitds' elabord par les 
penseurs liberaux des 18e et 19e sir Iles et mis en application par les divers peuples 
d'Amerique, d'Europe, d'Asie et d'Afrique 29 
Whilst this reads very much like an approval of the democratic heritage of Western 
European liberalism, the methods employed by the FLN to achieve their liberation 
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were at odds with this proclaimed concern for universalism. As Sirinelli has 
recognised: `L'aversion pour le terrorisme et pour la violence ä l'egard des civils 
rendra souvent l'engagement difficile ou reticent en faveur de Pun ou l'autre des deux 
camps d'un conflit qui ira en se radicalisant. '29 Vidal-Naquet has also observed an 
incompatibility between the emphasis on liberalism, tolerance and democracy which 
characterised the discourse of the Left in France and the aspirations of the FLN. It was 
not possible to `interpreter le mouvement algerien en des termes qui relevaient tres 
specifiquement du vocabulaire de la gauche franraise' 30 Vidal-Naquet was himself an 
archetypal liberal anti-colonialist. Although he came into contact with the FLN during 
the war by virtue of his position as editor of works such as Verite-liberte, he is at 
pains to point out that he was never `un adorateur du FLN'. 31 Whilst he was prepared 
to testify at the trial of Francis Jeanson, he subsequently felt it important to clarify that 
he did not share Jeanson's notion of engagement. It was, in his eyes, vital to maintain a 
certain critical distance from the FLN: 
Mon temoignage au proc6s signifiait que j'estimais ` hautement normal et satisfaisant que 
des socialistes francais se soient montres solidaires dans faction des militants algeriens'. En 
revanche, il me parait inadmissible de passer de 1'alliance ä 1'insubordination. L'integration 
au FLN des militants antifascistes a pu etre inevitable dans une periode de decomposition de 
la gauche francaise, eile n'a plus aucun sens aujourd'hui, oil semble s'esquisser un 
mouvement de masse. Aucune alliance ne saurait impliquer une sacralisation de Pallid. Il me 
semble qu'il ya un droit et meme un devoir de critique mutuelle. 32 
The difficult situation of the liberal anti-colonialist who wished to somehow 
'recuperate' the FLN's revolt within a French liberal, democratic tradition was also 
highlighted by the militant anti-colonialists of the day. In his 1959 work, L'an V de la 
revolution algerienne, Fanon argued that the nationalists recoiled in the face of certain 
terrorist acts, in part out of humanitarian concerns and in part so as not to distance 
liberal anti-colonialists. Nationalists had three concerns: 
[souci] de ne pas amonceler les victimes quelquefois innocentes, souci de ne pas donner une 
image fausse de la Revolution, et souci enfin de maintenir de son cote les democrates 
francais, les democrates de tous les pays du monde et les Europeens d'Algerie attires par 
l'ideal national algerien. (SR, 38-9) 
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If such sentiments again did not seem incompatible with the views of a liberal anti- 
colonialist, Fanon's tone had hardened by the time he came to write Les damnes de la 
terre. In this work, he argued that there was no place for liberalism in the 
revolutionary situation nor was it simply the case that the nationalists hoped to turn 
the values of 1789 against the French: 'La mise en question du monde colonial par le 
colonise n'est pas une confrontation rationnelle des points de vue. Elle West pas un 
discours sur l'universel, mais l'affirmation echevelee d'une originalite posee comme 
absolue' (DT, 10). He extolled the values of revolutionary violence as a means by 
which the colonised could recapture his essential humanity which the coloniser had 
for so long sought to deny him and stressed that the colonised could only take the 
place of the coloniser after `un affrontement decisif et meurtrier des deux 
protagonistes' (DT, 6-7). Such was the oppressive nature of colonial rule that in the 
insurrectionary period the reaction of the colonised was to `[vomir] ä pleine gorge' 
Western values and culture (DT, 12). 
Fanon was not merely describing a process, he also approved of it. Looking forward in 
Les damnes de la terre to a point at which the bonds of colonialism would be thrown 
off by every colonised people, he condemned the whole of the Enlightenment project, 
with its emphasis on reason and on the triumph of the intellect, for it was in the name 
of these very same principles that Europe had reduced most of the globe to slavery 
(DT, 230-1). Free from their Western oppressors, the newly independent peoples, 
Fanon argued, should not look to the European store of values for their guidance: 
Alors, fr8res, comment ne pas comprendre que nous avons mieux ä faire que de suivre cette 
Europe-lä. Cette Europe qui jamais ne cessa de parler de 1'homme, jamais de proclamer 
quelle n'etait inqui8te que de 1'homme, nous savons aujourd'hui de quelles souffrances 
1'humanite a paye chacune des victoires de son esprit. (DT, 230) 
The way forward for the former colonised territories was not to be found in some 
'imitation caricaturale et dans 1'ensemble obscene' of Europe (DT, 232), nor was it a 
case of attempting to better reflect the liberal principles which the Europeans 
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themselves ignored. For the benefit of the human race, newly independent peoples 
should strive to find a whole new set of values (DT, 233). 
In a similar, if less impassioned prose, Memmi also exposed the untenable position of 
liberalism within the Algerian conflict. The time when such values as tolerance, 
justice and democracy were applicable to the colonial situation had long since passed 
whilst the time of their re-emergence was yet to come: 
Mais en attendant, sur le sens du combat imm6diat, le colonisateur de gauche ne peut que 
rester divisd. Etre de gauche, pour lui, ne signifie pas seulement accepter et aider la 
liberation nationale des peuples, mais aussi la democratie politique et la liberte, la 
democratic 6conomique et la justice, le refus de la xenophobie raciste et l'universalite, le 
progres materiel et spirituel. Et si toute gauche veritable doit souhaiter et aider la promotion 
nationale des peuples, c'est aussi, pour ne pas dire surtout, parce que cette promotion 
signifie tout cela. Si le colonisateur de gauche refuse la colonisation et se refuse comme 
colonisateur, c'est au nom de cet ideal. Or il decouvre qu'il n'y a pas de liaison entre la 
liberation des colonises et l'application d'un programme de gauche. Mieux encore, qu'il 
aide peut-etre ä la naissance d'un ordre social oil il n'y a pas de place pour un homme de 
gauche en tant que tel, du moins dans un avenir prochain. (PC, 60-1)'3 
It is clear that liberal anti-colonialists were unable to support the FLN without, at the 
same time, setting aside the liberal principles upon which their engagement was 
based. Lacking a 'third force' in which to place their faith, the only remaining option 
open to them was to throw their lot in with the pro-Algerie francaise movement and, 
effectively, join the ranks of the colonial reformers. This was the path followed by 
Paul Rivet and as such is worth further elaboration here. 
During the war, Rivet was director of the Musee de 1 'komme, President of the French 
delegation to UNESCO in 1957 and, moreover, an ally of Ho Chi Minh. His 
ideological sympathy towards decolonisation, distinguishing him considerably from 
the likes of Soustelle, ought to have placed him firmly in the camp of the liberal anti- 
colonialists, if not the militant camp. In an interview with Claude Delmas conducted 
in 1956, Rivet stated his belief that the Algerian movement, at its outset, had been a 
legitimate demonstration of the wishes of a large part of the Arab and Berber 
communities. However, he felt that the continuation of hostilities had seen this 
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movement depart from its original, legitimate goals, to become a fanatical movement: 
`Ce mouvement initial s'est de plus en plus transforme en un mouvement nationaliste, 
religieux et raciste que, pour ma part, je ne puls approuver. '34 Rivet claimed to have 
spent his life in the service of anti-racism and as an opponent of religious 
sectarianism. According to the very same principles, he was obliged to condemn the 
FLN and his own erstwhile intellectual allies who were prepared to support the 
nationalists: 
Au moment oü un courant que je veux croire irresistible oriente le monde vers la tolerance 
politique et religieuse, et cherche ä rdaliser les conditions de la coexistence pacifique entre 
les peuples, il me semble 6trange que des hommes, mes amis, qui ont travaille avec tant de 
courage et de desinteressement ä cette oeuvre de paix, encouragent, soutiennent et meme 
attisent par leurs propos et leurs 6crits les antagonismes religieux, raciaux, politiques, 
sociaux et culturels qui opposent en Algerie deux communautes ethniques, alors qu'au 
contraire, au nom de leurs principes, ils devraient s'attacher ä lutter contre cet irrationalisme 
qui est le principal obstacle devant la paix. (p. 6) 
The fight that was taking place for national liberation under the FLN was to be clearly 
distinguished from the struggle which Ho Chi Minh had waged in Indochina. For 
Rivet, Ho Chi Minh's struggle had been devoid of any racial or religious element: 'Nul 
plus que lui ne desirait le maintien de la presence francaise dans le Vietnam 
independant' (p. 6); if the French presence had been eliminated, this was the fault of 
the French themselves. For this reason, no parallel could be drawn between the 
nationalism of the Vietminh and that of the FLN and, therefore a different stance, 
Rivet claimed, was necessary in each case. 
Concluding Remarks. 
This chapter has considered two liberal alternatives to integration. The advantage of 
integration over federalism was that it was unequivocal on the question of French 
sovereignty, seeking to offer a cast-iron guarantee to those Muslims who rallied to the 
French flag that they would not be abandoned. It had a simplicity and a coherence 
which made it the most likely of the reform solutions to stem, even where it could not 
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stop, the tide of Algerian nationalism. The chapter has also shown that the preferred 
solution of the liberal anti-colonialists did not offer a more viable alternative to those 
proposed by the reformers owing to the lack of a moderate, liberal alternative to the 
FLN. This rendered their position not only as untenable as that of the pro-integration 
camp but also less logical. Had it really been possible for the French to win the 'hearts 
and minds' of the Muslim population in sufficient numbers, then integration would 
have offered the best hope of success. For this reason, the following chapter, which 




A CLOSER LOOK AT INTEGRATION 
Casting a backward glance over the history of France's civilising mission, it is 
difficult to debate the question of whether this mission `worked' without adding that 
the nature of colonial oppression lay in part in the civilising rhetoric itself with its 
assumptions of European superiority and its disregard for indigenous culture and 
values. It is not enough to simply contrast colonial rhetoric and practice without also 
stressing the violence inherent in the very idea of imposing the coloniser's model of 
the `good society' upon the colonised. 
Soustelle was keen to stress that integration was not merely assimilation in another 
guise. Whereas assimilation contained an inherent assumption about what it meant to 
be French, integration, in his eyes, demanded no conversion to an ill-defined norm of 
`Frenchness'. By exploring the components of integration, this chapter will seek to 
assess whether the programme did, as Soustelle claimed, escape from the obvious 
Eurocentrism of its forerunner. Although more sensitive to the dangers of imposing an 
alien culture upon Algeria's Muslim population, integration, we will argue, still did 
not completely avoid the assimilationist logic of making Frenchmen and women out 
of colonial subjects. In addition, having seen in Chapter Three the way in which 
reformers' reading of the colonial past was insufficiently critical of the injustices it 
produced, this chapter will further show that in the domains of political rights, land 
reform and industrialisation, the specifics of Soustelle's proposals fell short of the 
stated aim of parity between coloniser and colonised, providing instead a continued 
sop to European minority rule. 
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Any discussion about the 'appropriateness' of French plans to transform Algeria gives 
rise to delicate questions born of the debate between universalism and cultural 
specificity which we highlighted in our introductory chapter. The question of whether 
democratic government represents the best form of political organisation for all 
peoples or whether industrialisation constitutes the best way for poor countries to 
escape from under-development cannot be answered in any absolute sense but any 
response must surely take into account the opinions of those to whom these models 
for a more efficacious organisation of society are on offer. This is part of the reason 
why, in the context of the Algerian war, the 'consent potential' was so central to the 
reformers' justification for their stance and why it was so strongly contested by the 
militant anti-colonialists. A recurrent point of reference in this chapter will therefore 
be Fanon's discussion of the themes of development and consent which he explicitly 
links in L'an V de la revolution algerienne. 
Fanon's portrait is a polemical one. Although perhaps a more accurate representation 
of the Muslim population than those produced by the reformers, it nonetheless over- 
estimated the unanimity of revolutionary sentiment which animated the Muslim 
population as a whole, as Chapter Four highlighted. Its usefulness here, though, is that 
it imposes a constant vigilance upon our assessment of the provisions of integration. 
Whilst there is a temptation to condone some of the ideas advanced by Soustelle on 
the grounds that they went at least part of the way towards promoting a multi-cultural, 
multi-ethnic vision of society, this approval rests upon the consent of the colonised. 
By keeping in mind Fanon's portrait, we remain mindful that this consent was not 
forthcoming. 
Assimilation and Integration 
One of the key points of Soustelle's integration programme was that Muslims would 
not have been required to renounce part of their identity as it found expression 
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through religion and language in order to qualify for French citizenship: 'Integration 
nest pas assimilation; l'originalite ethnique, linguistique, religieuse de 1'Algerie doit 
etre et sera respectee' (AS, 109). In L'esperance trahie, he shows himself to be partly 
sensitive to, and critical of, the blithe self-assurance which underpinned the concept of 
the civilising mission. Although he praised the good will of the French colonisers, a 
clear note of criticism is discernible in his description of the French as `enclins ä se 
meler de tout et avec tous, croyant toujours bon de transposer automatiquement sous 
le ciel d'Afrique ou de 1'Asie les institutions et les mmurs de la France' (ET, 19). 
Camus was similarly critical of the overly-prescriptive elements of assimilation which 
offered a very narrow understanding of `Frenchness'. He claimed that the policy of 
assimilation had been an unmitigated failure for two reasons: `parce qu'elle n'a jamais 
ete entreprise, et ensuite parce que le peuple arabe a garde sa personnalite qui nest 
pas reductible ä la nötre' (our emphasis). ' 
In a note to President du Conseil Edgar Faure, Soustelle emphasised the difference 
between these two policies: `L'assimilation visait l'individu, l'integration interesse la 
province. Il faut renoncer a l'illusion de faire de chaque Musulman un Francais de 
France'. 2 Although claiming to know a number of Muslims who had been totally 
assimilated, Soustelle, writing in 1961, reiterated the point that integration concerned 
Algeria as a whole rather than a few individuals. In his eyes, the separateness of the 
`Algerian personality' posed no barrier to the potential success of his programme: 
Elle [l'integration] reconnait formellement la personnalitd algerienne, faite de l'originalit8 
ethnique, culturelle, linguistique d'une majorit8 de sa population. L'integration prend 
1'Algerie teile qu'elle est, les Algdriens tels qu'ils sont, comme l'histoire les a faconnes, 
pour faire entrer de plain-pied cette province dans la Republique francaise. (ET, 286) 
He denounced the claim that integration was comparable to assimilation or that it 
simply reinforced the colonial status quo as a 'mensonge stupide qu'on esperait 
accrediter en le repetant indefiniment' (ET, 27); it "was only because integration was 
'un mythe puissant' that it had attracted so much criticism (ET, 27). These are ideas to 
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which he would remain constant, commenting during a 1988 interview: `Ne 
confondons pas integration et assimilation; l'assimilation s'adresse ä des individus, 
c'est une Utopie; on ne prend pas un musulman pour en faire un Francais moyen. '3 As 
we shall now see from an examination of the cultural, economic and political 
dimensions of integration, Soustelle's assertions turn out to be partly true and his 
indignation at being misunderstood half justified. 
Changes to the Algerian Economy 
Integration promised to end the exploitation of Algeria's indigenous population and to 
radically improve their material standards of living. Writing in 1961, Soustelle 
claimed that he had wanted to `imprimer ä 1'economie algerienne un dynamisme 
suffisant pour resorber son secteur sous-developpe, creer des emplois et combattre la 
misere'(ET, 288). As a largely agrarian economy, land distribution and use was 
central to any development project. Soustelle envisaged the creation of a special 
agency which would redistribute some land to Algerian farmers either by offering 
long-term tenancy agreements with the eventual option to buy, or by selling it to them 
with the finance provided through long-term loans (AS, 77). He also wanted to see the 
abolition of the Khammessat, a feudal system under which peasants worked the land 
but were obliged to give four-fifths of their profits to the landowner. He proposed to 
replace this with a new system which would allow for a fifty-fifty distribution of the 
profits. Whilst these plans were designed to meet some of the needs of the rural poor, 
they only scratched the surface of what might have been attempted. A more radical 
and fair solution would not necessarily have meant returning all the land to the 
descendants of those from whom it was originally expropriated, but it certainly would 
have implied some financial compensation, imaginative thinking and, in all 
likelihood, an army of lawyers to arrive at an equitable arrangement. Certainly, to 
broach the question of the redistribution of land to the indigenous population would 
have been to venture into a potential minefield, a move which would have provoked 
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the anger of the settlers with all of their prejudices about `lazy' Arabs and their highly 
developed sense of self-worth as pioneers and cultivators. In addition, extensive land 
reform would, in all likelihood, have placed extra financial demands on the French 
government and the French taxpayer. However, if Soustelle was sincere about wanting 
to right some of the wrongs of the past then land ownership was an issue which he had 
to tackle. Instead he provides us with an example of his unwillingness to go the extra 
mile down the road of reform. 
Industrialisation as the way forward 
If the plans for land reform were not as fully worked out in Soustelle's writing as 
might have been expected given that most of Algeria's Muslim population lived off 
the land, this was in part due to the fact that, in his eyes, the key to raising incomes of 
Muslim peasants lay with the promotion of industrial growth. He remained 
unconvinced that the overall standard of living could be significantly improved by 
reform in the agrarian sector: 
Voici trop longtemps qu'on parle de la `vocation agricole de l'Algerie'. Pour sauver 
I'Algerie, c'est-ä-dire les Algeriens, il faut industrialiser le pays. Meme modernisee, 
l'agriculture ne peut ä eile seule combler le vide qui s'elargit entre les subsistances et le 
nombre des consommateurs sous 1'effet d'une ddmographie `galopante'. (AS, 62) 
He declared himself uninterested in dogma and concerned only with efficiency when 
it came to the economic instruments to be employed to bring an end to human misery 
and suffering: 
J'avoue qu'en de telles mati8res les partis pris doctrinaux me paraissent sans interet; libre 
entreprise et planification, ententes volontaires d'entrepreneurs et orientation d'Etat doivent 
concourir au meme but, car ce but est d'une importance vitale et compte seul. (AS, 64) 
It is perhaps an unfair reading of Soustelle's good will to argue that he merely wanted 
to turn Algeria into an adjunct of the French economy to be exploited ruthlessly. Yet, 
whilst he professed no particular predisposition for any one economic orthodoxy, his 
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proposals in actual fact amounted to the incorporation of the Algerian economy into 
the capitalist system of surplus production and consumption: 
Le fellah vit presque en circuit ferme: du point de vue de l'economie generale, il nest pas un 
consommateur. L'ouvrier, au contraire, ach6te et consomme. Distribuer des salaires, c'est 
creer un pouvoir d'achat, et par consequent ouvrir de nouveaux marches ä l'industrie. Celle- 
ci apparait donc comme une pompe qu'il faut amorcer pour qu'ensuite eile continue ä 
fonctionner d'elle-meme. (AS, 62) 
Camus largely agreed with Soustelle that only the adoption of the Western model of 
economic development could lift Muslims out of their misery: `Quoi qu'on pense de 
la civilisation technique, elle seule, malgre les infirmites, peut donner une vie decente 
aux pays sous-developpes' 4 Muslims, he believed, should not take refuge in a vague 
pan-Islamic movement, with its emphasis on traditional values, since this was to look 
5 backwards rather than to the futures 
Chaussade took a similar line, emphasising that the expansion of the agricultural 
sector could only have a limited effect upon the per capita income of the country as a 
whole: `Le perfectionnement des methodes archaYques utilisees dans la plus grande 
partie du territoire et 1'extension des zones de culture intensive permettront d'accroitre 
les revenus et les emplois tires des activites rurales, mais dans une mesure 
relativement limitee'. 6 
Germaine Tillion, in accordance with her central thesis that the problems of Algeria 
resulted from contact between industrialised and non-industrialised societies, situated 
the Algerian question as a microcosm of the global problem of under-development; 
the transformation of Algeria and all other non-industrialised countries had to be 
complete and all encompassing and the problems faced by `des peuples dits "sous- 
developpes"' required for their resolution `le passage d'un systeme dans un autre, 
c'est-ä-dire rien de moms qu'une mutation' (AL, 52) (original emphasis). The only 
possible solution to Algeria's economic woes was to continue along the path of 
modernisation, necessitating `un alignement culturel, economique et social avec les 
143 
pays evolues du monde' (AL, 86). Algeria had gone past the stage of being able to 
adapt to the problems posed by the inexorable march of planetary civilisation. The 
destruction of traditional society, caused by contact with modernity and accelerated by 
the process of colonialism, meant that there could be no return towards the past: 
`Maintenant, pour [l'Algerie], c'est - tout de suite - la civilisation industrielle 
intensive (avec tout ce qu'elle implique) ou une rapide degenerescence, agitee de 
soubresauts sanglants (AL, 111). 
Figures such as Tillion and Soustelle did not seem to be fully sensitised to the 
complexities surrounding development aid. At the very heart of their plans for the 
industrialisation of Algeria lay a belief in modernity and `progress'. Essentially, these 
plans were underpinned by a familiar Enlightenment discourse about the triumph of 
man over nature, with traditional patterns of living involving minimal 
industrialisation, and subsistence farming seen as inferior. At no point did Tillion or 
Soustelle challenge the notion that surplus production is axiomatically good, or that 
developing land and cultivating it automatically constitutes progress. Their plans to 
push Algeria through an accelerated Industrial Revolution made scant mention of the 
massive social and cultural impact which would have followed in its wake such as the 
widespread population shifts from rural to urban areas. As Maran has noted, absent 
from Tillion's writing is `a process of self-questioning about the attributes that she as 
a French social scientist thought constituted "civilization"; a questioning about the 
right of the peoples themselves to determine whether they wished at all - and if so by 
what means - to "advance" or "modernize" their civilization according to European 
standards'. 7 
In partial contrast, a manual produced by the Cinquieme Bureau for soldiers on duty 
in the Sahara demonstrates a certain amount of sensitivity in this area by advising 
French soldiers against falling into the trap of being over-paternalistic: 
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Toute action sera menge (... ) non dans un esprit de paternalisme, qui ne serait d'ailleurs pas 
de mise, ni dans un esprit d'oeuvre de charite, mais avec la volontd et dans le but de: 
promouvoir la population, lui redonner, avec la conscience de ses responsabilitds, la 
confiance dans la France et dans son destin, lui donner la volontd d'etre et de rester 
francaise 8 
If those arguments which hold that any kind of economic assistance should be rejected 
either on the ultra-liberal grounds that it distorts the workings of the market or on the 
grounds that it encourages recipients to remain in a position of dependency are 
ignored, few people would argue that the provision of economic aid is, in itself, 
malevolent. At a local level, it is perhaps somewhat harsh to cast the soldier engaged 
in the small-scale project of digging a well in order to provide a community with fresh 
water in the role of colonial oppressor or agent of Western capitalism. The same point 
might be made of the military doctor providing free medical advice and undertaking a 
vaccination campaign to prevent infant mortality in some of the remote Muslim 
communities. Certain human requirements such as food, water, warmth and shelter 
transcend cultural specificity and attempts to provide for these basics cannot 
reasonably be condemned on the grounds that they constitute an imposition of one 
economic system upon another. 
To this we must add two qualifications. Firstly, it is important not to exaggerate the 
extent to which the activities of the SAS were representative of the Army as a whole 
nor, as we pointed out in Chapter Two, should we be overly generous in our 
interpretation of exactly what it was that the SAS were trying to achieve. Secondly, 
the question of consent must be taken into consideration. As we will recall, Fanon 
thought it beneficial that the coloniser share his knowledge with the colonised: 
En toute objectivite et en toute humanite, il est bon qu'un pays techniquement plus avance 
fasse profiter un autre de ses connaissances et des decouvertes et des savants. Quand la 
discipline consideree vise la santd de 1'homme, quand eile a pour principe meme de faire 
taire la douleur, il est Clair qu'aucune conduite negative ne saurait se justifier. (SR, 107) 
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At the same time, however, Fanon argued that the Western model of progress was 
initially rejected by the colonised not because it was intrinsically bad, but precisely 
because it came from the coloniser. 
Imagining an Independent Algeria 
The belief that the French knew best when it came to deciding which changes were 
most appropriate for the Algerian economy was reinforced by reformers' assessment 
of what would happen to Algeria were she to become independent. For Soustelle, in 
such an eventuality, Algeria's government would have to impose on an already 
impoverished population 'des sacrifices inhumains pendant des annees' (AS, 65). 
Warming to his theme, he proclaimed financial, fiscal or economic autonomy for 
Algeria to be a fiction, `vingt fois plus mythique que la fameuse "fiction des trois 
departements"' (AS, pp. 237-8). For Camus, an independent Muslim Algeria would be 
unable to cope economically, rendering its political freedom worthless: `une Algerie 
purement arabe ne pourrait acceder ä l'independance economique sans laquelle 
l'independance politique n'est qu'un leurre'. 9 
In a changing international situation based around 'block' politics and an increasing 
economic interdependence, reformers sought to depict the nationalist aspirations of 
the Algerian people as an irrelevance. For Mercier, the changing world order only 
allowed'les grands ensembles de peuples qui se groupent autour d'une conception de 
l'homme et autour de structures economiques, etablies et en developpement'. For this 
reason, he proclaimed Algerian independence to be 'une duperie'. 10 Chevallier 
employed a similar language, proclaiming independence to be 'le produit du reve'. 
Given the prevailing international situation, no nation was truly independent. 'Aucun 
peuple', he concluded, 'ne peut desormais vivre seul sans appui economique, militaire 
ou financier, voire politique, du grand bloc de nations pour lequel il a opte, du camp 
auquel il appartient' (NA, 183). 
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These high-handed dismissals of Algerian independence produced by reformers were 
all articulated from France, a country whose status as a sovereign nation was long- 
established. Whereas French patriotism which had produced, amongst other things the 
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man, was celebrated within France for having 
served the cause of humankind, Algerian nationalism was perceived as out of step 
with the historical moment. Reformers were not, of course, prepared to extend the 
logic of their argument to France itself. Although France was not economically 
independent, there was no suggestion that she should give up her sovereign status. In 
the international climate of superpower domination, far from accepting the loss of 
their great power status, the French struggled fiercely to maintain as much 
independence as possible. Indeed, the retention of Empire was part of the strategy for 
l preserving that independence. " 
The argument that Algerian independence served no useful purpose also derived in 
part from a Eurocentric attitude which suggested that, left to their own devices, 
Algeria's Muslim population would quickly slide back to an imagined pre-colonial 
level of technological inadequacy. As Soustelle wrote: 
Livree a elle-meme, par ses propres forces et avec ses seules ressources, l'Algerie ne peut 
que succomber. Laissons-y jouer les lois naturelles: I'Algerie aujourd'hui est au niveau de la 
Sicile, demain eile en sera A celui de l'Egypte, apr8s-demain ä celui de I'Inde ; la disette 
endemique, les famines et sans doute la guerre civile y ram8neraient alors la population A un 
nombre plus adapte aux ressources. (AS, 237-8) 
This view is indicative of Soustelle's inability to see beyond the prejudices 
characteristic of the colonial mindset. Unable to recognise any capacity for self- 
improvement amongst Muslims, he assumed that Algeria had only advanced out of 
barbarism because of the French presence. Were the French to leave, a vague 
conception of the 'laws of nature' had decreed that Algeria would once again take its 
place amongst the poorest countries in the world. This was, in part, linked with his 
belief that the land was incapable of feeding the population. It was also, in his mind, 
associated with the likelihood of civil war, almost as though, being less civilised than 
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their European counterparts, the indigenous population could not avoid fighting 
amongst themselves. Such assumptions, of course, have very little to do with any 
perceived 'laws of nature' and much more to do with Soustelle's discriminatory 
imaging of the Algerian people. Moreover, even if such laws did exist, Soustelle saw 
them as acting only on the Algerians since his point was precisely that, under French 
guidance, they could be transcended. To this we can add that given the levels of 
poverty and malnutrition which already existed in French-controlled Algeria, there 
was more than a hint of irony, apparently unrecognised by the French, in their 
warnings to Muslims that, left to their own devices, they would be in dire trouble. 
Soustelle's view that Algerians could not manage on their own was, in fact, widely 
shared by other advocates of colonial reform. In Chevallier's writing, the negative 
imaging of the indigenous population is attached to his valorisation of the settler 
community. Were the settlers to leave Algerian soil, their pioneering and 
entrepreneurial spirit would leave with them: 'Si demain le colon europeen d'Algerie 
venait ä se decourager et ä disparaitre, une presence sedentaire, un guide, une volonte 
s'eteindraient et des regions entieres, pour un long temps peut-titre, retomberaient 
dans la misere et dans la nuit' (NA, 174). Camus adopted a similarly negative imaging 
of the Algerians. In his eyes, any policy which led to a French withdrawal from 
Algeria could not be tolerated since it would condemn the Muslim community to even 
greater poverty: 'Je ne puis non plus approuver une politique de demission qui 
abandonnerait le peuple arabe ä une plus grande misere'. 12 
Cinquieme Bureau propaganda reproduced these themes. A pamphlet destined for 
conscripts and reservists returning from Algeria opined that without France Algeria 
would quickly become 'un territoire qui retournerait bien vite ä 1'anarchie; un territoire 
voue ä la misere faute de techniciens'. 13 A 1956 pamphlet arrived at the same 
conclusion, suggesting that `privee de la France, l'Algerie entrerait donc dans une 
effroyable periode de misere'. 14 Likewise, a prepared script designed to be read out by 
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soldiers upon their first meeting with Muslim villagers declared: `L'independance 
d'un pays sous-developpe c'est sur le plan social, 1'arret de progres et meme le 
declin. '15 
In addition to their Eurocentric attitudes towards the potential for development within 
the indigenous community, reformers predictably did not recognise that French 
colonialism had hardly left Algeria in a position where she was well equipped to deal 
with the modern world. As Memmi argued, rather than lead to the development of the 
colonial territories, colonialism actively under-developed the colonised. The lack of 
technological skill amongst the colonised people did not prove that they were 
backward as the settlers frequently claimed, nor did it justify their subjugation. 
Instead, it highlighted the inherent injustice of the colonial system. 
C'est vrai que les colonises ne savent pas travailler. Mais oii le leur a-t-on appris, qui leur a 
enseignd la technique moderne ? Oü sont les ecoles professionnelles et les centres 
d'apprentissage ? (PC, 133) 
For Memmi, the coloniser required only the labour of the colonised and so had no 
interest in training engineers and technicians from amongst the indigenous people. 
The distance between the level of development of the two societies became 
increasingly problematic as the pace of technological development in the world 
increased which, in a self-reinforcing spiral, reinforced the coloniser's belief that the 
colonised was incapable of adapting to the demands of the modern world (PC, 133-5). 
Culture and Identity 
Muslim women and Islam 
The place of women within Muslim society could not be neglected under plans for 
integration. Whilst this programme was intended to respect the tradition and identity 
of Muslims, it was also concerned with equality and, had it been implemented, should 
have seen Muslim women gain the same rights as women in mainland France. This 
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would have included the right to vote, a provision incorporated into the 1947 Statute 
for Algeria but never applied. Soustelle had very little to say about the whole question 
of the emancipation of women. In his initial plans for integration, he did not 
immediately envisage the extension of voting rights due to the potential outrage it 
would have caused: 'L'empressement marque par les Musulmans ä cet egard se montra 
si tiede, pour ne pas dire plus, que j'estimai inopportun d'etre trop en avance sur les 
mceurs' (AS, 88). 
The French Army took a more active role in advocating policies to address the 
woman's role in society. 16 A Cinquieme Bureau study investigating ways of promoting 
better relations between settlers and Muslims appreciated the need to have greater 
contact with Muslim women both as a necessary component of integration and as a 
means of undermining the rebellion. The authors of the report imagined that Muslim 
women desired to break free of the constraints which their traditional roles as wives 
and mothers placed upon them: 
Du cote feminin, la musulmane etant confinee dans son foyer, on trouve peu de contacts 
possibles ä premiere vue. Cependant la femme musulmane se rend compte de la condition 
inferieure qui lui est imposee, eile ne demande qu'ä briser ses chaines. '7 
Writing in Le Bled in 1958, Cayol, drawing up a balance sheet of French 
achievements, made it clear that Muslim women had been specifically targeted as part 
of the integration programme: 
Pour atteindre les femmes, malgrd la reclusion dans laquelle elles vivent, des equipes 
medico-sociales feminines ont ete crddes. Chacune des equipes, accompagnee d'un medecin, 
assure dans les douars le service medical et social. Ces equipes entrent en contact avec les 
femmes et les rdunissent dans les cercles fdminins pour accelerer leur promotion sociale. '$ 
It should perhaps be noted in passing that not all of the material produced by the 
Cinquieme Bureau for the consumption of Muslim women held out the promise of a 
more European lifestyle with'short skirts, make-up and other trappings of liberation. 
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In the following tract produced by the Cinquieme Bureau, Muslim women were 
addressed in their customary role as guardian of the home. 
Mares d'Algerie, qui vous vole vos enfants ? Le FLN 
Femmes d'Algerie, qui vous vole vos maris ? Le FLN 
Jeunes filles d'Algerie, qui vous vole vos fiances, vos freres ? Le FLN 
Le rebellion barbare du FLN c'est pour vous la maison sans homme. 
La rebellion barbare du FLN c'est pour vous la peur, la misfire 
La rebellion barbare du FLN c'est pour vous les enfants qui ont faim. 
ý") 
Empechez vos hommes de deserter leur foyer pour s'avilir dans la rebellion barbare. 19 
This caveat aside, the culmination of French plans to accelerate the social promotion 
of women occurred during the events of May 1958 and came to crystallise particularly 
around the issue of the wearing of the veil. During the so-called fraternisation of this 
month Muslim women were encouraged to remove and burn their veils as a symbol of 
their emancipation. These attempts to win over Muslim women by promising 
emancipation on Western European lines incurred the wrath of Fanon. He argued that 
by encouraging Muslim women to adopt European patterns of dress, the coloniser was 
not only attempting to undermine the rebellion but was also engaged in an attempt to 
impose an alien model of society: 
Convertir la femme, la gagner aux valeurs etrangeres, l'arracher ä son statut, c'est ä la fois 
conquerir un pouvoir reel sur l'homme et posseder les moyens pratiques, efficaces, de 
destructurer la culture algerienne. (SR, 20) 
With each veil that fell, Fanon claimed, it was as though the Muslim woman was 
accepting the rape of her identity by the coloniser (SR 24-5). It is difficult not to agree 
with Fanon on this point. The Army's attempt to persuade women to remove their 
veils was a rather clumsy attempt to impose French culture upon the Muslim women. 
As a marker of cultural and religious identity, and given its connections with female 
sexuality, the veil was central to Muslim society in Algeria and was particularly 
sensitive terrain upon which to venture. Integration was supposedly predicated upon 
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respect for the indigenous culture whilst the Army's plans to unveil Muslim women, 
even if they added to the theatricality of the events of May 1958, scarcely differed 
from a policy of assimilation. 
For Fanon, the issue of the veil was connected both to the wider issue of the 
emancipation of the woman and, once again, to the consent of the colonised. In his 
eyes, the decision over whether to wear the veil was taken in accordance with the 
dictates of the revolutionary conflict and the need to oppose the coloniser. In order to 
penetrate into the European area of the city, Algerian women adopted European 
fashions and hairstyles in order to pass unnoticed by the French soldiers, allowing 
them to carry out their revolutionary role of planting bombs. As soon as the French 
became alerted to this tactic, the veil was donned again to serve a different role in the 
revolutionary struggle, that of smuggling weapons. When the French tried to persuade 
Algerian women to throw off the veil, they clung to it more strongly: 'A l'offensive 
colonialiste autour du voile, le colonise oppose le culte du voile' (SR, 29). After the 
particular events of May 1958 to unveil Algerian women, women took to wearing the 
veil again 'spontanement et sans mot d'ordre' (SR, 46). This did not mean, however, 
that Fanon was opposed to the emancipation of the woman. In fact, he largely shared 
the idea that the elevation of the female to a more prominent role within Algerian 
society was to be welcomed. When change was imposed by the French, however, any 
positive benefits were eclipsed simply by the fact that what was being offered was 'of 
the coloniser; colonialism could not impose such changes on the Algerian woman. 
11 faut toujours voir l'attitude globale de refus des valeurs de l'occupant, meme si 
objectivement ces valeurs gagneraient ä We choisies. Cest faute d'avoir saisi cette realite 
intellectuelle, cette disposition caracterielle (... ) que les colonisateurs ragent de toujours 'leur 
faire du bien malgre eux'. (SR, 46) 
Soustelle had almost as little to say about the status of Islam under integration as he 
did about the role of women. In broad terms, his proposals were based upon the 
Republican model of the separation of Church and State with the right of religious 
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tolerance proclaimed. The only roles which the integration process envisaged for the 
State were as arbitrator between different communities over the use of mosques and 
religious lands, and as a provider of indemnities for the religious elders in the same 
way that it assisted protestant and catholic priests (AS, 86-7). 
For Bayet, to claim that religious differences created an insurmountable obstacle to 
the success of integration was to be unfaithful to a democratic and republican 
tradition: `Infideles ä la pensee genereuse des hommes de 89, inegaux ä la mission 
qu'ils nous ont leguee, nous oserions dire qu'entre les Musulmans et nous la diversite 
de croyance creuse un fosse infranchissable? '. 20 Proposals to respect the Islamic 
religion certainly constituted an improvement upon the old policy of assimilation 
since they had no implications that French identity was in any way linked with 
religious belief. However, given the actions of the Army in seeking to unveil Muslim 
women, questions must be asked about the extent to which the French truly intended 
to respect religious differences. 
Language and Education 
In Metropolitan France in the 1880s, Jules Ferry's educational reforms had sought to 
suppress regional dialects in favour of French in order to foster a more coherent 
national whole. If integration was to be something more meaningful than an attempt 
at assimilation, there could be absolutely no question of attempting a similar policy in 
Algeria. Given that the goal of integration was to allow a plurality of different cultural 
identities to co-exist within the same national framework, the recognition and 
promotion of linguistic diversity had a key role to play. Soustelle was sensitive to this 
since the stated aim of his integration programme was to turn Algeria into a bilingual, 
and even trilingual, society. The teaching of Arabic was to become compulsory in all 
schools, even amongst those in which the overwhelming majority of the pupils were 
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from a European background. This, Soustelle believed, could only lead to the cultural 
enrichment of Algeria: 
Que I'Algerie doive devenir une communaute bilingue, puisant de ce fait dans les tresors de 
deux civilisations, me paraissait et me parait toujours souhaitable; l'harmonie entre les deux 
populations ne peut qu'y trouver son compte. (AS, 88) 
In the case of the Berber language, which had only a spoken form, Soustelle envisaged 
that, in the long term, a written form might be provided but still thought it desirable 
that Berbers should learn both French and Arabic in order that they would be able to 
play a full role in Algerian society. 
Soustelle's concerns with promoting linguistic plurality fed into a broader 
preoccupation with education as a whole. He intended, for example, to improve the 
educational facilities for Muslim children and in a radio broadcast in early January 
1956, stressed the positive qualities with which he believed education to be invested 
and praised the work which had been undertaken by the French since the outbreak of 
the conflict in offering new educational opportunities to Muslims: 
Chaque fois que dans un douar lointain une ecole a ete bätie, cela a ete une victoire, une 
victoire pacifique du progri s humain, une victoire commune de tous les Francais d'Algerie, 
Europeens ou Musulmans, contre i'ennemi commun qui est 1'ignorance 2' 
In Aimee et souffrante Algerie, he recounted his visit to a school and described the 
pleasure he experienced in seeing the children learning: 
Avec quelle emotion je voyais clans les villages, 1'ecole en activite, remplie de petits 
Kabyles aux tetes tondues de pres, au visage fin et intelligent ; souvent, signe des temps, des 
fillettes vetues de robes multicolores suivaient, dans une autre lalle, le cours donne par 
l'institutrice. Ces enfants, avenir d'une Algerie plus heureuse, combien je leur souhaitais, au 
fond de mon cccur, de connaitre un pays pacifi8 et prosp8re. (AS, 41) 
Through his plans for the promotion of the Arabic language, Soustelle was keen that 
the indigenous culture should be respected. The language in which the curriculum was 
to be delivered remained, however, only one of a myriad of potential problems linked 
to the development of a suitable education programme. Although Soustelle took 
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pleasure in seeing schools being built and children learning, his writing did not really 
dwell upon what the children were being taught. Soustelle was an ethnographer by 
training and not an educationalist and as a consequence can hardly be blamed for not 
discussing curriculum content in any detail. Nonetheless, the issue was particularly 
delicate. Few would argue that programmes designed to promote mass literacy 
represent a `good'. In the colonial context, however, the education of the indigenous 
population, where it took place, risked becoming not an instrument of emancipation 
but simply the imposition of the cultural norms of the dominant colonial power upon 
the indigenous society. According to this reasoning, the school teacher became the 
very embodiment of colonial oppression. For Memmi, induction into the education 
system of the colonised denied the colonised a 'voice' and a history which predated the 
coloniser's arrival: 
Or la Ws grande majorit8 des enfants colonises sont dans la rue. Et celui qui a la chance 
d'etre accueilli dans une ecole n'en sera pas nationalement sauve: la memoire qu'on lui 
constitue n'est sOrement pas celle de son peuple. L'histoire qu'on lui apprend n'est pas la 
sienne. 11 sait qui fut Colbert ou Cromwell mais non qui fut Khaznadar ; qui fut Jeanne 
d'Arc mais non la Kahena. Tout semble s'etre passe ailleurs que chez lui ; son pays et lui- 
meme sont en fair, ou n'existent que par reference aux Gaulois, aux Francs, ä la Marne ; par 
reference ä ce qu'il n'est pas, au christianisme, alors qu'il n'est pas chretien, ä l'Occident 
qui s'arrete devant son nez, sur une ligne d'autant plus infranchissable qu'elle est imaginaire 
(PC, 124). 
In criticising the introduction of a Eurocentric curriculum, it might be argued that 
Memmi was seeking to condemn colonialism on contradictory grounds. Whereas 
earlier we saw him dismissing the civilising mission itself as a project never 
attempted, on this occasion he was condemning the violence inherent in attempts at its 
implementation. Ultimately, his opposition to the very ethos of the civilising mission 
was less extreme; he admitted that assimilation had 'un parfum universaliste et 
socialiste qui la rend a priori respectable' (PC, 161). His critique of colonial society 
tended to focus more sharply on what he believed to be the inability of the colonial 
system to bring about a progressive improvement in the lifestyle of the colonised. In 
fact, rather than being contradictory, Memmi's criticisms of both the coloniser's 
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unwillingness to civilise and of the 'civilising activities' themselves can be seen to 
reinforce each other to the extent that they impale colonialism on the horns of an 
impossible dilemma. Either talk of a civilising mission is a `cover' for economic 
exploitation or, if seen as sincere, imposes an alien system of values upon the 
colonised people, violating their identity and ripping apart the fabric of their society. 
In both these cases, the notion of the `good' coloniser becomes a contradiction in 
terms since the coloniser's status qua coloniser is dependent upon an original and 
ongoing abuse of the colonised. Rather than the `win-win' situation which the pro- 
colonial lobby believed would result from the French colonial presence, Memmi's 
point was that for those forced to live under colonial rule, the situation might more 
accurately be described as 'lose-lose'. 
The testimony of Lieutenant Le Merre, the SAS officer whose thoughts on solving 
unemployment we considered in Chapter Three, is again useful here. In his report, Le 
Merre described the lack of schooling opportunities for young Muslims in the sector 
to which he was assigned. The children, unsupervised and left to run wild, simply 
idled away their time: 
Il y avait IA une centaine de jeunes garcons et filles, qui en dehors des heures de classe 
trainaient la savate dans le village. Une centaine de petits presque sauvages ä apprivoiser - et 
pour cela il n'y avait rien. Rien que la bonne volontb du personnel de la S. A. S., et les deux 
moniteurs. 22 
With the help of many of the villagers in his sector, Le Merre constructed a 
community centre in which the two teachers provided rudimentary education for the 
children and carried out adult literacy classes. The children were even sent to France 
to spend time at holiday camps or with French families. Le Merre stressed the positive 
outcome of these visits in persuading the children of their place within the national 
community and in provoking a whole series of attachments to France: 
Nous avons envoye des jeunes en colonie de vacances en metropole, et certains dans des 
families, et tous sont revenus enchantes disant: 'C'est bon, c'est beau, la France, notre 
pays!... ' 
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Et les moniteurs leur faisaient chanter: `Ma Normandie', `A la Claire Fontaine' et d'autres 
chansons (... ) 
Et les moniteurs leur lisaient des chapitres de leur manuel (... ) qui contenaient des directives 
pour dduquer, instruire et distraire les jeunes `Nous sommes Francais... ' `Algerie, Province 
francaise... ' 23 
For Le Merre, this was integration at a grassroots level, but integration nevertheless. 
From our perspective, however, it looks far more like assimilation. Nowhere are 
Memmi's concerns regarding the potentially exploitative nature of the educational 
process better illustrated. Many of the administrative tasks and the teaching functions 
undertaken as part of the integration programme had to be performed by soldiers like 
Le Merre who, perhaps not devoid of a certain paternalistic good will, were unable to 
appreciate the delicate interplay between education and identity. One imagines the 
way in which an Algerian family might have reacted upon seeing their children return 
from school with nothing less than the propaganda of the French Army on their lips. 
Once again, the question of consent must be considered. Soustelle viewed the 
construction of new schools as 'le temoignage et le symbole de la culture, de 1'entente 
et de la paix' and decried the FLN's tactic of burning them down (AS, 277-8). He was 
unable to comprehend how the nationalists could claim to have the interests of the 
people at heart and seemed to believe that, were the FLN to succeed, they would go on 
burning schools: 'Ce peuple veut acceder au savoir pour mieux vivre; eux [les 
terroristes] veulent l'obliger ä croupir dans l'ignorance' (AS, 277-8). 
Fanon did not write about the FLN's tactic of burning schools in any detail but the 
same logic which he applied to the wearing of the veil can be extended to this 
situation. Whilst Soustelle was correct to argue that education offers a way out of 
under-development, what he failed to realise was that the tactic of burning schools had 
little to do with a refusal of education per se merely of the education imposed by the 
coloniser. A similar mistake was made by Alquier in Nous avons pacffIe Tazalt. Upon 
discovering that a school had been destroyed, Alquier sarcastically remarked, 'La nuit 
derniere, (... ) le FLN a poursuivi son muvre de liberation de I'Algeriei 24 
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An article appearing in an Algerian newspaper written by a demobilised reservist and 
describing a school inspection by a senior officer stressed not only the lack of 
sensitivity of French soldiers to the issues of culture and identity connected with 
education but also the lack of success enjoyed in teaching young Muslim children. 25 
According to the report, the visiting officer began by repeating familiar slogans of 
French propaganda such as `L'Algerie c'est la France', 'vous etes tous Francais' and 
other phrases of the same ilk. Unfortunately, the children did not speak French and 
their attention soon waned when the usual distribution of sweets did not follow. 
Annoyed, the captain instructed the schoolteacher to teach the children songs with a 
patriotic theme on the grounds that these were very important in the development of a 
sense of identity. He admitted to having heard children in an Algerian village in 1946 
singing `Marechal, nous voila', an ironic indictment of French attempts to use 
propaganda on Algerian children. Most importantly of all for the author of the article 
was the context in which the education was being provided: 
Ce que n'a pu dire l'instituteur aux deux representants du Service Psychologique, c'est 
combien sa situation 6tait psychologiquement fausse vis-ä-vis de ses e18ves (... ) dont 17 
n'ont plus leur ptre, arretd et emmend par les troupes francaises. * 
When the French Army had rounded up, tortured or executed so many adults during 
the course of the war, it was ridiculous, as the author of the article correctly pointed 
out, to expect Muslim children to become devoted supporters of the French cause. 
Political Reform 
Alongside economic and cultural change, integration also promised to establish an 
institutional framework at both local and national level which accorded much greater 
representation to Muslims. For this reason, Soustelle proposed that Algeria be 
represented in the French National Assembly according to the same criteria as any 
other French province. The representation of Algeria's indigenous people would no 
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longer be determined by their ethnicity or religion but simply on the grounds of their 
membership as citizens ä part entiere of the French Republic. 
Whilst at the national level Soustelle's integration project denied the `specificity' of 
Algeria, he nonetheless believed that it was important to preserve a certain amount of 
local autonomy: 
Les realitds invitent l'observateur ä menager la diversitd des groupes humains, ä leur 
conferer une autonomie locale trios large, et A reserver au-dessus d'eux un arbitrage qui 
protege chacun d'eux des empii tements et de l'arbitraire. (AS, 239) 
In part, Soustelle's ideas were a logical response to the scattered location of the 
indigenous population which did not lend itself very easily to an overly centralised 
system of local and regional government and made the imposition of a country-wide 
system based on the French model somewhat impractical. However, Soustelle also 
justified this position on the grounds that he did not want to see the Europeans 
reduced to the status of an oppressed minority and put in a position where they would 
be forced to leave Algeria (AS, 238). If he was worried about the rights of the 
Europeans, the fact that, under his scheme, Algeria would have formed part of 
Metropolitan France and would have enjoyed equitable representation within the 
national parliament should have been enough. Integration, whilst accepting cultural 
and religious differences, was supposed to eradicate the importance of ethnicity when 
it came to choosing a political structure. To suggest otherwise was to contradict its 
very ethos. Certainly, the abolition of European minority rule may well have met with 
a considerable amount of hostility from amongst the European population but the 
ability of the settlers to accept reform and the imposition of a new political settlement 
for Algeria which put an end to their privileged position was, like land reform, a sine 
qua non of the eventual success of integration. 
Soustelle's apparent unwillingness to contemplate fully the logical implications of his 
own integration programme is also visible in his proposals for voting arrangements. 
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He argued for the abolition of the communes mixtes, which were to be replaced by 
elected rural communes. 26 In those communes where there were very few European 
electors, the single electoral college was to be established. However, in the communes 
de plein exercice where three-fifths of the representatives were chosen by the 
predominantly European college and the remaining two-fifths of the college by the 
second, and exclusively Muslim, electoral college, Soustelle was more conservative. 
Denouncing this division of power as `contraire ä l'equite et au bon sens', his own 
plans were scarcely any bolder (AS, 89). Whilst the logic of the integration position 
required the abolition of the double electoral college altogether, Soustelle proposed 
merely to equalise the weighting of the two electoral colleges (AS, 90). There does not 
seem to be any rationale, under the conditions of equality of citizenship which 
integration demanded, for the maintenance of any form of the double electoral 
college. As Reis pointed out in no uncertain terms: 
Il faut titre net, l'integration signifie d'abord le college unique mais aussi - un homme valant 
un homme, un Africain valant un Europeen, un membre de Vex « deuxi8me college » valant 
un beneficiaire du Decret Cremieux, valant lui-meme Bergson et Benda, valant eux-mr mes 
Gabriel Marcel et Francois Mauriac - que les 10 millions d'habitants de l'Algerie auront 
dans l'Assemblee politique commune une representation proportionnelle ä leur nombre 27 
As far as the administration was concerned, Soustelle wished to create a civil service 
with a much broader ethnic base in order to counter the charge that Algeria was 
administered in accordance with the wishes of a dominant European minority. His 
desire to incorporate more Muslims into the administrative hierarchy testifies to his 
partial willingness to accept that the French colonial enterprise had not always done as 
much for the Muslims as it might have done. French attitudes towards the `elite' of the 
indigenous population had, since 1830, been `un tissu de contradictions et de 
paradoxes' (AS, 67). Having bestowed upon certain members of the indigenous 
population the benefits of a French education, the French had made the mistake of 
instituting a kind of glass ceiling which had prevented Muslims from-rising to the 
higher echelons of the administration (AS, 67). From this discriminatory policy, 
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backed by the ignorance of many civil servants of the Arab and Berber languages - 
`ignorance qu'on ne saurait trop severement condamner (AS, 80)' - had come an 
administrative body `separe du pays et impermeable ä lui. (AS, 80)'. 
Soustelle proposed a policy of preferential treatment for Muslims in the short term so 
as to equalise the number of Muslims and Europeans within the administration, the 
nationalised industries and the public service industries (AS, 81). Of course, if strict 
proportionality was to be observed, the weighting of the indigenous population to the 
European settlers within the administrative corps within Algeria would have been 
around eight to one and if integration over the long term was to be accepted in all its 
fullness, this should have been the target. Once again two contradictory tendencies can 
be observed: Soustelle did show a certain amount of good will in embracing the logic 
of reform but was only prepared to go so far; whilst he desired to do more for the 
Muslims, he persisted in defending the minority rights of the Europeans. Seen in 
isolation, this criticism might appear somewhat harsh, yet examined alongside his 
plans for the reform of local government, the timidity of his proposed changes is more 
discernible. 
Concluding Remarks. 
To the credit of reformers, integration constituted an improvement over assimilation. 
Soustelle's plans for the teaching of Arabic to all of Algeria's schoolchildren, for 
instance, was certainly more progressive than simply stating that Muslims had to learn 
French. However, integration was not without its problems and the similarities 
between the integration programme and the civilising mission of the past are clear. 
Firstly, this was a French project designed to transplant onto Algerian soil a French 
version of a modern, functioning economy which made assumptions about the 
blueprint for development that was to be implemented. The programme prescribed the 
type of political system that was most appropriate for Algeria, offering specifically 
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French notions of citizenship. The project can be summarised as an attempt by the 
French, in most cases backed by a measure of good will, to tell the Algerian people 
what was in their best interests. Secondly, the general principles of integration were 
more liberal than the details. The proposals for land reform and the changes to the 
political system, had they been implemented, would not have delivered the promised 
equality. Thirdly, there was the issue of consent. As Fanon concluded, even if some of 
the changes offered by the coloniser would have benefited the colonised, serious 
doubt persists over whether they could ever have been accepted 'dans une quiete 
neutralite' (SR, 109). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
OPPOSITION TO INDEPENDENCE 
For Raoul Girardet, the Algerie francaise camp was a broad church. He writes of 
`l'heterogeneite de ces milieux Algerie franraise' comprising the `humanisme 
algerien' of those who advocated a multi-racial Algeria based on equality for all of its 
citizens, as well as the militant defenders of the French presence in Algeria for whom 
the defence of French sovereignty coüte que coüte took precedence over, where it did 
not rule out altogether, the introduction of liberal reforms. ' Preceding chapters have 
highlighted the deficiencies of the reformers' liberalism, suggesting that the Algerie 
francaise camp was perhaps more homogeneous than Girardet is willing to recognise. 
This chapter provides further entries for the negative side of the reformers' balance 
sheet. It analyses an alternative agenda for opposing independence adopted by 
reformers which competes for ascendancy with the liberal solution which they 
claimed to be pursuing. 
This alternative agenda was based on the 'harmony of interests' doctrine. Reformers 
employed economic arguments and stressed the need to preserve French prestige to 
justify the retention of Algeria. These arguments were accompanied by statements 
emphasising the need to maintain Algeria's status as part of the French Republic. If 
such statements were intended to show that the future status of Algeria was a strictly 
French affair, reformers were also prepared to attach a wider significance to the 
conflict according to which the FLN were imagined as mere pawns in a global 
ideological struggle. 
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Algerie: Terre francaise 
The human accompaniment to the theme of the mise en valeur of the Algerian 
territory was to be found in the defence of the settlers. Soustelle praised the pioneering 
spirit of the first European settlers, particularly in their cultivation of the Mitidja 
(AS, 56). The purpose of such praise was to legitimise the European presence. The 
settlers, having cultivated the land, had, in his eyes, acquired the right to own it. In 
common with all other reformers, he was by no means willing to countenance the 
physical displacement of the settler community: `On ne « rapatrie » pas en metropole 
des gens qui sont nes en Algerie, dont les peres et les arriere-grand-peres y sont nes et 
y reposent de leur dernier sommeil' (DA, 23). Chevallier, as a pied-noir, claimed the 
right to call himself an Algerian on the grounds that five generations of his ancestors 
had made Algeria their home. The frontier spirit of these pioneers, `bouleversee par 
les passions', 'brülee par le soleil' and constantly doing battle with disease, gave them 
the right to stay in the land (NA, 12): 
Du jour oü, des forets de la Mizrana qu'ils [cinq generations des miens] exploitaient sur la 
cote kabyle au temps des pantheres, ils s'enracinPrent dans cette Algdrie devenue leur terre, 
un peu comme leur patrie, eux et leurs descendants ne devaient plus partir. (NA, 12) 
In 1960, de Gaulle was to dismiss the claims of the settlers that Algeria needed to be 
preserved with the barbed retort: '1'Algerie de papa est morte' 2 In order to challenge de 
Gaulle's implication that the period of colonial rule over Algeria could be seen as an 
inglorious episode in France's history, Soustelle evoked the familiar glorification of 
the settlers' pioneering virtue. In this instance, it was set alongside another argument 
intended to justify Algeria's status as forever French - the selfless sacrifice of the 
settlers during the two World Wars: 
Quant A la gouaille sur `l'Algerie de papa', c's tait, je le rep8te, un `mot d'auteur' qui a fait 
sourire en metropole. Mais en le profdrant on courait le risque, et cela n'a pas manqud de se 
produire, de blesser bien des Algeriens, dont le `papa' et le 'grand-papa' avaient creve de 
fi6vre dans les marais de la Mitidja, defriche les terres ingrates couvertes de jujubiers et de 
palmiers nains, bäti des maisons et des routes, crd de la prosperite pour les Musulmans 
aussi bien que pour les Europeens, et souvent perl ä Verdun, au Chemin des Dames, en 
Italie, en Allemagne, en portant les armes pour defendre ou liberer la France. (ET, 104) 
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Since settlers had fought for France in the First and Second World Wars, their right to 
call themselves French could not be questioned. Since Algeria had been one of the 
sites from which the French had relaunched their fight against the German occupation 
during the Second World War, it had to be clung onto all the more vehemently in the 
post-war world. A brochure produced by the Cinquieme Bureau in 1956 echoed 
Soustelle's praise of the 'heroic' settlers: 
Qu'ils soient venus de France ou d'autres pays mdditerraneens, les Europeens d'Algerie se 
sentent profondement francais. Its Pont bien montrd, non seulement pendant la guerre 1914- 
18, mais egalement pendant la campagne de Liberation, au cours desquelles tant d'entre eux 
ont donne leur sang pour la patrie. 3 
Of course, these eulogies of the role of the settlers in the Second World War ignore 
the pro-Petainist and anti-Semitic attitudes displayed by many of them during the 
early years of the war. Moreover, to claim that Algeria, as a site of resistance to 
German occupation, 'saved' France during the Second World War is to overlook the 
alternative centres of French opposition to the Germans. 
The Second World War was not the only historical event called upon to justify the 
continuation of French sovereignty over Algeria. Pro-reform elements within the 
French Army employed a particularly patriotic language to describe the conflict and 
sought to place their combat in a historical lineage in which French soldiers had been 
called upon to defend the territorial integrity of the nation. According to one 
Cinquieme Bureau manual, the Algerian war had provoked an instinctive reaction 
amongst French people to defend their homeland which could be summoned up 
whenever the nation and its values were under threat: 'Cet esprit se retrouve ä tous les 
moments de notre histoire oü on a pu voir "la Patrie en danger. "' The Algerian war 
formed part of an historical continuum, the latest in a long line of historical conflicts 
in which the people of France had answered the nation's call. Prior to the Algerian 
war, such outpourings of patriotic *sentiment, the manual states, had been witnessed in 
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the attitudes of the volunteer army of 1792, the militias of 1870, the 'sacred union' of 
1914 and the soldiers of 1942.5 
Writing in the Revue Militaire d'Information, General Ely made the same connection 
between the conscripts and reservists serving in the Algerian war and previous 
instances of popular participation in defence of the nation. The young men who served 
in the ranks of the Army, he imagined, saw themselves as soldiers of progress, 
advancing humankind along a difficult and torturous path towards some unidentified 
end. It was the same devoted attitude which had inspired draftees during the First 
World War and the Resistance movement during the Second: 
Foi, confiance, optimisme, animes par un grand enthousiasme, sont des vertus creatrices. 
: Armee se doit de les avoir et de les pratiquer. Et consciente que 'le sens ineluctable de 
l'histoire' est bien celui d'une progression humaine, qui n'exclue pas 1'erreur ou la souffrance, 
eile fera beneficier de sa foi ardente la jeunesse de France qui Bert daps ses rangs et qui 
reclame du plus profond d'elle-meme des motifs de croyance. 
La France de 1914 croyait. 
La France de la Resistance croyait. 
La France de 1958 frdmit de la croyance souveraine dont eile se sent peu ä peu envahie 6 
Of course, the idea that all the conscripts and reservists thought this way was, to a 
large extent, no more than wishful thinking on Ely's part. The key point to observe 
here, however, is that Ely apparently saw no contradiction in mobilising patriotic 
themes in order to justify French control, indicative of the extent to which the belief 
that Algeria was France had permeated thinking within the military. 
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For Camus, it was the fact that prior to the French conquest there had never been an 
Algerian nation which gave settlers the right to remain: 
Si bien dispose qu'on soit envers la revendication arabe, on doit cependant reconnaitre 
qu'en ce qui concerne l'Algdrie, l'independance nationale est une formule purement 
passionnelle. 11 n'y a jamais eu de nation algerienne. 7 
To recognise the a priori existence of both an Algerian state and a national 
consciousness was both to cast the French in the unwelcome role of occupying power 
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and to leave reformers open to the charge that theirs was a futile attempt to graft 
French nationality upon an unwilling people already having a national identity of their 
own. Whether or not there existed an Algerian nation prior to the French conquest 
remains a moot point. For the FLN, there was no doubt. Amongst their initial 
demands, they listed `la restauration de l'Etat Algerien' making French colonialism 
an interruption in the ongoing history of the Algerian nation. 8 Stora offers some 
support for this position, pointing out that prior to the French conquest, Algeria 
enjoyed many of the trappings of statehood, with most of the European nations and 
the United States having diplomatic missions based there .9 Even 
if one accepts that 
pre-colonial Algeria was not a nation (in the sense of having neither a fully sovereign 
State apparatus nor a strongly developed sense of national consciousness amongst its 
people), Camus' argument was spurious. He assumed that nations are timeless 
entities, rather than artificial and unstable creations of relatively recent historical 
vintage. His argument ignored the likelihood that an Algerian nation would have come 
into being without colonialism as well as the fact that, by the time he came to write, 
an embryonic national consciousness had been strengthened through opposition to 
colonial repression. 
Economic Concerns 
In the last chapter, we examined reformers' proclamations that without France, Algeria 
would be unable to survive. If, in part, this was a reflection of their belief that the 
French had a responsibility to develop their North African 'province', it also revealed 
some of their Eurocentric assumptions about the indigenous population. This section 
highlights two other arguments employed by reformers based on economic concerns 
which sit uneasily alongside their claims that they wanted to help the Algerian people 
escape from poverty on purely humanitarian grounds. 
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Firstly, Soustelle's apparent generosity to help Muslims seems to be implicitly tied to 
the question of French sovereignty. His 1965 work La page nest pas tournee is 
marked with a certain schadenfreude directed at the Algerian people. Once Algeria 
had become independent, he begrudged every penny spent to help her on the path to 
recovery, seeking to turn his pre-independence prediction of economic misery into a 
post-independence reality. Comparing the treatment handed out by de Gaulle's 
government to the pieds-noirs forced to return to France with its attitudes towards the 
FLN, he wrote: 
11 est immoral, A coup sCir, que des Francais meurent de faim ou se suicident de ddsespoir 
(... ) alors que les tueurs qui les ont spolids et jouissent de leurs biens, voient en outre une 
pluie d'or francais ruisseler dans leurs mains toujours tendues. Notre Gouvernement est ä 
double face: d'une prodigalite de nouveau riche envers le FLN, il tend aux Francais 
d'Algerie le visage fermd d'Harpagon. (PT, 33) 
The French people who had wanted to cast off the burden of Algeria because it cost 
too much had been misled; Algeria continued to cost the French money with the 
crucial difference that the money was no longer used for any useful purpose: 
L'Algerie, naguPre, nous coütait des sommes considdrables, certes, mail investies dans une 
province francaise, pour 6lever le niveau de vie d'une population - europeenne ou 
musulmane - qui etait francaise, pour retablir la paix, pour sauvegarder la sescuritd de la 
metropole. Aujourd'hui ce flot d'or se perd sans resultat dans le gouffre sans fond d'un pays 
anarchique, retoume de deux siPcles en arriere, pour soutenir un regime de brigandage, pour 
financer des entreprises de subversion. (PT, 63) 
In fact, Soustelle went as far as making the argument espoused by Raymond Cartier 
during the war by arguing that the government should prioritise spending on domestic 
reconstruction rather than waste it on the colonies. In particular, he criticised `la 
dilapidation des deniers publics pour soutenir Ben Bella et d'autres dictatures du 
Tiers-Monde - contre la construction d'ecoles, de lycees, d'höpitaux, contre 
1'expansion et la recherche scientifique et technique, contre le logement, contre 
1'equipement du pays en routes, canaux, telephones' (PT, 228). 
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A Return to the `Harmony of Interests' 
As far as reformers were concerned, the ties between France and Algeria were not 
only territorial and human, but also economic. According to the 'harmony of interests' 
argument, the French could gain economically whilst providing the benefits of their 
civilisation to the Algerians. As Blaut puts it: 'The counterdiffusion of material wealth 
from the colonies back to the European centre is seen as part of a compensation for 
the gift of civilisation and, on these terms, is morally justifiable. i1° Reformers were not 
averse to making use of this argument. In their eyes, there was a symbiotic 
relationship between the two territories. Without Algeria, they claimed, the French 
economy would enter a massive recession. 
Soustelle argued that France benefited economically from the possession of Algeria. 
He predicted serious consequences for France were this territory to be lost. Not only 
would all the other French possessions in Africa swiftly follow suit but France would 
lose the equivalent of 6% of its gross national product in terms of lost exports and the 
equivalent of 3.75% in lost imports (DA, 30-1). In addition, the discovery of the 
considerable oil and gas reserves in the Sahara gave France an opportunity to escape 
her long-standing energy dependency on imports from other countries: 
L'intdret du Sahara est de nous offrir une chance, la Beule qui soit en vue pour aujourd'hui et 
pour un avenir previsible, de combler notre deficit energetique sans dependre pour cela ni 
des Arabes ni des Etats-Unis. (DA, 32) 
Chaussade similarly stressed that the development of the Algerian economy would 
bring a raft of economic opportunities for France and, crucially, security of energy 
supply: 
Si les liens qui attachent l'Algerie ä la France disparaissaient, celle-ci ne pourrait, par des 
moyens appropries, ni se liberer sürement d'une dependance petroli8re qui, jusqu'ä 
maintenant, est allee croissant, ni eviter d'assujettir la satisfaction de ses besoins 
energetiques au niveau incertain de ses ressources en devises etrangeres. 11 
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Similar concerns of economic woe were expressed in Cinqufeme Bureau publications. 
One pamphlet warned that `l'economie francaise serait sans 1'Algerie gravement 
affaiblie' and forecast a whole series of dire consequences for the economy of 
Metropolitan France were she to be divorced from her North African market: in the 
textile industry, 15,000 workers would be laid off and a reduction of 25% in the 
volume of exports would ensue; in the automobile industry, 10,000 redundancies were 
forecast; in the agricultural sector, a massive fall in exports would result; and, more 
generally, the resources of the Sahara would forever be lost to France. The report 
concluded that it would be impossible to maintain living standards in France at the 
same level without Algeria. Interestingly, the question of the `return' of the pieds- 
noirs was also mentioned, but dismissed as an unrealistic scenario on the grounds that 
it would be impossible to house and find employment for such a large influx of 
people. 12 Similarly, French soldiers about to be demobilised were informed by the 
Cinquieme Bureau that one ninth of the work that took place in France was directly 
linked to Algeria. 'Notre Pays ne peut rester lui-meme que par ses prolongements 
africains', the report pronounced. 13 
Such fears of French economic collapse proved to be ill-founded and the economic 
logic which sustained them incorrect since, as Marseille's analysis shows, many of the 
French exports sent to Algeria were paid for via loans obtained from the French 
government. Thus, he writes: `s'il est exact de dire que l'Algerie est le "premier 
client" de la metropole, on ne saurait dire que c'est le "meilleur client"'. 14 The overall 
insignificance of the Algerian market for the French economy became even more clear 
once independence had been obtained since, despite the loss of this territory, French 
firms flourished and the economy continued to grow. 
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Grandeur 
Closely linked to the threat of economic ruin that reformers believed would result 
from France's eviction from Algeria was the fear of a loss of prestige. In Le drame 
algerien, Soustelle seemed particularly concerned that, in the event of a French 
withdrawal, Algeria would fall under U. S. control, leaving the Americans to exploit 
the resources in the Sahara for their own purposes. He attacked Aron for believing that 
France would manage adequately once she had been returned to her European 
boundaries. The nation's role in such a situation, he quipped sarcastically, would be to 
`accueillir les touristes americains et leur tendre la main pour qu'ils y jettent quelques- 
uns des dollars que leur rapportera le petrole saharien' (DA, 16). There was, in his 
eyes, `quelque chose d'6trange et de suspect' in Aron's insistence that France should 
leave Africa in order to take up a lesser role in an American-dominated Europe (DA, 
17). Five years later, in L'esperance trahie, he returned to the theme, attacking those 
who 'ne voient point d'inconvenient ä ce que la France, rejetee de l'Afrique, vegete 
dans son petit hexagone continental' (ET, 214). 
Under threat, in Soustelle's eyes, was France's global vocation; he believed that France 
should aspire to play a leading role on the world stage and was scornful of the idea 
that French overseas possessions could be replaced by a vague rayonnement culture!: 
Le rayonnement de la pensee, voila la consolation qu'on nous promet en echange du 
renoncement aux droits et aux devoirs de la puissance, l'impalpable royaume qui 
recompenserait notre resignation. Quelle illusion ! (DA, 64) 
If countries maintained a certain attachment to the French language and culture, it was 
in the hope that France would remain an independent power in the future (DA, 65). 
Were this independence to be compromised, these countries, Soustelle predicted, `se 
detacheraient, le cc ur en deuil, d'un pauvre petit Etat qui se serait renie lui-meme' 
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(DA, 65). France's influence abroad depended above all on her prestige; `supprimez ce 
prestige et tout disparait', he warned (DA, 66). In fact, it was not simply a question of 
prestige, at stake was the health of the French nation: 
En realite le drame n'est meme pas celui de 1'Algerie, c'est celui de la decadence. C'est la 
question, le 'defi' comme dirait Toynbee, qui nous est posee, ä tous et ä chacun: 'Acceptez- 
vous la decadence de la France T. (DA, 66) 
At the time of writing, Soustelle remained a close collaborator of General de Gaulle. 
His insistence that France had a duty to preserve her great power role to meet the 
expectations of other nations was typically Gaullist in tone. What Soustelle did not 
appreciate, in a way that de Gaulle almost certainly did, was that France was hardly 
doing much to increase her global prestige by continuing to fight a war in Algeria 
which most people outside France itself thought unjust. 
In his fear that a redefinition of France's role would take place that relied less on 
physical power and more on cultural and diplomatic ties, Soustelle anticipated the 
foreign policy which de Gaulle would pursue. His criticism avant la lettre of these 
policies looked forward to the accusations which he would later level at the General. 
In 1965, with the Empire lost, he launched a scathing attack on de Gaulle's attempt to 
redirect the French `national vocation' away from North Africa. Speculating that de 
Gaulle's haste to rid France of Algeria derived from a desire to have a free hand to 
pursue a greater role in Europe with a new continental focus for the Army's activities, 
Soustelle countered: 
[De Gaulle] a sacrifid une realitd tangible, un territoire, la vie et le bonheur d'hommes et de 
femmes dont il itait le gardien. Les gens me font sourire, qui qualifient de 'realiste' la 
politique algerienne du Gdndral: c'est bien lä, au contraire, la politique la plus irrealiste qui 
se puisse concevoir - celle qui consiste ä lAcher la proie algerienne pour l'ombre d'une 
chimdrique grandeur mondiale. (PT, 134-5) 
Just how successful de Gaulle's foreign policy proved to be is open for debate. Whilst 
in his speeches he attempted to present an image of France as a player of major 
significance on the world diplomatic stage, it might be argued that he managed to 
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achieve very little other than to irritate his closest allies. Few commentators, however, 
attack him for deciding to withdraw from the colonies. Given that France's power had 
declined in absolute terms, Soustelle's belief that she could still aspire to great power 
status on traditional lines was hopelessly anachronistic. 
Algeria: The Global Significance 
The emphasis which Soustelle placed on the preservation of national prestige added 
an international dimension to the Algerian question. The alleged global significance of 
Algeria was also evident in another common theme of the reformers' writing. 
Reformers constructed and reconstructed the ideological motivations of the FLN 
along various lines whose function was to locate the Algerian conflict within a 
broader geo-strategic frame; Algeria became not just a local decolonisation struggle 
but an episode in a planetary conflict pitting the West against various ideological 
forces bent on its destruction. The FLN were represented alternately as agents of 
Soviet-led international global Communism, Islamic fundamentalists determined to 
wage a Holy War, or one arm of Nasser's grand strategy to unite the Arab world. At 
times reinforcing, yet often mutually incompatible, the various strategies to demonise 
the FLN attempted to play down the specifically nationalist element of the 
revolutionary ideology which had managed to subsume within it numerous different 
beliefs. 
The Communist Threat 
The outbreak of the Algerian War coincided with one of the most unstable periods of 
the Cold War. In the eyes of those French soldiers who had fought in Indo-China, the 
FLN became merely another manifestation of the same Communist-inspired enemy. It 
was common, for example, for soldiers to refer to the combatants of the FLN as `les 
Viets'. 15 The Communist threat was heavily stressed in military propaganda addressed 
to French troops. For example, a manual produced in 1957 for soldiers on duty in the 
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Sahara opens with a number of quotations from leading Communist thinkers including 
Lenin and Mao-Tse Tung who had predicted that the conquest of Europe would take 
place via Africa. Appearing at the very start of the manual, the portrayal of a gradually 
encroaching red menace was clearly intended to convince French soldiers of the 
necessity of their combat, especially with Indo-China lost and Asia apparently 
slipping out of the orbit of Western control. Faced with this threat, the Army's task 
was the `defense des valeurs sur lesquelles repose notre civilisation'. 16 
Mercier also sought to play on fears of Communist take-over. In the global ideological 
combat which he believed to be taking place, the Western bloc was divided between 
colonial and Metropolitan powers, with the latter often failing to grasp the 
significance of the colonies. Decolonisation favoured the Communists by creating an 
ideological vacuum which they could quickly fill: 
Dans les pays que 1'Occident abandonne, le communisme vient s'etablir, il s'apprete ä 
combler le vide, ä donner sa reponse aux questions qui se posent et son rem6de aux luttes 
intestines qui, immanquablement, se font jour. Ainsi du Viet-Nam, ainsi de 1'Indondsie, ainsi 
du Moyen-Orient, ainsi peut-@tre demain de la Tunisie et du Maroc, ainsi peut-titre apres- 
demain de I'Algerie, et voila la citadelle, le sanctuaire du monde occidental, la vieille 
Europe qui a tire toute sa sagesse, tout son equilibre, toute son humanite des antiques 
civilisations de la Mediterranee, tournee par la Mediterranee eile-meme. " 
Even where the nationalism of the FLN was accepted, it was seen as a stalking horse 
for future Communist infiltration, what Behr described as the 'Manichean proposition' 
that in 'an under-developed country, independence equals neutralism, which in turn 
equals satellization by the Communist bloc'. 18 
Such anti-Communist rhetoric projected a somewhat distorted image of the FLN. 
Although the leaders of the FLN were prepared to accept material help from 
Communist powers and whilst the regime instituted after independence was based 
around a version of one-party state socialism, the defining characteristic of the FLN 
was its nationalism rather than its Communism. As Schulte comments, `while the 
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FLN accepted aid from the Communist block, they dourly avoided entanglement with 
it' 19 
The Islamic Threat 
We do not need to stand at the safer critical distance of the post-cold war world to 
appreciate the hyperbole contained in reformers' fears of a Communist take-over. The 
alternative portraits of the FLN produced at the time of the conflict by reformers 
themselves call into question the seriousness of the Communist threat. On other 
occasions, Islam rather than Communism was perceived as the driving force of the 
rebellion. In 1957, Marechal Juin was to describe the rebellion as `un terrorisme 
aveugle et barbare engendre dans la fievre d'une poussee malsaine de racisme et de 
fanatisme religieux' 2° This theme was also taken up by reformers. As Chapter Five 
highlighted, it was the alleged religious fanaticism of the FLN that caused Paul Rivet 
to abandon his anti-colonial stance and condemn the rebellion. Soustelle, in his 
response to Aron, labelled the Algerian nationalists as 'fanatiques retrogrades, imbus 
d'un esprit theocratique et totalitaire' (DA, 52). In the aftermath of the war, he 
described the French withdrawal as 'la reconquete de l'Algerie par 1'alliance du 
fanatisme islamique des Ulema et de la subversion communiste' (PT, 180). Given the 
ideological standpoint from which Communists view the world, it did not seem to 
occur to Soustelle that the aims of international global communism might be 
incompatible with religious fanaticism. 
In defence of the reformers, it might be pointed out that not all sought to attribute the 
causes of the rebellion to external forces or religion, thereby denying the responsibility 
of French colonial practice for having created resistance to it. Chevallier, whilst 
admitting in 1958 that external factors had some influence over the rebellion, argued 
that to overestimate their importance was no more than a diversionary tactic employed 
by those Europeans who wanted to evade their own failings. 
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D'aucuns qui rdpugnent ä faire leur autocritique constructive cherchent une evasion en 
attribuant aux seules excitations exterieures I'origine du trouble de la masse musulmane et, 
du meme coup, les causes de la rebellion. (NA, 30) 
Against those who sought to locate the origins of the rebellion in the religious 
fanaticism of Muslims, Tillion argued that the followers of Islam were no more 
fanatical than Christians. Muslims, she argued, could not be considered en bloc since 
a Muslim intellectual had more in common with a Christian intellectual than with a 
simple shepherd of the same religious faith (AL, 38). In her eyes, it was wrong to 
under-estimate the primacy of economic under-development as a cause for revolt: 
Les Musulmans vivent, en quasi totalite, dans un des secteurs terrestres les plus mat places 
par rapport ä 1'ebranlement de la civilisation mecanique, et toutes les somettes qu'on nous 
raconte sur 1'Islam viennent de 1A. (AL, 20) 
Tue Pan Arabist Threat 
Another frequently alleged controlling influence over the rebellion was the cause of 
pan-Arabism. References to the nefarious activities of Egypt within the writing of 
French commentators are legion. The abortive Suez expedition in 1956 was 
underpinned by the belief that one of the keys to solving the Algerian problem was 
located in Egypt. The Egyptian influence is particularly prevalent in Soustelle's 
explanation of the origins of the rebellion. The attacks against French installations 
were carried out, he claimed in 1955, by a small number of conspirators, financed and 
trained by Nasser, gradually fomenting dissent (AS, 17-21). The specifically 
nationalist aspect of the rebellion was denied, written out of the preoccupations of 
those involved in the rebellion: 'En fait, il ne fut jamais question dans tout cela de la 
pretendue "nation algerienne", encore moins des formes juridiques ou politiques 
qu'elle devait adopter' (AS, 23). Later in the same work, Soustelle referred to the 
leaders of the FLN and `leurs inspirateurs au Caire' (AS, 118). He claimed to have 
captured a document penned by Ben Bella in 1955 in which the latter indicated that 
his plans had been formulated `avec 1'accord du Grand Frere' which, as Soustelle 
pointed out, was none other than Colonel Nasser (AS, 218). The success of the FLN in 
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establishing itself as the most significant of the nationalist groupings could be 
attributed to the fact that it received support from Egypt: `Il tient sa force de 1'Egypte, 
et c'est pour 1'Egypte qu'il agit' (AS, 233). 
A propaganda brochure produced for French soldiers by the Cinquieme Bureau in 
April 1956 entitled `Alerte ä l'imperialisme nasserien', and quoting extensively from 
Nasser's own writing, typified French military paranoia about the possibilities of a 
united Arab world set against them. 21 Seeking to portray Nasser as `un nouveau 
"Führer"', the pamphlet claimed that Nasser had a three-stage plan, to unite the Arab, 
African and Islamic world. That Nasser aspired to unite the Arab world with Egypt at 
its centre, that he wanted to help the sub-Saharan African countries to liberate 
themselves from their colonial yoke and that he wanted to forge links between 
Muslims the world over were offered as evidence of his hegemonic pretensions. 
Precisely how they differed from French plans to be at the heart of the European 
Community, from French dreams of a Eurafrique centred on France or from the fact 
that Catholics all around the world follow the words of a single figure based in Rome 
were never made explicit. Aspirations accepted as normal `at home' were transformed 
into a dangerous form of imperialism when they manifested themselves in a similar 
form elsewhere. Nor in the comparison between Nasser and Hitler was any mention 
made of the Egyptian leader's capacity to realise his plans. Nasser certainly lacked the 
military-industrial capacity to unite the Arab, African and Muslim worlds through 
force. Whilst Egypt was favourable to the Algerian revolution, the war was not the 
first step in some power-crazed drive of an Egyptian dictator. Once again, no attempt 
was made by reformers to reconcile the threat posed by Nasser's Egypt with that of 
international global Communism. Indeed, Alerte ä 1'imperialisme nasserien readily 
cited the future President of Egypt Anwar Sadaat, at the time Minister for Islamic 
Affairs, who had spoken of Islamic unity as a third way between Communism and 
international capitalism: 'Grace au regime economique islamique, nous pouvons creer 
un troisieme bloc entre le bloc capitaliste et le bloc communiste. '* It would be 
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tempting to suggest that these attempts to fabricate an enemy or, at the very least, 
exaggerate the nature of the threat posed appear scarcely credible with the benefit of 
hindsight were it not for the fact, as Said's Culture and Imperialism indicates, 
Western media and politicians continue to engage in exactly the same process when 
public support for overseas military activity is required. 2 
The confusion over precisely what was at stake in Algeria are perhaps nowhere better 
summarised than in the following quotation from Soustelle: 
L'Algerie evacuee sera pan arabe, communiste ou amdricaine, peut-titre les trois choses 
simultanement par voie de partage ou successivement, eile sera tout ce qu'on voudra sauf 
algerienne. (DA, 55-56) 
The reason that Algeria might fall under this curious and highly improbable mix of 
different regimes was due to its strategic location. Its position on the Mediterranean 
seaboard, coupled with the oil resources in the Sahara, which meant that no great 
power could afford to let it pass into the hands of another. 
Conclusion. 
We began this chapter by referring to the notion of the 'harmony of interests'. For the 
reformers themselves, of course, the 'harmony' remained intact; the need to defend the 
West against Communism, protect the French economy or retain national prestige 
coincided neatly with the necessity of implementing a reform package and with the 
wishes of the indigenous population. Missing from the writing of reformers, however, 
is any sense of hierarchy. No indication is given as to which of their reasons for 
opposing Algerian independence was the priority. We can only speculate whether they 
would have advocated the continued prosecution of the war on the grounds of 
prestige, anti-Communism or economic security, if they had realised their mistake in 
assuming that most Muslims wanted to be French. This question must remain 
unanswered precisely because this was a dilemma whose existence reformers were not 
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prepared to acknowledge. From the evidence available, serious doubt persists that they 
would have been prepared to admit the illiberalism of their cause and support a French 
departure from Algeria. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
REFORMERS AND THEIR SCAPEGOATS 
For colonial reformers, driven by their misguided faith in the 'consent potential', any 
setbacks suffered by the reform programme could not be explained in terms of a 
systematic failure of colonialism. Instead, they generated a number of `scapegoat 
stories' the purpose of which was to account for the success of the FLN in winning the 
battle for the `hearts and minds' of the population. It is these stories which are the 
subject of this chapter. 
The chapter is divided into three parts, each dealing with a separate story. First, 
France's political leadership. The governments of the Fourth Republic were attacked 
for their inability to put in place a package of reforms attractive enough to deflect 
Muslim opinion from the nationalist cause. However, since reformers believed that 
the fraternisation of May 1958 heralded the start of a new era of harmonious 
collaboration between Algeria's European and Muslim communities, the actions of 
the Fourth Republic's leaders were not seen as fatal to the cause of reform. A new 
story and a new scapegoat was required, with General de Gaulle the obvious 
candidate. In Soustelle's eyes, de Gaulle destroyed the good will generated by the 
events of May 1958, sabotaged the integration movement, and ultimately, brought 
about the downfall of Algerie francaise. 
Two other targets for criticism are considered here - the French Army and the 
Intelligentsia. The chapter charts the way in which some reformers, although crucially 
not Soustelle, denounced war atrocities committed by the French Army as antithetical 
to the very principle of reform, thereby seeking to blame elements within the Army for 
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the inherent flaws within their own position. As a parallel to his ambivalence towards 
French Army atrocities, Soustelle was scornful of those intellectuals who deigned to 
criticise the French Army, accusing them of undermining the chances of winning the 
`hearts and minds' of the Muslim population. 
The Politicians and the Failure of Integration 
Writing in 1955, Soustelle asserted that the main threat to the eventual success of his 
integration programme lay in the political game-playing which dominated 
government practice during the Fourth Republic and which saw the national interest 
subordinated to personal ambition or petty intrigue. Any proposal was automatically 
subject to discussions which were `interminables et byzantines' in nature (AS, 52). By 
way of example, he claimed that a project to declare a special state of emergency in 
Algeria proposed by Mendes-France's government had been rejected by a number of 
members of parliament owing not to their opposition to the measures themselves, but 
to the factional rivalry which existed between supporters of Mendes-France and Edgar 
Faure. 'Ainsi, vont, helas, les choses chez noun', Soustelle complained (AS, 29). 
The dictates of the counter-revolutionary struggle, he argued, obliged the government 
to take 'une position ferme, cent fois reiteree', entailing the elaboration of a 
programme 'de maniere ä ne plus laisser aucune place ä 1'equivoque' (ET, 91). 
Although in Soustelle's mind the officers of the SAS managed to reassure those 
Muslims with whom they came into contact of the benevolence of French intentions, 
the confidence which they engendered was, he claimed, like `une plante fragile', one 
that would withstand neither `quelques averses de scepticisme' nor `la secheresse du 
doute' (ET, 90-1). Whilst the Army gave its word that the French would not abandon 
Algeria, the governments in Paris provided doubt and scepticism in abundance: `Paris 
tergiversait, Paris polemiquait, Paris parlait de negocier. Paris s'apitoyait sur le sort 
des terroristes, Paris ironisait aux depens des Musulmans fideles' (ET, 91). 
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At times, Soustelle claimed, it was simply the intransigence of those who refused to 
accept the need for reform which prevented the implementation of the integration 
programme. In Aimee et souffrante Algerie he recounts how on 23 March 1955 he had 
felt obliged to hold the threat of his resignation from the position of Governor-General 
because of the administration's reluctance to fund his proposals for reform. He had 
spent his time involved in acrimonious discussions with representatives from the 
Ministry of Finance who, like so many 'marchands de tapis' had constantly 
endeavoured to counter his requests either on the grounds that further funds were not 
required or by arguing that the money was needed for strictly military requirements 
such as barracks (AS, 45). 
Soustelle was angered by the filibustering tactics employed by the administration in 
both Algiers and Paris to block his proposal to raise Muslim representation within the 
civil service in Algeria to fifty percent: 
Tantöt on me remontrait que mes propositions sacrileges violaient de venerables preceptes, 
ce que je savais fort bien; tantöt on s'efforcait de me decourager par un feu roulant de 
critiques; tantöt on avait recours ä la methode dilatoire des notes, contre notes, reponses aux 
precedentes, observations sur ces derni8res et commentaires sur ces observations, le tout 
suivant le cours majestueux et lent que 1'administration sait imprimer ä sa demarche quand 
(... ) eile attend qu'un Ministre ou un Gouverneur importun soit amend ä quitter la place en 
raison des bouleversements p8riodiques de notre systPme parlementaire. (AS, 82) 
Chevallier also criticised the lack of reforms enacted by French governments between 
1956 and 1958. In his opinion, Algeria had been the victim of a government policy 
which had been unable to produce any tangible results: 
Pendant les deux dernieres annees, eile [L'Algdrie] avait vecu sous le regime de la 
decomposition du pouvoir camoufle derriere le decor en carton-pate des reorganisations et 
des reformes sur le papier ä usage des congr6s. Le mensonge regnait en maitre. (NA, 154) 
The 19571oi-cadre, which, despite its obvious complexities, Chevallier believed to be 
a positive development, was, he contended, sabotaged by the political parties each 
seeking to divide up the municipal councils to find positions for their own people 
(NA, 158). 
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In his bid to secure support for his reform package, Soustelle saw himself as 
'comparable ä un homme qui lutterait pour sa vie contre un ennemi implacable, tandis 
que des vols de guepes, tenacement accroches ä son corps, le perceraient sans repit de 
leurs aiguillons' (AS, 107). It was not just the defenders of the colonial status quo who 
composed these metaphorical swarms of wasps. Soustelle portrays himself as the 
victim of the classic pincer tactic of figures from opposite ends of the political 
spectrum conspiring to destroy a reasonable political project for completely 
contradictory reasons. Whilst some figures refused to discuss reform because they 
would not tolerate any change which would `porterait atteinte aux positions acquises' 
others, he claimed, 's'empressent de les rejeter (... ) en les declarant insuffisantes et 
depasses' or 'les condamnent parce qu'ils jouent sur le desordre et qu'ils preferent le 
trouble revolutionnaire ä une evolution pacifique' (AS, 53). It was a game in which the 
leading lights of both the Left and the Right excelled because it won them popularity 
with their followers and allowed them to advance their own personal agenda even if 
the good of the nation was compromised in the process(AS, 53). Reis agreed, accusing 
the Communist Left in France of making common cause with the ultras from the pied- 
noir community who did not want to see any reforms at all: `Ces ultras 
metropolitains, pour gauchistes qu'ils se donnent, se coalisent automatiquement avec 
les ultras d'outre Mediterranee. Pour denoncer 1' «hypocrisie assimilationniste» tout 
leur est excellent -jusqu'au temoignage du Pied Noir'. 
1 
Soustelle was certainly correct to point out that there were weaknesses in the regime. 
As Howard Machin observes, the Fourth Republic was characterised by `multi-party 
rivalry with intense ideological conflict, organisational fragmentation and weak, 
unstable governing coalitions'. 2 There were seven changes of government from the 
outbreak of hostilities to the inauguration of the Fifth Republic, all of which resulted, 
directly or indirectly, from the situation in Algeria. And as Machin adds, `Not only 
were there sharp conflicts between the parties, but factionalism and personal rivalries 
were rife within almost every party'. 3 These weaknesses, which bedevilled the Fourth 
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Republic throughout its existence, lent an air of incoherence to government handling 
of all questions, not just the Algerian one, giving rise to its reputation as le mal aime. 
However, Soustelle was unwilling to concede that the activities of the political leaders 
or the endemic weaknesses of the system of government during the period from 1954- 
58 had little overall impact upon the unfolding of the Algerian drame. Given the state 
of opinion in France and Algeria by the time of the outbreak of hostilities, the 
governmental role became simply one of either hastening or prolonging the inevitable. 
Smith writes of: 
the essential mistake in perception made by the leaders of the Fourth Republic who held 
that France was being defeated in Algeria not by the historical anachronism of her goals 
there but by the spectacle of her parliamentary weakness and the reaction this produced in 
the Muslim population 4 
Moreover, there was arguably less in-fighting within French parliamentary circles on 
the Algerian question than Soustelle claimed. Despite the apparent incoherence which 
characterised the handling of the Algerian question by the political leaders of the 
Fourth Republic, there was a broad cross-party consensus that Algeria should not be 
independent. Whilst recognising that the political system in place during the Fourth 
Republic had led to weak government, Smith argues that it was not immobility and 
indecision but a certain amount of resolve and unity which characterised the attitudes 
of the vast majority of the political class of the Fourth Republic towards Algeria. 5 On 
the sovereignty question, there was little dissent. As Home observes, `In November 
1954 the unyielding gospel of 1'Algerie, c'est la France very much represented French 
political opinion of almost all hues'. 6 After the fall of Mendes-France, governments of 
the Fourth Republic by and large continued to affirm the indissoluble nature of the ties 
linking the Hexagon with its North African 'province'. As Bernstein puts it: 'La these 
exposee en cet automne 1954 par les hommes de gauche qui gouvernaient alors la 
France ne variera plus jusqu'en 1959: 1'Algerie, c'est la France. '7 
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The commitment of successive governments not to cede independence to Algeria was 
reflected in the vocabulary chosen to describe the conflict. A variety of terms were 
employed, all of which sought to reinforce the notion that Algeria did not constitute a 
nation in its own right. To admit that France was at war with Algeria was to concede 
the existence of a separate Algerian entity or, at the very least, to lend an air of 
legitimacy to the demands for independence as articulated by the FLN. For the French 
to have declared a state of war with the FLN would have amounted to a de facto 
recognition that French sovereignty over Algeria was little more than an elaborate 
legal fiction. As Stora puts it: `Nommer la guerre, ce serait reconnaltre une existence 
separee de l'Algerie, ce serait admettre une `autre histoire'. 8 
Merely to talk of a civil war would have been to accord a greater degree of recognition 
to the FLN than the French government was willing to concede. An entirely different 
vocabulary was required, a way of describing the conflict which made no concessions 
to France's opponents. Stora has observed that in the immediate aftermath of the 
1954 Toussaint uprising, official language made reference to `les evenements' in 
Algeria. The French Army was entrusted with carrying out `operations de police'. 
During the vote in the French National Assembly of March 1956 on whether special 
powers were to be accorded to the Mollet government, the term employed was 
`actions de maintien de f'ordre'. In 1957, at the time of the so-called Battle of 
Algiers, the Army was encharged with `operations de retablissement de la paix 
civile'. 9 
Even the most frequently alleged potential bradeurs de 1'Empire Guy Mollet and 
Pierre Pflimlin, had no plans to renounce French sovereignty over Algeria. Mollet, 
even before his conversion to a more hawkish line in the wake of the famous 
`tomatoes incident' of February 1956, was hardly a pro-independence man. 1° If Mollet 
wanted peace, it was to be a peace on French terms. Whilst Pflimlin had expressed his 
desire for a `political solution' to the conflict, which meant a possible return to the 
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agenda of the issue of negotiations with the FLN, he was not prepared to countenance 
a complete French withdrawal. As Giles puts it, 'suspicions that he was contemplating 
a sell-out should have been without foundation'. " 
On the question of reform, as Talbott has noted, the Algerian policy of every 
government of the Fourth Republic, and even that of de Gaulle during the Fifth, 
amounted to a promise of reform backed by military force: 
MendBs-France and each of his successors, including Charles de Gaulle, announced plans 
for putting down the rebellion in Algeria, modernising the backward Algerian economy, and 
remaking the political system. 12 
Admittedly, these reforms were not forthcoming and Soustelle was probably justified 
in his anger. If he had been correct in his belief that Muslims were open to persuasion 
about the merits of French rule, his assessment that government immobility was 
contributing to failure on the ground in Algeria would certainly not have been 
malapropos. As it was, the failure of any Fourth Republican government to produce an 
unambiguous Algerian policy only increased the speed with which an untenable 
situation deteriorated and had the effect of pushing the Army into a more openly 
political role than arguably at any time in its history. 
May 1958 and the Return of de Gaulle 
Soustelle's critique of the successive governments of the Fourth Republic must also be 
interpreted within the context of the particular significance which he attached to the 
events of May 1958. Since in his eyes the fraternisations which took place between 
Europeans and Muslims brought victory within the reach of the French, neither the 
system of government nor the people who staffed the Fourth Republic could be 
condemned for having sealed the fate of Algeria. Consequently whilst his criticisms of 
Fourth Republican governments were certainly not lacking in venom, the ultimate 
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responsibility for the loss of Algeria was located after 1958. Thus on the eve of 
Algerian independence he wrote: 
Du 13 mai 1958 aux derniers mois de 1961, de l'espoir et de la fraternite ä la haine et ä la 
desesperance, de l'union ä la division, de la victoire prochaine ä la deroute organisee, la 
France et sa province nord-africaine ont descendu en trois ans une pente de plus en plus 
escarpee. (ET, 9) 
Reis showed only slightly less optimism than Soustelle about the essential 
recuperative powers of May 1958. He believed that the failings of the Fourth Republic 
had contributed to the worsening of conditions in Algeria and, as a consequence did 
not think that victory would be easily achieved. Nevertheless, if this was not the 
moment for triumphalism, he still considered May 1958 as a new departure which 
paved the way for an eventual French success: 
Les echecs passes sont significatifs: ils doivent imposer la modestie ; ils ne sont pas 
desesperants. Mieux vaut donc considerer la voie comme ouverte mais difficile, accessible 
seulement ä ceux qui oseront faire preuve d'initiative et peut-titre meme d'invention. 13 
The FLN could never realistically have achieved a military victory and its supporters 
could only aspire to undermine the will of the French to remain. Had a French leader 
determined to pursue a policy of integration at any cost assumed the reigns of power 
in 1958, and had it been possible to work a near miracle and secure settler, domestic 
and parliamentary support for such a policy, the situation in Algeria would, in all 
likelihood, have reached a stalemate. De Gaulle did not prove to be such a leader. 
Whilst one should not underestimate the extent to which the dogged resilience of the 
FLN forced the French to the negotiating table, de Gaulle was clearly a driving force 
in moving the agenda away from a policy of integration towards an acceptance of 
Algerian independence. Unwilling to see the war drag on interminably and aware that 
support for its prolongation could not be maintained in anything other than the short 
term, he gradually shifted the tone and content of his public discourse on Algeria away 
from the agenda favoured by the Algerie francaise camp. Much has been written about 
the evolution of de Gaulle's Algerian policy and the debate over his intentions upon 
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his return to power is not one to which we wish to contribute at length here. In 
passing, let us say that it is possible, although unlikely, that his declared policy was at 
odds with a personal preference to keep Algeria French with only his consummate 
sense of political realism causing him to realise that Algeria could not be saved. There 
are much stronger grounds for believing that he was always searching for a fin 
honorable to the conflict even if he was unsure about the exact nature of the ties 
which would exist between the two territories and did not originally envisage the 
`return' of the pied-noir community to Metropolitan France. His plans to endow 
France with a new European vocation and to increase France's standing on the world 
stage, allied with a political philosophy which believed in the `separateness of 
peoples', a lack of faith in the willingness of the settler community to accept reform 
and a belief that the reconstruction of the Algerian economy was an economic 
liability, all point to the conclusion that de Gaulle never seriously envisaged 
integration as a possible solution to the conflict. Whatever the reasons, de Gaulle's 
gradual public withdrawal of support for the ideas espoused by the reformers allowed 
figures such as Soustelle to avoid ever having to acknowledge the failure of the 
`consent potential'. Although it was almost four years after de Gaulle assumed the 
reigns of power that the protracted Algerian conflict was finally brought to an end, his 
role in the decolonisation process was sufficiently active that it presented reformers 
with the opportunity to hold him responsible for the failure of their project. Although 
scarcely credible, the `consent potential' was, ultimately, never tested to destruction. 
Soustelle's 1961 work, L'esperance trahie attempts to dismantle de Gaulle's Algerian 
policy from 1958 onwards, presenting it as a betrayal not only of de Gaulle's own 
historical attitude to Algeria, a kind of de Gaulle contre le gaullisme, but also as a 
betrayal of both the settler and Muslim communities in Algeria. 
Given that, in Soustelle's eyes, the vote of September 1958 on the new Constitution 
had demonstrated the ongoing viability of the `consent potential', and given that the 
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Constantine Plan launched in October 1958 was largely compatible with the aims of 
integration, the starting point for his attack on de Gaulle's Algerian policy was the 
latter's self-determination speech of 16 September 1959. Soustelle was hostile to the 
very idea that the Algerian people might be given a vote on their own political destiny 
at such a delicate stage in the conflict, believing that this risked undermining ground 
which had already been won. In his eyes, the Muslim population had already affirmed 
its loyalty to France and a further consultation could only give the impression that 
French commitment was wavering: 
Le Chef de I'Etat a lui-meme solennellement affirme aux Algeriens de touter origines qu'ils 
8taient desormais des `Francais ä part enti8re, egaux en droits et en devoirs'. II ne faut pas 
qu'on puisse dire que sa parole a 6te reprise. Aprils les elan de fraternisation du 16 mai et 
des jours suivants, le referendum du 28 septembre - compris par tous les 6lecteurs comme 
un choix entre la France et la secession -a fourni une preuve non contestable. (ET, 124-5) 
Irrespective of the significance which reformers attached to the fraternisation of May 
1958 and the September vote on the Constitution, neither offered Muslims the chance 
to make an unequivocal pronouncement about their aspirations as the referendum on 
national self-determination would have done. Robert Bony, writing in L'Aurore two 
days after de Gaulle's 16 September speech, saw the proposed referendum as a perfect 
opportunity to confirm the fact that the vast majority of Muslims supported the 
French. The FLN, Bony claimed, had been unable to prevent Muslims from 
participating en masse in the referendum of September 1958, from occupying public 
positions in greater numbers than ever, and from fighting in the French Army. For this 
reason, 'France' (although in reality Bony spoke only for himself) envisaged 'sans 
apprehension aucune' the promised referendum. Furthermore, the FLN would be free 
to participate on the grounds that this was a democratic way to proceed: '[La France] 
ne craint nullement que le FLN presente demain ses candidats. Elle leur donne au 
contraire 1'assurance qu'ils auront toute latitude de diffuser leur propagande. C'est la 
democratie' (original emphasis). 14 
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Soustelle's unwillingness to accept a democratic vote seems to suggest a possible lack 
of faith about its outcome and demonstrates a singular disregard for the ability of the 
Muslims to understand exactly what was being asked of them: 'Les Musulmans ne 
comprendraient pas ce retour en arriere, ni qu'on effacät pour ainsi dire d'un trait le 
geste souvent courageux qu'ils ont alors accompli' (ET, 125). It was a position 
satirised by R. Treno writing in Le Canard Enchaine who attacked those who claimed 
to believe in the sincerity of the fraternisations of May 58 and yet were unwilling to 
contemplate a further consultation of the electorate. He criticised the hypocrisy of 
'tous ces faux jetons des pretendues organisations "patriotiques" d'Alger qui, apres 
avoir simule en mai 1958 le "ralliement" des Arabes, ont peur aujourd'hui que leur 
imposture n'eclate ä la faveur d'un referendum d'autodetermination non truque'. 15 
Soustelle also argued that by according the Muslims the right to separate themselves 
from the mother country, they would enjoy a right not accorded to other French 
citizens. He felt this would lead Muslims to believe that they were not citizens like 
everybody else: 'Certain pourront en deduire qu'ils ont une "vocation" ä se separer de 
la France, certains que la France ne veut pas de leur adhesion, la dedaigne et la 
repousse' (ET, 125). This comparison with the other provinces of mainland France, as 
on other occasions, was inappropriate. Irrespective of the label which the French 
sought to attach to the conflict in Algeria, there were not 400,000 French troops in 
Brittany, Corsica, Alsace-Lorraine or any other French province seeking to suppress a 
secessionist movement by force of arms. Had this been the case then it is to be hoped 
that all but the most illiberal of figures would have considered holding a referendum 
over the future of whichever province was concerned. 
In support of Soustelle and from within the reformers' logic, it might be argued that 
the polarising nature of the counter-revolutionary struggle meant that any signs of a 
weakening French presence would seriously hamper prospects of victory. For 
Soustelle, a democratic consultation of the Algerian people about their future was only 
190 
to be contemplated at a much later date once the conflict had been brought to an end 
and the French had benefited from the chance to implement some of their reforming 
measures. Given this opportunity, there was no doubt in his mind that the vote would 
produce `une confirmation ä la fois eclatante et sereine' of the willingness of Muslims 
to remain French (ET, 125). 
On balance, even taking into account the particular constraints which the nature of the 
conflict placed upon the normal process of political consultation and policy 
formulation, Soustelle's opposition to a referendum on Algerian self-determination 
was far from convincing. If he was prepared to countenance the idea of Muslims 
participating freely and equally in the political life of a Franco-Algerian ensemble, 
then, by the same logic, he should certainly have had enough faith in his convictions 
to believe that the Muslims were capable of understanding the significance of a vote 
where the question of the future relationship between Algeria and France was at stake. 
Given his belief in the 'consent potential', Soustelle's attack on de Gaulle over the 
manner in which the referendum was framed (rather than the principle itself) was 
more logical. He criticised de Gaulle for his use of the term `francisation' in the 1959 
speech since, in his eyes, it failed to recognise the difference between integration and 
assimilation: `Le vocabulaire, 1'insistance sur le detail des dispositions identiques ä 
celles qui existent en metropole, et surtout 1'absence de toute reference au 
particularisme algerien, ä la "personnalite" algerienne, donnent ä tout ce passage une 
tonalite "assimilationniste"' (ET, 285). In Soustelle's eyes, the debate over Algeria's 
future was already `trop riche en disputes verbales' and the introduction of a new term 
provided the FLN with ample scope for propaganda. He viewed the word Trancisation' 
as a contradiction: `Comme on ne peut `franciser' que celui qui ne 1'est pas, cela 
revenait ä dire que les Musulmans n'etaient pas francais' (ET, 130). He also claimed 
that this new term was counterproductive since it could only alarm Muslims who were 
willing to be `integres' but not `francises' (ET, 130). In fairness to de Gaulle, the 
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speech of 16 September 1959 did refer to religious and cultural differences. However, 
renowned for the studied precision with which he selected his phrases, de Gaulle's 
avoidance of the word `integration' was clearly deliberate and provides evidence of 
the new direction which his declared stance on Algeria was taking at this point in 
time. The tone of the 16 September speech was such that it was clear that de Gaulle 
did not favour francisation but favoured association. 
His severe reservations about the planned referendum of 1959 notwithstanding, 
Soustelle did not view the speech as the key moment of de Gaulle's betrayal and he 
was prepared in extremis to go along with the idea on the basis that the offer of a 
democratic consultation was valuable in convincing international opinion of France's 
good intentions, even though it made the situation more difficult on the ground in 
Algeria. Victory, in his eyes, remained possible providing not a moment was lost in 
launching a campaign in favour of francisation, despite his `repugnance pour le mot' 
(ET, 131). This was a campaign which, of course, de Gaulle did not sanction. 
However, even more worrying than Soustelle's opposition to a vote per se is his 
attitude towards the possibility of a referendum defeat. He contended that were a vote 
on national self-determination to yield a Muslim majority in favour of independence, 
it could not be respected: 
`Les Algeriens' existent mais il n'y a pas de peuple algerien. On ne saurait donc admettre 
que la consultation envisagee soit celle du `peuple algdrien' appele ä se prononcer en bloc 
sur les destinees d'une entite Algerie concue fatalement comme un Etat. L'homogt neitt 
ethnique et culturelle est une condition indispensable pour que soit valide un vote oiü la 
majorite l'emporte sur la minorite. (ET, 125) 
Despite his faith that any election on national self-determination conducted under the 
right circumstances would not 'go against' the French, his misplaced certainty of 
victory can in no way be invoked as an excuse for an argument which suggests that 
the democratic process would only be acceptable on the condition that it produced a 
favourable result. 
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The final nail in the coffin of Algerie francaise, as far as Soustelle's account is 
concerned, was de Gaulle's speech of 7 March 1960. He roundly condemned De 
Gaulle's reference to an Algerie algerienne: 
Les evenements de mai 1958 avaient soude, en Algerie, le peuple et l'armee, 
miraculeusement rapproche les communautes musulmane et europeenne par-dessus des 
prejug8s et des rancceurs seculaires, d8concerte l'adversaire, ouvert la voie de la paix pour 
une Algerie nouvelle. Il sembla tout d'abord que cette occasion historique allait etre saisie. 
On sait aujourd'hui ce qu'il en advint. Incomprehensiblement ecartee, la solution ä la fois 
francaise et humaine que tons attendaient a disparu du langage officiel, pour ¬tre remplacee 
par une formule obscure incapable de susciter d8vouement et espoir. 16 
He accused the General of altering the choices to be presented to the people in a future 
electoral consultation on Algeria's future. Francisation had been replaced by a new 
option in which Algeria would `revenir ä la domination directe pratiquee par la 
metropole depuis la conquete' (ET, 187). Soustelle countered that Algeria had never 
been subject to direct domination and that the French colonial presence had seen a 
gradual transfer of rights to the Muslims (ET, 187). In his mind, the speech could only 
have one intention: 'Il s'agissait de discrediter toute We de francisation ou 
d'integration en faisant apparaitre ces solutions comme reactionnaires, retrogrades et 
colonialistes' (ET, 188). To claim that integration was the same as direct domination, 
was, in Soustelle's eyes `faux et malhonnete' since the domination of Algeria was 
exactly the opposite of the goal which he and his fellow supporters of integration had 
in mind (ET, 188). 
Soustelle was correct in his accusation that de Gaulle had effectively shifted the 
parameters. What he did not appear to appreciate was that de Gaulle was more 
concerned with pushing ahead with the decolonisation process than he was with 
giving an accurate representation of the reformers' position. As a skilful polemicist 
himself, Soustelle should have realised that in order to win support for a particular 
policy, one seeks to caricature and distort the ideas advanced by political opponents. 
Instead, he viewed this speech as an insult to all those Muslims who had died at the 
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hands of the FLN in their bid to bring about an Algeria based on the ideals of equality, 
fraternity and progress. 
In shifting the political agenda away from integration, not only had de Gaulle 
sacrificed a highly advantageous political position but, in Soustelle's eyes, had also 
scuppered a certain military victory. He expressed his disbelief that `un Etat, n'ayant 
subi aucune defaite militaire, ayant au contraire victorieusement contenu sur le 
territoire conteste la poussee et les violences de la rebellion' could decide to place the 
Algerian territory and all its inhabitants `ä la discretion d'un ennemi battu' (PT, 12). 
Attacking Main's signature of the Armistice in 1940, Soustelle claimed that de 
Gaulle's acceptance of the Evian accords was even more worthy of condemnation. 
Petain had, if not an excuse, then at least the explanation that the French Army was 
beaten. De Gaulle, however, had carried out `cet abandon voulu, organise, impose, 
sans explication et sans excuse, cette capitulation devant un ennemi epuise' (PT, 51). 
Soustelle's fears that the support of the Muslim population was beginning to ebb away 
were shared within the Cinquieme Bureau. In a study of Algerian opinion carried out 
at the end of 1960 the optimistic tone of the service notes and the military bulletins of 
1957 had been replaced by a much more pessimistic note. Whereas the authors 
believed that the majority of the Muslim population were previously hoping for a 
French victory, they recognised that there had been a change in opinion: `Pour la 
masse musulmane l'espoir a change de camp'. 17 At the start of the year, they claimed 
that 20% of Muslims had been in favour of the French, 20% had been pro-FLN and 
60% had been undecided. The position at this new juncture was now 10% of Muslims 
in favour of the French, 40% in favour of the nationalists and 50% still undecided but 
leaning towards the rebellion. The report argued that those favourable to the French 
had seen their hopes of victory dashed and felt betrayed by de Gaulle's government 
which had reneged on the commitment of previous administrations never to abandon 
Algeria: 'Ils eprouvent aujourd'hui le sentiment d'etre `laches' par la France dont ils 
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avaient deliberement choisi le drapeau pour l'ideal'. * Those Muslims who had 
previously been reluctant to commit themselves to either camp were turning to the 
rebellion as the only viable option: 
Its sentent que l'hesitation n'est plus de mise et que le temps est venu de s'engager: ils 
choisissent donc pour la plupart le camp de l'Independance, sans se cantonner dans une 
position intermediaire qu'ils considerent comme intenable dans de brefs delais. * 
The report attributed responsibility for the situation to General de Gaulle and for 
having placed the Army in an extremely awkward position: 
Notre action est devenue de plus en plus delicate au cours des derniers mois du fait de 
1'extreme sensibilisation des communautes et de l'opposition formulee A 1'egard de la 
politique gouvernementale par une partie de la population. * 
Soustelle's sentiment that a certain military victory had been denied only by the 
machinations of General de Gaulle were also shared by a number of disgruntled Army 
officers, many of whom would go on to take part in the Generals' Putsch. As Stora 
puts it 'ils sont nombreux ä considerer que de Gaulle - un officier comme eux - les a 
trahis et a transforme leur victoire militaire face au FLN en debacle politique'. 18 
Viewed from a certain perspective, the situation on the military front for the French 
after de Gaulle's return to power, far from deteriorating, did indeed improve. The 
ALN's combat strength was severely weakened by the Challe plan. 19 However, these 
successes, whilst providing further grist to the mill of those who wished to condemn 
de Gaulle were hardly conclusive evidence that victory was close at hand. Indeed, 
such claims contradicted the idea which had assumed almost mantra-like status 
amongst many French soldiers virtually throughout the conflict that the key to victory 
lay in winning over the 'hearts and minds' of the civilian population. Military 
dominance counted for little whilst the nationalist impulse remained unchecked since, 
like the hydra from classical mythology, new combatants emerged to take the place of 
those cut down in battle. Victory in Algeria entailed not only the capitulation of the 
FLN but also the eclipse of the independence ideal which drove their struggle; the 
triumph of an ideology as well as one of arms. 
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Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the war, with an independent Algeria already an 
established reality, Soustelle continued to believe in the `consent potential', arguing 
that the Algerian people had been treated with nothing short of contempt. Any attempt 
to define the conflict as a movement of national liberation was a wilful distortion of 
the truth. The Evian accords had not led to greater liberation and less misery for the 
indigenous population. (PT, 14). In the change of sovereignty, the will of the Algerian 
people had counted for nothing: 'Qui, ä vrai dire, s'en est soucie dans cette cynique 
mascarade par laquelle, sous pretexte du droit des peuples ä disposer d'eux-memes, on 
a dispose des Algeriens comme d'un betail qui change de maitre? ' (PT, 16-17). 
The Failings of the French Army 
Nowhere were the divisions within the French Army more apparent than in the debate 
over torture which pitted the reforming elements against those who have been 
described as 'military realists'. 20 Once again, the 'consent potential' was central to this 
debate. With their continuing belief that the majority of the Muslim population did not 
share the beliefs of the FLN militants, reformers inside and outside the Army argued 
that many soldiers were undermining the mission to win `hearts and minds'. 
The opposition of colonial reformers to the methods employed by the Army is well- 
known and was based around two key points of principle. Firstly, the collective 
reprisals at times exacted on Muslim villages thought to be harbouring FLN 
combatants and the use of torture were held to be morally wrong, a fundamental 
contradiction with a whole tradition of religious, political and philosophical thought 
concerned with the `rights of man' which the French claimed to uphold? ' 
Secondly, reformers condemned as counterproductive the use of what they saw as 
excessive force. From the perspective of the colonial reformer, such methods signalled 
that French soldiers, preoccupied with suffocating any manifestations of opposition to 
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French rule, cared little for the transformation of Algeria and were unmoved by the 
miserable existence eked out by most Muslims. The systematic round-up and torture 
of Muslims could not fail to create a sense of schism with the civilian population on 
one side and the French Army on the other. The Muslim population, rather than 
becoming the object of the Army's concern, took on the role of enemy. The Army was 
not `in' the civilian population as the logic of counter-revolutionary warfare required; 
on the contrary, it had set this civilian population apart. Once this had taken placed, 
reform was stripped of any real meaning. 
Amongst the protestors from within the military, Colonel Barberot is an important 
figure. The shootings of innocent Muslims by French soldiers were, for him, `non 
seulement inutiles mais nuisibles' and for this reason alone had to be absolutely 
condemned 22 The blatant disregard for human life shown by some soldiers indicated 
that the Army was incapable of according Muslims `la pleine dignite humaine' which, 
in his eyes, was more important than the practical measures involved in the reform 
process (p. 116). The Army gave the impression of wanting to do no more than protect 
the privileged position of the European population, becoming, `un instrument de 
protection au service de la fraction d'origine europeenne et de sa situation privilegiee' 
(p. 116). Each Muslim wrongfully killed by the French Army led ten other Muslims to 
join the rebellion. The final and tragic consequence of the prolongation of such tactics, 
Barberot warned, was either genocide, which he saw as `[une] hypothese exclue par la 
definition', or capitulation (p. 117). 
Barberot was supported in this view by his immediate superior, General Paris de 
Bollardiere who argued that the use of torture contradicted the very goal of the 
counter-revolutionary struggle: `La guerre revolutionnaire est une guerre dans laquelle 
la population est 1'element essentiel et faction que l'on peut avoir sur la population ne 
se resume pas ä la torture. C'est une veritable deviation de 1'esprit'23 
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One could cite a number of similar statements made by colonial reformers, protesting 
against torture or other atrocities. Prominent amongst this group of figures was 
Camus, who in 1956 condemned FLN and French Army atrocities and naively, given 
the nature of the conflict, appealed to both sides to exclude non-combatants from the 
fighting. Mention should also be made of Pierre Henri Simon who in his work Contre 
la torture denounced the practices undertaken by the French Army, whilst in Portrait 
d'un officier he encapsulated the moral quandary of the liberal officer in Algeria. 24 
Chevallier was also critical of the French Army which had managed to swell the ranks 
of the FLN by behaving in the early stages of the war as though it were possible to 
vanquish the rebellion simply through the application of more force (NA, 34-5). The 
logical implication of these criticisms is that had the Army behaved better, the war 
might not have been lost. The loss of consent amongst the Muslim population could 
thus be blamed upon human failing and the specific violence perpetrated by soldiers 
of the Army, rather than the structural violence embedded in the colonial system. 
The reformers' position has come under criticism from a number of different sources. 
In his article La Paix des Nementchas published in April 1957, Robert Bonnaud gives 
a disturbing account of acts of torture and the execution of wounded FLN soldiers 
witnessed during his period of service in Algeria. Responding to the argument that 
those who spoke out against such atrocities were dishonouring France, Bonnaud 
commented, `Si 1'honneur de la France ne peut aller qu'avec ces tortures, alors la 
France est un pays sans honneur'. 25 Yet, in his eyes, there was no possibility that 
France's honour might be redeemed, short of bringing the war to an end. Incidents 
such as those he witnessed were an inevitable consequence of the war: 
Il n'y a pas d'Algerien innocent du desir de dignite humaine, du desir d'emancipation 
collective, du d8sir de liberte nationale. Il n'y a pas de suspect arret6 ä tort et torture par 
erreur. (p. 582) 
For Bonnaud, the way in which the French were fighting the war could not be 
improved since the battle for the 'hearts and minds' had long since resulted in a victory 
198 
for the cause of the FLN. Consequently, even the most genuine attempts at 
pacification quickly became acts of repression: `les mieux intentionnes et les plus 
naivement pacificateurs glissent tres vite sur la pente de l'immoralisme repressif 
(p. 583). 
Assailed by militant anti-colonialists, reformers were also criticised by members of 
the French Army who justified torture on the grounds that it was an essential element 
of the conflict in which they were involved, a necessary means of gaining information. 
The Army faced a stark choice; either such tactics were employed or defeat would 
follow. The chief spokesperson of these `military realists' was General Massu. His 
1971 work La vraie bataille d'Alger provides an informed and uncompromising 
account of the events which took place in the capital in 1957. Without the use of 
torture, he submitted, it would have been impossible for the French to counteract the 
terrorist activities which the FLN were using in Algiers. 
A number of contemporary commentators have approved the thesis of the military 
realists and the militant anti-colonialists over that of the reformers that the recourse to 
torture by the Army was the logical consequence of the French desire to retain control 
over Algeria. Looking in particular at the Battle of Algiers, Home argues that the 
French Army could not have afforded an ignominious reverse in the capital as this 
would have led to a groundswell of support for the rebellion after which `the whole of 
Algeria would almost certainly have been swamped by the FLN'26 In similar vein, 
Schulte suggests that by the time of the Battle of Algiers, the French Army was caught 
in a dilemma: `It seems unlikely that by January 1957 the French could have won the 
Battle or even contained the situation without torture - but neither could they accept 
defeat in the capital city. '27 For Dine, it was the nature of the struggle which placed 
the reformers in an impossible position: 
The fact remains that the principal contention of the 'realists', both the anti-war radicals on 
the Left and the theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire on the Right, was the one borne out 
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by history: the war in Algeria could not be made more humane, since the conflict's political 
and military logic defied all attempts to impose moral limits upon it. 28 
In describing the `set-piece confrontation between liberal humanism and military 
realism' Dine's own stance is also apparent for the use of a term such as `realism' in 
itself shows that, in his eyes, the reformers were misguided. Similarly, the notion of a 
term such as `liberals' dilemma' (intended to convey the irreconcilable nature of 
liberal [reformer] support for French control with their horror of the necessary 
methods used to achieve it), indicates a certain rejection of the reformers' position. 29 
For reformers, there was no dilemma - liberal methods and the prolongation of French 
rule were not perceived to be contradictory. 
On balance, Bonnaud's claim that every Muslim was in the camp of the rebellion, 
with its logical implication that a French soldier could open fire into a crowd at 
random and still not kill an innocent civilian, clearly formed part of those Manichean 
rhetorical portrayals of the Muslim population which characterise polemical writing 
on the conflict. According to Bonnaud's logic, terms such as `blind repression' and 
`excessive force' had no real meaning as the entire Muslim population was seen as 
complicit with the rebellion. Clearly, as reformers claimed, and as is evident from our 
argument in Chapter Four, it was possible to shoot or torture innocent people. And, 
from this, one must come to the conclusion that on numerous occasions the French 
Army caused Muslims to turn to the FLN by inappropriate action. This did not mean, 
however, that a more humane attempt at pacification would have succeeded in 
preventing the drift of the population into the camp of the nationalists. The reformers' 
case that the 'hearts and minds' of the civilian population were lost through the actions 
of the Army was flawed because it relied upon the veracity of the 'consent potential', 
which as we have argued, does not stand up to scrutiny. Had the Army refrained from 
torture then potentially the falsehood of the 'consent potential' would have been 
exposed sooner since the necessity of torture was in part a reflection of the implacable 
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logic of the conflict but was equally indicative of the fact that the 'hearts and minds' of 
too many Muslims had already been lost to the rebellion. 
Soustelle's Stance 
At this point, it is worth digressing for a moment to consider the position of Jacques 
Soustelle. Rather than join the moral protest amongst reformers against war atrocities, 
his position can be seen as more akin to that of the `military realist'. Following the 
massacre at Philippeville in 1955, the official death toll amongst the European 
community was 71. The repression which followed it, even according to official 
figures, caused 1,273 deaths, whereas the FLN advanced a figure of around 12,000. 
Whilst even the lowest estimate of the scale of the repression marks this episode down 
as an atrocity, Soustelle simply commented: 'Notre riposte avait ete severe, mais non 
aveuglement brutale ni inutilement sanglante (AS, 125). 
In early 1955, Roger Wuillaume was mandated by Francois Mitterrand, then Minister 
of the Interior, to investigate the French Army's treatment of prisoners in Algeria. As 
Maran's study of torture and human rights in the war points out, Wuillaume's report 
was hardly the damning indictment of French Army atrocities that it might have been. 
Soustelle accepted the findings of the investigation that no attempt should be made to 
find those responsible for acts of torture committed prior to 1 February 1955 and 
effectively buried the report. 30 In a 1988 interview, he washed his hands of his own 
responsibility for torture, simply stating: `J'avais donne des instructions contre toute 
espece d'irregularites' 31 
If Algeria was part of France, as the official line proclaimed, then France and Algeria 
could not be at war. As a result, the French were placed in a difficult situation when it 
came to deciding how much power was to be invested in the Army under these 
'peacetime' conditions. Despite the legal and institutional ties linking the two 
territories, Soustelle advocated the suspension of normal judicial practices for 
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captured members of the FLN: 'on ne pouvait songer ä retablir l'ordre en Algerie sans 
disposer de pouvoirs adaptes ä la situation: c'etait lä un fait perceptible au simple bon 
sens. ' (AS, 45). He disagreed with the way in which rebels were given full access to 
civil procedures whereas French soldiers were often called to account for their actions, 
even those committed under fire. This is particularly disingenuous on Soustelle's part. 
Whilst the French Army was largely left to torture with impunity by successive 
governments with only a few token inquiries set up to deflate the protests largely 
orchestrated by intellectuals, thousands of Algerians were tortured without ever 
receiving a semblance of justice such as having access to a lawyer. 
Soustelle's attitude to Army atrocities also reveals a certain amount of hypocrisy. In 
the aftermath of the war, writing from exile in 1965, he continued to defend the settler 
community, denouncing the ignominy of the regime for its complicity with the 
shooting of Europeans in the violence of the rue d'Isly on 26 March 1962 (PT, 83-88). 
He condemned the torture carried out by the French Army on European settlers whilst 
saying very little about the treatment which thousands of Muslims suffered at the 
same hands throughout the war (PT, 96-99). 
It was Soustelle's attitude towards the issue of war atrocities which has given rise to 
the idea that he changed from reformer to ultra. Maran writes of the way in which 
Soustelle's `liberal views as head administrator in Algeria had turned hawkish 
because of the escalating violence'. 32 Throughout this thesis we have seen how 
Soustelle's attitude has, at times, fallen short of the liberal values he claimed to hold. 
His attitude towards atrocities was perhaps the most flagrant betrayal. Rather than 
speak of a political conversion to the camp of the ultras, it is perhaps more 
appropriate to posit the existence of an unresolved contradiction in his thought. For, if 
Soustelle genuinely believed in the `consent potential', and there is no reason to 
suggest the contrary, how could he have offered his tacit endorsement of some of the 
worst atrocities committed by the Army during the war? The question is never 
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thoroughly investigated in Soustelle's own writing and we can only speculate as to 
what the answer may have been. A clue, however, is provided in the writing of Massu. 
In essence, Massu constructed an image of a `clean torture' limited in time and space. 
This 'clean torture' was limited in time because Massu did not believe that such 
practices would have to be used on a permanent basis. Massu argued that torture was 
viewed within the Army only as a means of gaining information rather than as a 
punishment to be inflicted upon a particular individual for having supported the FLN. 
Defending what he saw as the `veritable caractere de notre mission', he was also keen 
to point out that a certain amount of restraint had been employed during interrogation 
sessions; force was only to be employed `avec le souci constant de ne pas attenter ä la 
dignite humaine et de ne jamais detruire la personnalite, comme cela se pratique dans 
bien d'autres pays'. 3 For Massu, if torture meant temporarily casting aside 
humanitarian concerns, it was only so as to be able to defend them better; recourse to 
such tactics constituted a lesser evil than the endless stream of brutal and unprovoked 
attacks which had been carried out in Algiers by the FLN. Massu invoked 
`l'incroyable sauvagerie par laquelle le FLN decida de rallier ä sa cause les masses 
musulmanes, sauvagerie dont la vue fut intolerable meme pour les plus endurcis'. 34 
This, of course, begged the question as to when the liberalism that was supposed to be 
defended would actually be resumed. 
Torture was limited in space because, for Massu, it would not need to be inflicted 
upon vast numbers of people. Massu claimed that torture was employed `dans le seul 
but de remonter les filieres du terrorisme35' This was contrary to the reality of what 
actually took place in the Battle of Algiers during which it is estimated that up to 40% 
of the male population of the Casbah was arrested. 36 Such a high percentage of arrests 
demonstrates that the French Army viewed almost every Muslim as a potential FLN 
member. 
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However flawed, the reformers' position at least has the merits of logical consistency 
since, had the 'consent potential' been a valid notion, the need to torture as a means of 
gaining information would not have existed. Soustelle's endorsement of brutal 
measures was less logical. Although it was a more realistic assessment of the nature of 
the warfare, it left unreconciled his tacit approval of severe and indiscriminate 
repression with his ongoing belief in the 'consent potential'. Furthermore, any attempt 
to reconcile the 'consent potential' with the use of war atrocities through the notion of 
a `clean torture' proved equally unsatisfactory since the fact that torture was extended 
to the many, rather than limited to the few, simply exposed the myth of the 'consent 
potential' itself. 
The Intellectuals 
Unwilling to attack the Army for its atrocities, Soustelle instead vented his anger at 
the intellectuals who led the campaign against these atrocities. In an open letter 
penned in 1955, Soustelle argued that intellectuals should strive to 'substituer aux 
vagues images passionnelles qui sont l'instrument habituel de la politique les notions 
de probite, de precision et de rigueur auxquelles nous tenons par profession'. Unless 
intellectuals constantly approached their work with a constant vigilance and 
'impartiality' - Soustelle's word - then their opinion counted for no more than that of 
an individual chosen at random. 7 This was a particularly strange attitude given the 
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bias of Soustelle's own convictions and was perhaps indicative of his outright refusal 
to envisage a position other than the one he adopted as being in any way intellectually 
honest. He admitted that his attitude was one of incomprehension towards those 
intellectuals who sought to criticise his reform project: 
Je ne parvenais pas ä comprendre comment des 'nationaux'pouvaient faire aussi bon marche 
de l'interet du pays en accablant d'injures celui - quel qu'il füt - qui se trouvait representer la 
France ä Alger, en pleine tourmente; comment des Chrdtiens, et qui se proclamaient tels 
avec plus d'insistance que d'humilitr, pouvaient montrer tant d'injustices, de passion et 
d'aigreur; comment des hommes de progres pouvaient sacrifier ä leur sectarisme les 
204 
possibilitds qu'ouvrait une politique de rdformes sinc8res, et s'associer en fait avec les 
tenants du fanatisme le plus fe roce et le plus retrograde. (AS, 106) 
The attack against the intellectuals is continued in Le drame algerien, where the 
stance adopted by Raymond Aron is seen as symptomatic of a wider intellectual 
decadence. The work opens with a reference to the Mongol conquest of Mesopotamia. 
To commemorate their victory, the Mongols had erected a monument made from the 
skulls of the inhabitants of Baghdad who had not defended themselves against the 
invasion. The intellectuals of 1957, Soustelle warned, were opening the gates of 
France to a new incarnation of the Mongol hordes (DA, 1). 
For Soustelle, the FLN had no need to produce its own publicity since this particular 
task was undertaken by the French press: `C'est notre presse quotidienne ou 
hebdomadaire, c'est notre intelligentsia qui leur offrent arguments, slogans, themes de 
propagande' (DA, 2). As far as Soustelle was concerned, the actions of a figure such as 
Aron simply delayed a French victory, causing additional bloodshed (DA, 49). 
In Soustelle's later writing, it is the hypocrisy and inconsistency of the protesting 
intellectuals that are the subjects of his attack. Intellectuals were only opposed to 
oppression when the `oppressors' were white Christians whereas they readily 
supported the tyranny of Muslims or Arabs (ET, 22). Passionate opponents of any 
form of European nationalism, they remained 'furieusement entiches de tout 
nationalisme africain ou asiatique (ET, 22). Such sentiments derived from a mixture 
of defeatism, crass ignorance, a snobbish desire to be in the intellectual avant-garde 
and an admiration for the exotic (ET, 22). 
Soustelle's critique of the Intelligentsia was taken up within French Army circles. In 
March 1958, an editorial in Le Bled provocatively entitled 'La grande muette est-elle 
morte', attacked 'la presse progressiste pretant consciemment ou non son concours aux 
ennemis de la France'. 38 Looking forward to the discontent of the Army which would 
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find expression in the events of May of that same year, the editorial claimed that the 
soldier could no longer remain neutral on the much wider question posed by the 
Algerian crisis: 'Est-on pour ou contre la Patrie et la Civilisation qu'elle incarne? ' 
39 
An article on the same page reporting a visit to the Constantine region by Lacoste 
praised 'ces unites parachutistes qui se battent sans faiblir pendant que les imbeciles 
les insultent ä Paris' 40 
If these opinions were to be found in publications such as Le Bled which were largely 
favourable to a pro-reform agenda, it is little surprise that they were also shared by 
some of the more extreme figures from amongst the French military, further 
highlighting the fact that reformers and hard-liners at times held common views. By 
way of example, let us consider the case of Antoine Argoud, a colonel in the French 
Army and later a defector to the ranks of the OAS, whose own condemnation of the 
intellectuals was coloured by his fascist leanings. Intellectuals, Argoud claimed, were 
incapable of understanding the stakes in the Algerian conflict because they had no 
first-hand knowledge of counter-subversive warfare. Distant from the fighting and 
safe in their luxurious Parisian apartments, they made erroneous analyses of the 
conflict and, in so doing, undermined the Army's mission. For Argoud, there was 
something perverse about those intellectuals who, it appeared to him, delighted in 
decrying France. He referred to the 'intellectuels pervertis' and decried their 
'masochisme intellectuel'. 41 In the total and unyielding combat to thwart the 
Communist conspiracy to take over the world, the fine principles which many 
intellectuals claimed to defend were inappropriate to a struggle in which the free 
world faced a fight for its very survival. For Argoud, the reservoir of abstract 
arguments `digne de Byzance' from which intellectuals drew was often no more than 
a reflection of cowardice in the face of the danger confronting France (p. 27). The 
Intelligentsia was pusillanimous and decadent, having lost `l'instinct de conservation' 
(p. 27). 
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Camus: A More Moderate Protest 
Camus' conception of the role and purpose of the intellectual was vastly different from 
Argoud's extremist invective. He was himself a protesting intellectual and, unlike 
Soustelle, did speak out on the question of torture. Nevertheless, Camus repeated, 
albeit in diluted form, some of their complaints against the intellectuals. Whereas, for 
Soustelle, any intellectual who spoke out against the war was suspect, Camus tended 
to direct his criticisms at those intellectuals more engaged than himself, specifically 
the militant anti-colonialists. 
Camus believed that the intellectual not only had a key role to play in the formation of 
opinions but, to a certain extent, acted as the `conscience' of society. Claiming that his 
personal predilections caused him to shy away from the political arena, he believed 
that he had a duty as a writer to speak out on certain matters: 
Je ne suis pas un homme politique, mes passions et mes goats m'appellent ailleurs qu'aux 
tribunes publiques. Je n'y vais que force par la pression des circonstances et 1'idee que je me 
42 fais parfois de mon metier d'dcrivain. 
As a pied-noir, Camus believed that his personal connection to Algeria led him to take 
a more responsible position than some of the more inflamed writing on the subject of 
colonialism. He argued that it was the duty of the intellectual to be responsible: 
`Quand le destin des hommes et des femmes de son propre sang se trouve lid, 
directement ou non, ä ces articles qu'on ecrit si facilement dans le confort du bureau, 
on a le devoir d'hesiter et de peser le pour et le contre. '43 Turning to those 
intellectuals who had no personal knowledge of the Algerian situation, Camus 
commented `ceux qui ne connaissent pas la situation dont je parle peuvent 
difficilement en juger', an argument which was always vulnerable to the response that, 
as a member of the European community, he was blind to, and complicit with, the 
exploitation of the Muslims. 44 
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Influence of the Intellectuals 
As Jean-Francois Sirinelli has commented, the Algerian war constituted `un moment 
cle de 1'histoire recente des intellectuels francais' 45 Daily newspapers enjoying wide 
circulation such as Le Monde or Le Figaro, weekly publications such as L'Express 
and France Observateur, and monthly reviews with a more restricted readership such 
as Esprit or Les Temps Modernes all carried numerous articles by intellectuals which 
attacked either the aims of the conflict or the means by which it was being waged. 
Alongside the regular weeklies and monthlies, other publications were established 
with the specific purpose of providing oppositional comment on the war. By way of 
example one might cite Francis Jeanson's pro-FLN review Writes Pour. Anne 
Simonin's study has drawn attention to the prominent role played by the publishing 
houses the Editions de Minuit, Maspero and Seuil which were influential in bringing 
reports of the atrocities committed by the French Army into the public domain and in 
providing a forum for writers to engage in a more wide-ranging condemnation of the 
French pacification effort. Their role, as Simonin notes, can be considered as `Pun des 
symboles de la resistance intellectuelle francaise ä la guerre d'Algerie' 46 Many of 
their publications specifically attacked the Army, with the accounts of war atrocities 
by a number of reservists contained in La Gangrene (Editions de Minuit) and Henri 
Alleg's La Question (Editions Minuit) being possibly the best known. These were not 
the only publishing houses involved. The year 1957, the most fertile point of the anti- 
repression campaign, saw the publication of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's 
Lieutenant en Algerie published by Julliard, and Des Rappeles temoignent by the 
Comite de Resistance spirituelle. And, as Talbott has pointed out, the charges that 
found their way into print were only a fraction of those circulating in manuscript. 7 
Despite the proliferation of material, it is unlikely, although impossible to prove 
definitively, that the activities of. intellectuals had anything other than a minimal 
impact upon the eventual outcome of the conflict. Whilst one might speculate that the 
campaign against war atrocities might have succeeded in sensitising the public in 
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France to the horrors of the conflict and, at the margins, contributed to the growing 
popular disenchantment with the war, it is unlikely that their influence was a 
determining factor. By the same token, although articles critical of the war appearing 
in the French press might have found their way into the hands of Muslim civilians in 
Algeria, it is doubtful that these articles would have played a major part in convincing 
them to join the nationalists. Soustelle, in his indignation that the French Army might 
be challenged failed to recognise this. 
Concluding Remarks 
By the time the French sent reinforcements to Algeria in 1954, the chances of `saving' 
French rule were limited to a full-scale and prolonged military repression. The 
gradual disenchantment of the Muslim population, created by the logic of the colonial 
system, which eventually gave way to an armed uprising had only two outcomes: 
either it was suppressed by the French military as had happened at Setif in 1945, with 
the result that any pretensions of liberalism on the French part had to be abandoned, 
or, the FLN would succeed in undermining the French will to remain, as proved to be 
the case. This underlying dynamic meant that neither individuals such as de Gaulle, 
groups of protesting intellectuals, nor the French Army in its entirety could have 
influenced the failure of integration other than at the margins, by prolonging or 
shortening the inevitable. In his pursuit of a policy of decolonisation, de Gaulle 
pursued a more realistic policy than the reformers who wanted to keep Algeria. It is a 
matter of debate over whether he did it from more noble sentiments. Nevertheless, he 
was undoubtedly better able to read the political mood than the colonial reformers. 
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CHAPTER N IN E 
THE SETTLERS AND THE PEOPLE OF 
METROPOLITAN FRANCE 
A democratic solution to the Algerian conflict which provided the same rights to all of 
Algeria's population was impossible without the consent of the majority of the settler 
population and that of the people of mainland France. This final chapter is divided 
into two parts. The first examines the way in which Soustelle in particular sought to 
present the settlers as capable of accepting reform. The second considers Soustelle's 
claim that domestic support to pay for the reconstruction of Algeria could be found. In 
each case, we will seek to show that these assessments of the reformers were incorrect 
since there was no substantial evidence of a readiness to accept reform either amongst 
the settlers or the people of mainland France. 
Reading the Settlers 
Faced with the twin argument that the colonial system forced the settler community 
into an inflexible authoritarian role and condemned in advance any reforming 
intentions, Soustelle's response was twofold. Firstly, despite a thick dossier of 
evidence showing previous settler intransigence, he presented settlers as both willing 
and psychologically able to accept a series of reforms which would end their 
dominance. Secondly, he reversed the argument used by Memmi in his portrait of the 
coloniser of good will. In Soustelle's imaging of the settler community, `good will' 
was the norm rather than the exception with those opposed to reform depicted as an 
irreducible core of ultras, unrepresentative of the majority. 
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Soustelle did not arrive at his belief in the `reformability' of the settler without 
expressing considerable reservations. His account of pied-noir reaction to his plans for 
reform was not one of unadulterated success and, at times, almost went as far as 
validating Memmi's argument that any liberal intent was bound to founder on settler 
illiberalism. 
Soustelle claimed that every effort was made to ensure that the local elections which 
took place in April 1955 proceeded fairly with the result that eight seats out of a total 
of 75 were won by supporters of Ferhat Abbas (AS, 102). Although Soustelle was not 
personally disappointed by the results of the election, the settler population was less 
pleased, sending him letters and telegrams expressing their annoyance that the 
nationalists had been `allowed' to win so many seats and accusing him of playing into 
the hands of the rebellion (AS, 103). Rather than interpret this as the routine reaction 
of the settler population who simply assumed that elections would be falsified as they 
had been in the past, Soustelle attributed the responsibility for these protests to the 
ultras. Similarly, the hostile reception which greeted him during a visit to Constantine 
was not to be interpreted as the ingrained hostility of a community engaged in a 
reactionary movement aimed at safeguarding their privileges. Instead, those who 
bayed for his blood were simply `de pauvres gens egares et mal guides', led astray by 
a small minority of hard-liners and countless false rumours circulating in the press and 
throughout the country (AS, 104). His account of his period as Governor-General also 
largely glossed over the declaration of no confidence brought against him in June of 
1955 by the Federation des Maires d'Alger because they thought him too liberal in his 
reforming intentions (AS, 112). 
Despite these initial hitches, Soustelle believed that `1'immense majorite des 
Europeens admettait de larges concessions pourvu que 1'appartenance francaise de 
1'Algerie ne füt pas menacee' (AS, 204). Admitting that it had been a struggle to win 
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support from the settler population for some of the measures which integration 
entailed, he thought that by 1958 this goal had been achieved: 
[Ma] conception de ! 'integration supposait que fut achevee la veritable decolonisation de 
I'Algerie, notamment par la suppression du double college electoral. L'opposition de 
certains Europeens ä ma politique se cristallisait autour de ce point. J `ai suscite, en 
pr8conisant le college unique, bien des rancceurs chez des Francais qui n'avaient pas 
compris. Il est de fait, cependant, qu'entre 1955 et 1958, aide par certains Europeens 
d'Algerie, je parvins ä faire accepter par ! 'immense majorite des non-Musulmans l'idee du 
college unique, a condition - et c'etait 1A une condition sine qua non - que j"t realisee 
I'integration. (ET, 26) (original emphasis). 
Whilst he admitted that the abolition of the double electoral college was the main 
point of dispute between himself and the settlers, which was only to be expected since 
it was the embodiment of the apartheid-like discrimination which reigned in Algeria, 
he attributed the causes of this hostility to a misunderstanding on the part of the 
Europeans over what the consequences of such a measure would have been. In the 
context of over a century of settler resistance to such egalitarian reforms, his analysis 
seems, at best, naive. One person, one (equal) vote was hardly a difficult concept to 
grasp. Those who opposed it, far from lacking understanding of its implications, in all 
likelihood knew only too well what such changes would have entailed, hence their 
hostility. As Chevallier commented in 1958, settler hostility to the single electoral 
college prior to that moment had always been grounded in their fear of being reduced 
to a minority within Algeria: `Chacun comprenait qu'en cela le college unique etait 
veritablement "la clef de la maison"'(NA, 20). 
As was the case with the Muslim population, Soustelle invested the events of May 58 
with immense significance as an indicator of settler opinion. The fraternisation 
marked the apotheosis of the gradual drift by settlers towards acceptance of the 
Muslim as equal; `le jaillissement visible d'une source souterraine' as he was to 
describe it a full seven years after the events themselves (PT, 78-9). His interpretation 
was simple: `les Europeens acceptaient l'integration avec toutes ses consequences' 
(ET, 38). The whole history of colonial failures had been swept away by this powerful 
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movement. The demonstrations of fraternity had `miraculeusement rapproche les 
communautes musulmane et europeenne par-dessus des prejuges et des rancccurs 
seculaires' (ET, 212). Soustelle's immediate reaction to these events, he tells us in 
L'esperance trahie, was to inform people in France and abroad of 'le veritable visage 
populaire, ä la fois national et democratique, d'un mouvement que Von s'obstinait ä 
affubler du masque hideux d'un "putsch fasciste"'(ET, 39). Even in 1988, Soustelle had 
not changed his opinion on the question of reforms: 
Les pieds-noirs n'&taient pas hostiles ä toute reforme raisonnable ; ils avaient compris que je 
les avais compris. J'avais reussi ä persuader les pieds-noirs, et notamment les maires, que 
les reformes que je proposais n'etaient pas de nature ä chasser les Francais mais A assurer 
une cohabitation correcte. ' 
Chevallier was similarly convinced, writing in October of 1958, that a miraculous 
conversion had taken place amongst the European population. With an emphasis on 
climatic factors which strangely (and ironically in the context) echoed Camus' 
fictional character Meursault claiming that he killed the Arab because of the sun, 
Chevallier asserted that a good dose of Mediterranean passion and lots of sun had 
succeeded in sweeping away in a few seconds ten years of opposition to the single 
electoral college (NA, 24). From this he concluded: 'Ne pouvant mettre en doute la 
sincerite de tels mouvements et sentiments, il faut donc prendre acte que desormais, 
tous les Algeriens sont d'accord sans esprit de retour' (NA, 24). Despite his 
preoccupation with the `lost opportunities' for implementing reforms prior to the 
outbreak of the rebellion, Chevallier's whole work is based on the presumed sincerity 
of May 58. 
La masse europeenne d'Algerie, courant au devant de la masse musulmane et lui tendant des 
mains fraternelles, avait fait litiere de tour ses prejuges, banni ses rancceurs et accept6 tout 
ce qu'elle avait si longtemps condamne. (NA, 159) 
It is an argument which has received only limited endorsement. Brian Crozier and 
Gerard Mansell view the pied-noir enthusiasm for integration as an emotive response 
whipped up by the collective hysteria of May 1958 yet do not seem to cast doubt upon 
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its sincerity; the assembled crowds 'were at last prepared to accept what scarcely any 
Europeans had ever dared to envisage in the past - equality of political rights for 
French and Muslims alike'. 2 Gillespie, on the other hand, cast aspersions on the 
sincerity of European motivations, arguing that the settlers `adopted the Army's 
formula for an Algerian solution - integration - out of no love for the Algerian 
Muslims'. 3 This impression of the settler community embracing integration only 
reluctantly, as the last realistic hope of keeping Algeria French is also offered in Droz 
and Lever's more recent account: 'Les Franrais d'Algerie, (... ) se rallient in extremis 
derriere l'etendard de 1'integration, consideree des lors comme un moindre mal' 4 
The events of these few heady days in May 58, however moving to those who 
witnessed them, can scarcely be taken as anything like conclusive evidence of a far- 
reaching psychological change within the settler community. Had it been possible to 
enshrine in law the principle of equality between European and Muslim, destroying 
the structures of power which had been in place since the earliest days of colonialism, 
the superiority complex which underpinned French colonialism could not be so easily 
swept away with a few strokes of a lawyer's pen. As Soustelle himself pointed out: 'Si 
le probleme algerien est de nature economique, sociale, politique, il est aussi, et plus 
encore peut-etre, un probleme de relations humaines'. 5 
To rid colonial society of its deeply-held prejudices would, arguably, have required 
years and one could hardly be convinced of the sincerity of such a huge attitudinal 
change based on the flimsy evidence of a few days. A glance forward at the evolution 
of the Algerian conflict from 1958 onwards appears to offer little in the way of 
supporting evidence for Soustelle's proclamations of settler good will. The violence of 
the OAS, the descending spiral of horror which saw random assassinations of 
Muslims and a scorched earth policy, can hardly be held up as examples of the 
settlers' fraternal affection for the Muslims but do seem very much like a desperate 
attempt to cling onto the privileges of colonialism. Soustelle's response, far from 
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disinterested given his own sympathy for the OAS, was to justify the actions of the 
settler population by subsuming them within another myth, that of the betrayal of 
integration by de Gaulle. 
De Gaulle's Betrayal of the Settlers 
De Gaulle was certainly unconvinced of the willingness of the pied-noir community to 
accept the implications of integration. In an interview for the Echo d'Oran in 1959, he 
argued that the settlers were looking for a convenient flag under which they could sail 
when in reality they favoured a return to the `good old days' of European domination: 
Ceux qui Grient aujourd'hui le plus fort `integration' sont ceux-lä qui alors [en 1943] etaient 
contre cette mesure. Ce qu'ils veulent, c'est qu'on leur rende 1'Algerie de papa, mais 
b 1'Algdrie de papa est morte, et si on ne le comprend pas, on mourra avec elle. 
Soustelle's reaction was vitriolic. The claim that the Europeans wanted to preserve the 
vestiges of an outmoded form of colonialism was, in Soustelle's eyes, `ä la fois 
sommaire, injuste et dangereux' (ET, 104). His argument was three-pronged. Firstly, 
he contended that there was now a different generation of Europeans to those who had 
historically resisted change, illustrating his view that the failings of colonialism were 
due to 'bad' colonisers rather than the logic of the system. Secondly, consistent with 
his earlier explanations for opposition to reform, the proponents of the status quo 
were no more than a minority. Thirdly, like the repenting sinner from Christian tales, 
the realisation by the Europeans of the error of their past ways was to be taken as a 
cause for joy rather than for further attacks upon them: 
II est faux, en effet, bien que ce soit lä un slogan ressass8 par tous les adversaires de 
l'Algerie francaise, que les 'intdgrationnistes' de 1959 soient, par definition, les memes que 
les immobilistes de 1936 ou de 1947. Beaucoup d'eau avait could sous les ponts, et meine 
dans les oueds depuis quelques annees. La petite minorite des veritables 'ultras' restait, eile, 
irreductiblement anti-integrationniste. Mais on oublie trop que la masse europeenne d'alors, 
oü Von comptait d'ailleurs beaucoup de jeunes sans passe politique, etait venue a 
l'integration, sincerement et meme passionnement, depuis qu'a partir de 1955 eile avait ete 
mise en presence de son lens et de sa portee. 
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Au demeurant, s'il etait parmi les partisans de l'integration en 1959 des hommes qui 
l'avaient combattue quelques annees plus tot, fallait-il leur en faire grief? Ou ne fallait-il 
pas plutöt se feliciter, et les feliciter, de cette heureuse evolution. (ET, 104) 
Soustelle attempted to justify the increasingly hard-line attitude adopted by the settlers 
as the conflict continued into its seventh and eighth years by stressing their place as 
victims. Drawing upon a particularly tenuous portrait of the settler as both good- 
humoured and politically left-leaning, Soustelle claimed that the settler population had 
had little choice but to gravitate towards the camp of the ultras: 
Comment se fait-il que les paisibles `Hernandez', au caract8re jovial, qui d'ailleurs le plus 
souvent votaient `ä gauche', fournissent mois apr8s mois, semaine apr6s semaine, des 
troupes ä ces mouvements qui surgissent de l'angoisse populaire ? La reponse est simple: 
c'est la politique du pouvoir, faite d'equivoque et de ruse, de promesses non tenues, 
d'abandons camoufles puis avoues, qui `fabrique de l'ultra', qui rend intenable toute 
position moderee et rejette tout Algerien soit vers la rebellion soit vers la resistance ä la 
rebellion. (ET, 133) 
For Soustelle, the responsibility for settler intransigence was entirely that of France's 
political leadership. If right-wing demagogues such as the cafe owner Jo Ortiz 
managed to garner popular support, this could, in Soustelle's opinion, be attributed to 
the machinations of a duplicitous government. For Memmi, by way of contrast, it was 
not the activities of the government which turned the liberal-minded individual into a 
violent reactionary, but the colonial system itself: 
Cet homme, peut-titre ami sensible et p8re affectueux, qui dans son pays d'origine, par sa 
situation sociale, son milieu familial, ses amities naturelles, aurait pu titre un democrate, va 
se transformer sürement en conservateur, en reactionnaire ou meme en fasciste colonial. 
(PC, 79) 
Owing to the fact that the coloniser's personal and professional life was so intimately 
tied up with the colonial system, he would, according to Memmi, inevitably approve 
discrimination and the codification of injustice, take delight in police tortures and 
even condone massacres (PC, 79-80). The history of the French colonial presence, 
from its very beginning through to the terrible violence which marked its end, 
certainly offers more evidence in support of Memmi's claim that the colonial situation 
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transformed the settler into a reactionary than it does to Soustelle's description of the 
jovial, left-leaning European forced by the government into adopting extreme 
measures. 
Whilst willing to admit widespread European consent for the aims of the OAS, 
Soustelle also attempted to exculpate settlers of any responsibility for the particularly 
violent activities carried out in the name of this organisation. OAS atrocities 
remained, in Soustelle's eyes, the work of a particularly violent minority of 
Europeans. By attacking the whole of the settler community, the government was 
seeking a pretext to discredit the cause of French Algeria and a justification for its 
policy of abandoning Algeria: 'En rejetant sur 1'ensemble des Francais d'Algerie la 
culpabilite de ces actes honteux, on s'efforce de justifier 1'injustifiable, de faire 
apparaitre comme un chätiment qui leur etait bien dü le sort de parias qui leur a ete 
inflige' (PT, 83). 
In the previous chapter, we argued that it was de Gaulle's active role in advancing the 
decolonisation process which allowed Soustelle to argue that the General had 
destroyed the `consent potential' amongst the indigenous population. The same 
argument can be applied to Soustelle's account of settler betrayal. The myth of the 
sincerity of the settlers conversion in May 1958 was never truly exposed. De Gaulle 
did not believe in it and was not prepared to pursue a policy of integration long 
enough to put it to the test. 
Domestic Support. 
France in Transition. 
The willingness of the people of mainland France to contribute to the transformation 
of Algeria proposed by Soustelle has to be evaluated against the climate of social 
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changes which were taking place within the Hexagon. Whilst the French Army 
persevered in its relentless bid to rid Algeria's towns, villages and deserts of the FLN, 
France's socio-economic landscape was undergoing a process of change which was 
both rapid and far-reaching in character. Initiated by the State planners and a dynamic 
class of entrepreneurs during the Fourth Republic, and invigorated by the support of 
General de Gaulle during the Fifth, the process of modernisation was very much 
underway whilst hostilities raged on the other side of the Mediterranean. As Giles has 
observed: `After having lingered for so long in the climate of the nineteenth century, 
France was now advancing with impressive speed into the twentieth'. 7 Although the 
trappings of modernisation were not always immediately welcomed, nor universally 
shared, the French people, on the whole, were developing a taste for higher standards 
of living and for consumer goods. France was becoming, if she had not yet already 
become, a modern, bourgeois, liberal, capitalist state. For Bernstein and Milza, the 
growth of consumerism provoked a profound change in the nature of French society: 
La croissance de la consommation se traduit par la mise ä la disposition des Francais de 
logements, d'automobiles, d'appareils electromenagers, par l'augmentation du niveau 
d'education de la masse de la population, par une course aux loisirs et aux vacances, qui 
amenent une transformation totale des mentalites et des reactions 8 
These changes provided fertile terrain to be charted by observers of the society of the 
day as seen in Roland Barthes' Mythologies. 9 Writing at a much later date, Ross 
provides an interesting angle on the way in which the stories of decolonisation and 
modernisation are to be read as parallel processes. According to her analysis, the rapid 
changes within French society served as a substitute for the colonies: 
In the roughly ten-year period of the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s in France - the decade that 
saw both the end of empire and the surge in French consumption and modernization - the 
colonies are in some sense `replaced, ' and the effort that once went into maintaining and 
disciplining a colonial people and situation becomes instead concentrated on a particular 
`level' of metropolitan existence: everyday life. 10 
Modernisation, Ross argues, led to a sense of turning in on oneself, a concentration on 
the private space. She refers to a process of `privitatization', where interest was 
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displaced from broader political questions and instead came to be concentrated in the 
trivial - shampoo, kitchens, household products (pp. 106-8). Modernity, she writes, 
destroys `the political socialization of individuals, such that one experiences public or 
even social matters not only as hostile or foreign but also as out of one's grasp, 
unlikely to be affected by one's actions' (p. 106). 
The depoliticising elements of modernity, as reflected during the Algerian war 
attracted considerable criticism from Sartre, who in Vous etes formidables, attacked 
the way in which the population had become distanced from the political process and 
caught up in its own private concerns. ll Francis Jeanson's article Para pacification 
also attacked the inadequacy of the response of the French public to the atrocities 
which were going on in Algeria, accusing them of being passively complicit with the 
rebellion. 12 As Stora puts it `la societe sait mais se contente de partager le secret d'une 
guerre non declaree'. 13 However, if the French people did not oppose the war as 
vigorously as the likes of Sartre and Jeanson would have liked, they were even less 
committed to the defence of French Algeria as the results of the opinion polls taken at 
the time indicate. 14 The frequently articulated belief that Algeria was part of France 
carried less weight at a popular level than it did amongst activists. As Ross puts it: 
The French felt the war to be both a foreign affair, something far away and extraneous, and a 
disruption within the very body of French society; these two perceptions were experienced 
simultaneously in France. '5 
Both of these perceptions led to the same conclusion - the war needed to be brought 
to an end. Since the war was distant, the French people did not have the emotional 
involvement towards Algeria that they might have had for one of the provinces of 
Metropolitan France. Since the war was disrupting life within France, if for no other 
reason than a whole generation of young Frenchmen were forced to serve in Algeria, 
there was also a strong incentive to disengage. Stora has emphasised that the 
enormous cost of two World Wars meant that the French preferred to enjoy the new 
era of comfort rather than consent to yet further sacrifices. 16 
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In short, the people of mainland France lacked the political will to accept the bill for 
the reconstruction of Algeria for many years to come whilst simultaneously bearing 
the burden, both financial and personal, of a long-term French military presence. Even 
if the image of la France genereuse, willing to pay for the reconstruction of Algeria, 
had been supported by the French public in times of economic plenty, recession might 
well have brought with it resentment of the financial burden imposed by Algeria, with 
untold consequences for the future of any fledgling Franco-Muslim community. 
The apparent lack of will to allow Algerians to share in the spoils of the 
modernisation process which France was undergoing was perhaps evident in the 
hostility directed at Muslims working in France whilst the war was ongoing. 17 Indeed, 
looking back on more recent hostility directed at immigrants of North African origin, 
Jean Daniel has offered a kind of retrospective scepticism that integration could ever 
have worked: 
La France [aurait]-elle ete accueillante pour une nation de Dunkerque A Tamanrasset, alors 
qu'aujourd'hui on supporte mal la dose jugee excessive d'injections islamiques daps notre 
paysage sociologique. '$ 
A Strategy of Denial 
The reformers' response to the charge that the French people were unwilling to fund 
the war was largely one of denial. Soustelle had surprisingly little to say about popular 
opinion prior to 1958. In fact, for the most part he seemed to ignore that there was a 
problem at all, arguing that the views of a figure like Aron were simply the expression 
of a personal agenda rather than a prescient analysis of the mood within the country as 
a whole. He took issue with Aron's claim that fifty percent of the French people were 
opposed to the war, noting that in all the by-elections which had taken place under the 
legislature of the day, the candidates in favour of the maintenance of French Algeria 
had won huge victories over the `porte-parole de l'abandon' (DA, 46). It was not the 
whole of France which opposed the war but rather Aron himself, who was attempting 
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to pass himself off as a spokesperson of the nation: `Il faut que la France ait mauvaise 
conscience puisque M. Aron en souffre lui-meme'(DA, 47). Aron had claimed that the 
French were being cowardly in not grasping the nettle of decolonisation, a point for 
which he was strongly criticised by Soustelle: 'De quelle lächetd parlez-vous? Ceux 
qui se battent pour 1'Algerie frangaise sont-ils donc des läches? ' (DA, 47). The young 
men who went off to fight for France, Soustelle imagined, were well aware that if 
Algeria was to go the same way as Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco, the consequences 
for the future of the nation would be grave. For this reason, the people of France had 
understood that there could be no more `abandons': 
Cela, le peuple francais le sent, lui qui paie de son argent et de sa personne, et qui decouvre 
au-delä d'une mer etroite et bleue 1'8tonnant prolongement de la France que bien souvent il 
ne soupconnait meme pas. (DA, 68) 
The whole of France, Soustelle asserted, shared his vision that Algeria must not be 
given over to the FLN. They understood that the loss of Algeria was equivalent to 
signing the death warrant of the French nation itself: 
La France est alertee et alarmee. Elle se rend compte plus ou moins clairement (... ) qu'en 
abandonnant 1'Algerie eile commettrait le geste du suicide, qu'elle abattrait la derni8re digue 
qui contienne encore le flot, qu'elle souscrirait else-meme ä sa decheance. (DA, 68-9) 
It is not really until after 1958, when popular opinion had undoubtedly evolved away 
from integration towards de Gaulle's Algerian policy of degagement, that Soustelle 
became more critical of the French people. However, just as we have seen on previous 
occasions, de Gaulle's role in manipulating popular opinion was perceived as crucial. 
For Soustelle, de Gaulle's success in the 1961 referendum could not be attributed to an 
overwhelming desire amongst the people of Metropolitan France to bring an end to 
the conflict but rather to the General's deceitful rhetoric which had fooled them into 
accepting his policies. It was 'un triomphe illusoire, comme celui de cet empereur qui 
fit battre la mer et se proclama vainqueur de Neptune' (ET, 219-220). Soustelle's 
critique of the 1961 referendum is four-fold. Firstly, he pointed out that de Gaulle 
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used the referendum as a thinly veiled personal plebiscite, with the propositions 
submitted to the public containing a thinly veiled threat to resign were he not to get 
his way (ET, 221). Secondly, he complained that de Gaulle did more than just violate 
the spirit of the referendum by censoring the `no' campaign and preventing its 
supporters from having an equal platform from which to state their case (ET, 221). 
Thirdly, he argued that the referendum itself was confusing. He pointed to the 
contradictory nature of the two questions contained within it, the first asking whether 
the French people approved the notion of self-determination for Algeria, the second 
asking whether they approved the implementation of the provisional authorities of an 
Algerie algerienne. When compared to the referendum of September 1958, this new 
consultation was, in his eyes, nothing more than a clever manipulation of the 
electorate: 
Le referendum du 28 septembre 1958 avait 6te un veritable referendum ; le peuple, mis en 
presence d'un projet soigneusement pr8par6 et etudie, qui avait fait l'objet de discussions 
approfondies et publiques, avait ä ]'adopter ou ä le rejeter. II s'agissait d'un texte 
constitutionnel, destine ä regler, esperait-on, pour une longue suite d'annees, le 
fonctionnement des pouvoirs publics. En janvier 1961, au contraire, on fixait aux citoyens la 
täche irr8alisable de repondre par `oui' ou `non' sur un ensemble de deux questions qui 
s'annulaient 1'une l'autre, relatives ä un probleme immediat et brillant ä propos duquel on 
entretenait volontairement la confusion la plus noire. (ET, 220) 
Soustelle's complaints had some validity. De Gaulle's referendum was confusing 
(although the September 1958 vote was even less explicit in terms of its implications 
for Algeria). In response to the accusation that de Gaulle was not a democratic leader, 
the Gaullist commentator Jacques de Montalais has argued that `toute la politique de 
Gaulle repose sur le consentement [... ] il n'a rien entrepris de decisif sans que le 
peuple y ait consenti'. 19 Whilst de Gaulle did obtain popular support for his policies, it 
would be slightly inaccurate to depict him as simply a passive register of popular 
opinion. On the occasion of each referendum, the choice was presented to the French 
people as one between de Gaulle and chaos, a return to the instability of the Fourth 
Republic and the difficulties associated with the previous regime. De Gaulle did not 
only respond to popular will but also managed to compress it into a mould determined 
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by him. However, Soustelle under-estimated the fact that none of these tactics would 
have been effective had the French people been determined to keep Algeria; the 
simple fact is that they did not. 
Soustelle's fourth criticism, on the other hand, was simply the result of muddle- 
headed thinking. He claimed that de Gaulle's referendum campaign was a false one 
because it deliberately dangled the carrot of a peace settlement in front of the French 
people rather than concentrating on the actual questions, contradictory as they were, 
contained within the referendum (ET, 220). Firstly, by the logic of Soustelle's own 
argument, a `yes' vote did open the gates to peace because it effectively gave de 
Gaulle a free hand to deal with the Algerian question as he saw fit. Secondly, by 
admitting that the people wanted peace, Soustelle undermined his own case because 
his integration project, even under the most favourable circumstances, would have 
required a continued military presence in Algeria for many years afterwards. 
As far as the popular endorsement of the Evian accords was concerned, Soustelle 
argued that the population had once again been misled by de Gaulle. They had been 
tricked into believing that these accords would solve the problem: 
On a fait avaler au peuple francais, ä force de propagande, l'illusion selon laquelle les 
accords d'Evian reglaient tout; satisfait, il a vote `oui' et s'est empresse, le cur leger, de 
partir en vacances pendant que I'Algerie plongeait dans l'enfer dechain8 par ce `oui'. 
(PT, 54) 
Popular attitudes, Soustelle claimed, were determined to a greater extent than is 
generally thought by the stance adopted by the State (PT, 171). De Gaulle, through his 
actions in Algeria, had taught the French people that the notions of honour and duty 
were meaningless. It was not only Algeria which had been lost but, echoing de 
Gaulle's own words, `une certaine We de la France'. To replace it, the only substitute 
which de Gaulle had found was a bland, apolitical materialism, described by Soustelle 
as `une sorte de morne "Enrichissez-vous" ou "Amusez-vous bien". Francais, nous dit- 
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on dormez tranquilles, mangez, buvez, partez en vacances: Papa s'occupe des affaires 
serieuses' (PT, 171). Whereas Ross blamed modernisation for this disengagement, for 
Soustelle, it was much more personal, linked to the particular brand of politics 
embodied by de Gaulle. De Gaulle's attempt at the politics of grandeur were seen as 
responsible for having depoliticised the French people and turned them into an 
unthinking, consuming, pliable mass: 
La pr6tendue politique de grandeur et l'abaissement de l'esprit frangais ne sont que les deux 
faces d'une seule et meme m6daille. A partir du moment oti Pon baptise `grandeur' la 
liquidation du patrimoine national, l'6goYsme feroce qui se derobe ä la solidarite 61ementaire 
entre fils d'un pays, la soumission aveugle aux caprices d'un Pouvoir qui ordonne le mardi 
le contraire de ce qu'il a ordonnr le dimanche, on ne saurait s'8tonner de 1'abaissement de 
1'esprit public. (... ) Le r6gime, loin de combattre cet abaissement, fait tout pour le 
precipiter, car cet abaissement le seit. Un peuple `d6politis6' comme on dit, occupe de 
babioles, de chansonnettes et de strip-tease, voila une bonne pate bien molle et facile ä 
petrir. (PT, 168-69) 
Soustelle's arguments are, once again, very similar to those adopted by certain 
sections of the Army who came to denounce the moral decadence of the society which 
they were supposed to be defending. Modernisation, along with the intellectuals, was 
another subject of Argoud's rage. He argued that the cult of material progress had led 
to the atrophy of the nation which had developed a soft underbelly and rendered the 
French unfit to take part in the combat for its survival: 'La richesse materielle, la 
securite, amollissent peu ä peu le corps et 1'esprit, atrophient l'instinct vital, rendent 
l'individu moins propre au combat pour la vie'. 0 He reasoned that the French people 
had taken refuge in their materialistic dreams making them unable to recognise the 
sacrifices needed to obtain victory in Algeria: 
Le Francais se laisse seduire par un langage qui pare la facilite du manteau de la vertu (... ) il 
en arrive ä se persuader que la victoire militaire est impossible et ä souhaiter avec 
l'adversaire un compromis qui sauve l'honneur, mette fin au conflit et lui permette de jouir 
sans arriere-pensee de ses week-ends et de ses conges payes? ' 
If France was so degenerate, one wonders why Argoud and others of his ilk were so 
concerned to protect it. Soustelle was, in part, saved from this contradiction by his 
argument that it was de Gaulle who had made unthinking consumers of the French 
224 
people. By using this convenient scapegoat, he did not need to fully confront the true 
nature of the changes affecting France nor come to terms with the fact that the French 
people did not share his vision of the future. Just like the settlers, the French people 
were largely unacknowledged by Soustelle as instrumental in undermining his plans. 
Domestic and settler opposition to reform was more crucial in rendering integration 
an unfeasible policy than the intellectuals, politicians or soldiers to whom Soustelle 
more readily attributed the blame. 
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CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to highlight the impossibility of colonial 
reform within the Algerian situation. The significance of the study, I have hoped to 
show, lies in bringing out a more thorough understanding of the ideas of those figures 
described by Memmi as `colonisers of good will'. Focussing primarily upon the 
writing of Soustelle and to a lesser extent, Camus, Chevallier, Tillion and various 
figures connected to the Army's Cinquieme Bureau, the study has indicated where 
their good will was misdirected and where it was, in fact, lacking altogether. 
Drawing on the work of leading anti-colonial writers as supporting evidence, the study 
has highlighted three areas in which the assessments of the reformers were flawed. 
Firstly, the 'consent potential', central to reformers' attempts to present French aims in 
Algeria as compatible with liberal values of tolerance, democracy and freedom from 
oppression, was greatly over-estimated. The study showed that whilst reformers 
managed to convince themselves that Muslims supported their proposals for the 
transformation of Algeria, with particular emphasis being placed on the so-called 
fraternisation of May 58, they failed to recognised that most of the Muslim 
community had long since turned against France. Secondly, reformers, and Soustelle 
in particular, could not accept that, on both a psychological and economic level, the 
pieds-noirs were not prepared to put an end to a system which enshrined their 
privileges and ensured their minority control of the territory. Thirdly, reformers failed 
to appreciate that insufficient domestic support existed to sustain a long-term financial 
commitment to Algeria. 
The study has exposed gaps in the reformers' professed liberalism in four areas. 
Firstly, reformers offered a generous reading of the French colonial past; whilst 
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figures like Soustelle praised the endeavour of the settlers in making land suitable for 
farming, they paid little attention to the fact that this land had been expropriated from 
Muslims. Secondly, the details of integration were less liberal than the general 
principles which underpinned it. If equality was the stated aim, the policies intended 
to bring it to fruition were insufficient; although damaging, they would not have been 
fatal to European minority control. Thirdly, whilst Soustelle was correct to claim that 
integration was more respectful of the cultural differences of the Muslims than the 
discredited policy of assimilation, he nonetheless tended to overlook crucial issues 
relating to the separate identity and culture of the indigenous population in the 
elaboration of his programme. This was most visible in plans for the transformation of 
the Algerian economy where little thought was given to the potential impact of French 
proposals upon Muslim society. Fourthly, reformers mobilised other arguments to 
support the continuation of the French presence in Algeria based on the notion of the 
'harmony of interests' which had very little to do with liberalism and probably placed 
them closer in terms of their ideological standpoint to the hard-line opponents of 
reform than they thought. 
Despite these failures, the ideas in which integration was grounded should not be 
condemned absolutely. If, following Memmi, assimilation had a universalistic flavour 
and socialistic flavour which made it a priori acceptable (PC, 161), integration was 
even more so. It should not be regarded as a betrayal of a cosmopolitan, multi- 
cultural, 'progressive' outlook to state that there are some positive elements within the 
integration programme, however much they were doomed to failure within the 
context of the colonial situation or undermined by the lack of sincerity of those who 
claimed to support them. 
The study has also highlighted the way in which reformers mistakenly attributed the 
blame for the failure of their proposals to politicians, soldiers and intellectuals. Owing 
to the perceived recuperative powers of May 1958, which allowed reformers to 
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believe that the slate had been wiped clean of all past colonial injustices and 
governmental failures, the principal responsibility for the failure of integration to 
come to fruition was seen as de Gaulle's. Our analysis was concerned to show that, 
whilst the actions of the various individuals or groups cited by reformers might have 
played the role of catalyst in bringing to an end the French presence, they were not the 
determining factor. 
Considerable importance has been accorded to the role of the French Army. It has not 
been our intention to rehabilitate the Army as a body. In many ways the Army can be 
considered as a microcosm of the Algirie frangaise camp as a whole. Just as civilian 
supporters of colonial reform and hard-line defenders of the status quo found 
themselves on the same side and often articulating similar themes, so the French 
Army contained a mixture of reformers and hard-liners. There is still much more work 
to be done on the Army. This study has drawn upon only a small percentage of the 
material which was generated from within its ranks during the conflict and the texts 
chosen focus on those areas of its activities most closely connected with reform. From 
our relatively limited investigation, it is clear that the contribution of some military 
commentators to the pro-reform camp was not insignificant, even if this conclusion 
cannot be extended to the Army as a whole. 
Colonial Reform in a Wider Context 
Integration as it was proposed by Soustelle was a policy inextricably linked with the 
colonial environment within which it was meant to operate. Nevertheless, it might be 
argued that some of the conclusions which can be drawn from an examination of this 
programme are not only restricted to the colonial situation. In Culture and 
Imperialism, Said considers the notion of 'overlapping histories', between the former 
colonial powers and their colonies. The multi-ethnic character of cities such as 
London and Paris can only be properly understood through an appreciation of the 
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colonial processes which brought them into being. ' The questions raised at the time of 
the Algerian war by the integration programme are not vastly dissimilar to those 
posed within the more contemporary setting of present day France concerning the 
relations between its different ethnic and religious communities. As Stora puts it: 
En France, «le probleme de l'integration» occupe une place centrale dans les debats 
politiques, ideologiques. Derriere les mots « integration », « assimilation », se dessine la 
grande question des Arabes en France, leur place, leur role comme nouveaux citoyens. 
Nombre de souvenirs qui paraissent perdus se reveillent, se manifestent : peut-on We 
musulman et francais ä part entibre ?A nouveau se 18ve le defi, non regle, qui a conduit A la 
guerre d'Algerie. 2 
In the current debate, the term integration continues to be confused with assimilation 
just as it was during the Algerian war. As Alec Hargreaves and Mark McKinney note, 
integration is 'a term which is not without ambiguity, but which more often than not is 
used as a polite circumlocution for assimilation. i3 David Blatt concurs, referring to 
France's republican model of integration where integration/assimilation stands in 
opposition to multi-culturalism, the latter defined as a recognition of ethnic 
communities and the support for the preservation of cultural differences. The general 
principles of integration as they were defined by Soustelle during the Algerian war 
and summarised by Droz and Lever as `1'egalite des droits dans le respect de la 
difference' therefore seem to be closer in meaning to current ideas about multi- 
culturalism. 5 For this reason, those who seek to overcome social division through an 
emphasis on shared humanity allied with a celebration, rather than a rejection, of 
difference, will find that a study of the integration programme repays its investment 
both for its positive points and in its failures. 
Whilst this thesis has broadly attacked the position of the reformers, as a final point it 
should be stressed that, if this critique is pushed too far, it can, paradoxically, come to 
resemble the illiberal attitudes more commonly associated with the extreme right. To 
disregard integration in any context as both impossible and undesirable on the 
grounds that any political project which lays claim to certain universal principles 
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denies cultural specificity is to venture on dangerous ground. Such an attitude gives 
rise to what Slavoj Zizek has termed apartheid `legitimised as the ultimate form of 
anti-racism, as an endeavour to prevent racial tension and conflicts. '6 This point is not 
just relevant within the context of contemporary France but can be extended beyond 
national boundaries. In his work The Clash of Civilisations, Samuel Huntington 
divides the world into seven different civilisations and forecasts potential conflict 
between them. 7 His controversial analysis is flawed, as Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal 
argue, since civilisations are far from the homogeneous and separate entities which 
Huntington imagines them to be. 8 However, Huntington's recipe for global stability is 
precisely to turn his description of the different civilisations into a political reality. 
Huntington rightly denounces the messianic tendencies of the West and argues that 
global crusades in the name of so-called Western values are always likely to generate 
sites of resistance. However, he offers by way of an alternative what might be 
described as a civilisational apartheid which not only posits minimum interaction 
between civilisations but also calls upon Western civilisation to reject `the divisive 
siren calls of multiculturalism' in the domestic setting. 9 It is to be hoped that 
Huntington's vision of the future, evoking memories of the constantly warring 
civilisations in George Orwell's 1984, does not prove to be accurate. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
A SELECTION OF TRACTS PRODUCED BY 




0 Freres Musulmans ! 
Les Fellagbas vows ont promis beaucoup depuis 2 ans, ei qu'ont-ils 
apporte en veril 
- La guerre, 
- La terreur, 
- La misexe dans vos mechtas. 
Et que font ils maintenant apres ces beaux resultats ? 
Its se cachent de Mechtas en_ Mechtas comme des betes traquees et non 
comme des Moudjahadines. 
Its egorgent leurs freres Musulmans qui desirent vivre en Paix. 
Its attaquent les femmes, Ies enfants. 
MAIS OU SONT LES GRANDS COMBATS CONTRE L'ARMEE FRANCAISE 
qu'ils evitent soigneusgment et qui devient chaque jour plus forte ? 
IL EST TEMPS DE COMPRENDRE LA NERITU 
Les fellaghas vous ont menti. La France ne quittera jamais I'Algerie 
mais, par contre, eile n'attend que la Paix pour vous traiter comme ses fits, 
vous accorder les droits des citoyens libres, et vous faire beneficier de so 
puissance et de so richesse. Les reformes quelle prepare vous etonneront par 
leur generosite. 
Mais chaque jour est un jour perdu pour vous 
Tout I'argent depense pour les soldats et les fusils ne servira plus pour cons- 
truire vos maisons et nourrir vos enfants. 
TRDVAILLEZ DONC ENFIN dans voire interei ei celul de vos families. 
Aidez les troupes a combattre les fellaghas. 
Prevenez les Postes quand ces derniers se dirigent vers vos Mechtas. 





LES FELLAGA ETAIENT SUR VOTRE TERRI70IRE 
LE 2.6 OC T0 8RE 
VoUS N'AVEZ PAS PREVENU 1E5 ÄUTORITES 
VOUS E%E5 DONC COMPLICES DES F*ELLACGA 
Cýf0151 SSEZ 
ENTRE 
LE FELLAG QUt PILLE ET TUE 









Vous n'avez pas vnulu entendre Pappel du Gouvernement 
francais. 
Vous continuez 3 vous laisser abuser par les rebelles. 
Vous. les accueillez chez, vous. 
Vous refusez d'envoyer vos enfants ä 116co1e et de parti- 
ciper ä la vie administrative. 
Vous commettez des sabotages sur les routes et les lignes 
telephoniques. 
Vous etes camplices des assassinats que commettent les 
rebelles sur les Officiers S. A. S. qui vous apportent du 
travail et de l'argent, ainsi que fordre et la paix dans 
vos villages. 
Ceci justifie les mesvses speciales prises par les AutoritÄs. 
lies concernent le renforcement du ccntröle de vcs acti- 
vites et de vos deplacements. 
** 
Ces mesures seront levees des aue vous aurez compris vos 
erreurs, abanüonne ceux qui vous trompent et retrcuve le 
ciroit cheinin. 
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N"OU5 LE5 ABATTRONS TOUS UN A UN AVEC 
VOTRE AIDE 
CE'JX QU'! LS AUPAIENT ENTRA! NES AVEC 
EUX PAR FORCE ET PAR TRAIT RISE 
QU'/LS *' S'ECHAPPENT 
NOUS LES ACCUE! LLEF? ONS ET NOUS LES 
P4ETTROfVS A L'ABRI EUX'ET LEUR FAMfLLE 
FAITES CONFIANCE A LA GRANDE 
FRANCE 
FIERE ET GENEREUSE --------, 
DIEU LJAIDE 
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1. - Ahmed et Salah, qui vont au souk, sur- 
, prbnnent 
des rebelles en train de parler. 
- Its ecoutent la conversation et apprennent 
que les rebelles vont venir a la mechta pour 
enlever des hommes. 
2. - Ahmed et 
Salah racontent ce qu'ils vies 
nent d'apprendre. 
- Nous voulons vivre en paix, 
disent li 
habitants de la mechta. I) faut prevenir 1! 
militaires francais. 
3. - Les habitants de la mechfa demandent 4. - Les rebelles barbares sont aircteý -ila protection des troupes francaises.. - La mechta pourra vivre en Paix. 
- Its indiquent I"endroit. oü se trouvent les Le silence c'est la guerre, la mort, la mist 








MOHAMED ET KADDOUR AIDENT LES REBELLES A SCIER LES POTEAUX 
MOHAMED ET KADDOUR SONT COMPLICES DES REBELLES - ILS SERONT PUNTS 
ýCo Eý: 
"DES REBELLES EUXAUSSIr 










DES MENSONGES QUI RAPPORTENT 
MUSULMANS, 
On vous a trompes. 
On vous a dit que le Front de la Liberation etait sans fissure et que tous les chefs politiques 
etaient derriere le F. LN. 
Demandez donc ä ce sujet I'avis de MESSALI Hadj. 
On vous a dif que I'Egypte pouvait compter sur des appuis puissants et obtiendrait ä I'O. N. U. 
une condemnation severe de Ia France. 
On vous a dif que jamais les condamnes 6 mort ne seraient executes. 
Que ne vous a-f-on pas dit encore, que de "promesses perdues dans le sang et les larmes. 
Quelle est la realite ? Quelle est la verite ? 
La France sort victorieuse du debat de I'O. N. U. et ceux-lä meme des peuples afro-asiatiques 
qui etaient les plus resolus ä obtenir contre eile une condamnation sans equivoque ont dü, I'Egypre 
en tote, faire stopper un vote qui consacrait leur defaite. 
Quant aux condamnes ä mort, les journaux vous apportent tous les fours des reponses defini- 
tives ä leur sujet, vous confirmant ce que vous saviez deja. La justice franraise est lente peut-etre, 
mais eile veut offrir toutes garanties, etre sereine et impartiale. La decision prise est ensuite implaca- 
cablement EXEC UT EE. 
Pendant que vous souffrez, ceux qui s'intitulent vos chefs, vivent A VOS FRAIS confortablement 
installes ä Oujda ou dans les palaces du Caire ou de New York ä 50.000 francs par jour. 
Leurs representants, sous le pretexte de vous apporter la liberte, dont vous jouissiez pourtant 
deje, sement dans vos douars et vos mechtas la ruine, la souffrance et les deuils. 
Voila le bilan de leurs actions. 
On comprend que ceux qui profitent de votre argent et abusent de votre hospitalite forcee 
ne souhaitent pas voir la fin dune aventure aussi avantageuse pour eux. 
C'est a vous qu'il appartient de mehre un terme ä ces abus. 
Ne vous laissez pas berner plus longtemps. 
Surmontez votre peur. Rejetez definitivement la ferreur qui pese sur vous. Aidez-nous ä demas- 
quer les agitateurs et les assassins. 
Encore un effort de votre part et nous vous delivrerons de leur oppression. Vous pourrez alors 
reprendre normalement vos activites et vivre heureux au milieu de vos families dans une Algerie 
prospere et apaisee. 
Z/ 
KABYLE 
ýcoute la voix de la raison 
Tu vivais Bans la paix. 
Tu allais tranquille sur de belles 
routes pour to rendre au marche. 
Tu etais fier de voir tes enfants 
instruire, de les voir lire et ecrire. 
Ton village etait fier de son ecole. 
Tu es prive de tout. Tes enfants 
pleurent et to reclament ä manger. 
Que de peine il to faut dans ton 
rude pays pour recolter quelques grains 
et economiser un peu Sargent. 
Ton pays est trouble 
Qui s6-ne le d6sordre? 
Qui coupe les routes? 
Tes petits enfants errent dans la 
campagne et sont ignorants 
Qui a brüle l'ecole? 
Ceux qui to privent egorgent les 
moutons et vivent grassement. 
Les bandits ramassent ton argent. 
06 va cet argent? 
Tu etais un homme libre, tu pouvais 
fumer comme il to plaisait. 
Apres une bonne journee, tu aimais 
parler avec tes voisins dans ! 'air calme 
du jour s'acheve, assis pres de to 
maison. 
Tu avais la place de ton ami sur 
une grosse pierre quand il venait 
vers toi. 
C'est interdit. 
Tu vis dans la peur. 
Ta maison est devenue to prison. 
La place est vide. Son sang a peut- 
etre coule. L'auraient-ils egorge? 
Ces heures de souffrance tu ne peux pas les 
laisser en heritage a tes enfants 
PENSE A DEMAIN, SOIS AUJOURD'HUI AVEC NOUS 
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PARLONS POUR DEFENDRE NOTRE VIE ET 
CELLE DE NOS PARENTS 
LE SILENCE EST DANGEREUX ! 
Celui qui se tait quand il a faim, meure sans titre secouru ! 
- Celui qui se tait quand il est egare dans le mensonge, meurt sans revoir 
la lumiere 
- Celui qui se tait quand il est menace, meurt sans eire protege 
LA REBELLION BARBARE 
QUI NOUS OBLIGE A NOUS TAIRE, 
VEUT NOUS FAIRE MOURIR 
Elle pille pour nous affamer. 
Elle nous ment pour nous egarer. 
Elle nous menace pour nous asservir. 
DIEU NO USA DONNE LA PAROLE, 
CESSONS DE NOUS TA IRE 
PARLONS pour eire sauves de la famine ! 
PARLONS pour retrouver la Iumiere de la Write ! 
PARLONS pour echapper ä la terreur ! 
LE SILENCE, 
C'EST LA GUERRE, LA MORT, LA MISERE ! 
LA PAROLE, 
C'EST LA PA IX, LA VIE, LA PROSPERITE ! 
26: 3 
ACTIONS DESTRUCTIVES DES FELLAGHAS 
Reference : Propagande - Fiche No. I 
LA FRANCE CONSTRUIT - LE FELLAGHA DETRUIT 
-Le Fellagha s'impose par la terreur, il egorge femmes, enfants, vieillards. 
2. -11 pretend lutter pour vous liberer des Europeens, mail il assassine surtout les 
Musulmans. 
-I1 pretend lutter contre la misere, mais il brüle vos recoltes, egorge vos 
troupeaux, incendie vous fermes. 
4. -Il pretend lutter pour le progres, mais il detruit les tracteurs, sabote les voies 
ferrees, les lignes telephoniques, (detruit les ponts), les routes, incendie les 
ecoles. 
-Le fellagha pretend lutter pour la liberte, mais par la menace et la terreur, il 
supprime la vötre. 
ýýý 
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